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1.1 The Development of Social Decision-Making: A Neuroscientific 
Perspective 
Humans grow up in highly complex social environments, and most of the 
decisions they make are in the context of social interactions. Already in infancy 
a large proportion of time is spent interacting with caretakers and over the 
course of development social interactions become more prevalent and 
particularly more complex. Social interactions involve a complex set of skills 
that support; (1) understanding and predicting the content of other minds, (2) 
building and maintaining relationships, and (3) taking into account social 
norms. One of the most salient developmental challenges is therefore to develop 
the ability to monitor and regulate thoughts and actions for adaptive behavior in 
social interactions. Indeed, it has been hypothesized that the prolonged period of 
human development and the relatively large neocortex have evolved in order to 
allow for more complex forms of social behavior (Wilson, 2000; Dunbar, 1998).  
The main aim of this thesis is to investigate the hypothesis that the 
development of social behavior is related to developmental changes in different, 
but interacting, brain networks. The thesis will focus on the developmental 
period between late childhood and young adulthood, because this transitional 
period involves a process of major social-reorientation (Nelson et al., 2005; 
Blakemore, 2008). Moreover, the use of recently developed imaging techniques, 
such as Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), indicated that this process of 
social re-orientation is paralleled by significant structural and functional brain 
changes (Blakemore, 2008). 
Understanding the emergence of social behavior in adolescence is of 
importance to society, as this is the critical transition period during which 
children gradually become independent individuals (Steinberg, 2008). 
Furthermore, investigating how adolescent changes in social behavior are 
instantiated in functional brain networks has the potential to enhance our 
understanding of both (1) social development, and (2) the neural correlates of 
social behavior in general. First, while evidence indicates that changes in social 
behavior are co-determined by socio-cultural (Greenfield et al. 2003) and 
internal factors (e.g. hormonal milieu), both must have an impact on the 
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function of brain networks in order to alter behavior. Thus, understanding the 
brain-behavior relation may provide a deeper insight in the mechanisms that 
underlie developmental changes in social behavior. In addition, knowledge of 
how brain development relates to developmental changes in brain function may 
constrain or extend current theories of cognitive development (Mareschal et al., 
2007). Second, because there are regional differences in trajectories of brain 
development, adolescent social development may serve as a natural model for 
the study of how different brain networks contribute to social decision-making 
in general.  
Before turning to the introduction of the empirical chapters, a broader 
background for this thesis will be sketched. First, two specific aspects 
underlying adolescent social decision-making are described in more detail 
(section 1.2). The following section describes how these changes are paralleled 
by structural brain changes (section 1.3). These developmental changes will be 
discussed in the context of neurodevelopmental models that hypothesize that the 
relation between interregional changes in brain structure and social behavior is 
mediated via changes in brain function (Nelson et al., 2005; Blakemore, 2008; 
Johnson, 2011). The next section discusses the advantage of Game Theoretical 
paradigms (economic games) to study the development of social behavior and 
its neural underpinnings (section 1.4). Subsequently, the neuroimaging 
literature on studies of social interactions with adults is reviewed (section 1.5). 
These studies have emphasized the involvement of different neural networks in 
social behavior. Together, the theoretical accounts of social development 
(section 1.2), the neurodevelopment models (section 1.3), and the adult 
neuroimaging studies (section 1.5) will function as essential reference points for 
understanding and interpreting developmental changes in adolescent brain and 
behavior. Finally, an outline of the chapters of this thesis will be provided 
(section 1.6). 
 
1.2 Adolescent social cognitive development: perspective-taking and self-
regulation  
Adolescence is the transitional period between childhood and adulthood which 
is characterized by a unique set of physical, cognitive, emotional, social and 
neurological changes (Steinberg, 2005; Casey et al., 2008). The onset of 
adolescence occurs with the start of puberty and is marked by large changes in 
hormone levels and associated changes in physical appearance (Dahl & Gunner, 
2009). The end of adolescence is less well defined and culturally diverse 
(Choudhury, 2010). It is generally considered to be the moment when the major 
physical changes have taken place, and an individual has attained an 
independent adult role within society (Lerner & Steinberg, 2004). For purposes 
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of this thesis, adolescence is defined as the age period between approximately 
10 and 22 years.  
Adolescence is characterized by a major process of social-reorientation; 
there is an increase in time spent with peers, and there are qualitative changes in 
peer relations (Hartup & Stevens, 1997). The most notable change in the nature 
of social interactions is the shift from a competitive to a more prosocial1 attitude 
(Eisenberg et al., 1991, 1995; O’Brien & Bierman, 1988; Schaffer, 1996; Van 
Lange, et al., 1997). These changes in social behavior during adolescence are 
thought to stabilize between middle and late adolescence (Eisenberg et al., 
1991, 1995; Schaffer, 1996). Indeed, a prosocial orientation is often considered 
a marker of attaining adult maturity that is accepted by both adolescents and 
adults (Eisenberg et al., 2005). This thesis concerns the developmental changes 
in adolescent social behavior, particularly changes in prosocial behavior in 
interactions with peers, and how these relate to developmental changes in brain 
function. The theoretical perspectives, that form the background for 
understanding the relation between brain and behavioral development, are 
inspired by traditional theories of cognitive development. Within this tradition 
two dominant strands of developmental theories can be identified that suggest 
that developmental changes in prosocial behavior during adolescence are related 
to the development of an increased capability for; (1) perspective-taking 
(Eisenberg et al., 1991, 1995; Kohlberg, 1981; Selman, 1980) and (2) self-
regulation2 (Zimmerman, 2000; Nelson et al., 2005; Steinberg, 2009).  
 
Perspective-taking 
Several developmental theories that explain adolescent changes in social 
interactions in terms of an increased capability for social perspective-taking 
(Kohlberg, 1981; Eisenberg et al., 1995)3. In general, these theories posit that 
during development, adolescents learn to better understand the perspective of 
the other and to coordinate between the different perspectives of self, others and 
society, which in turn may lead to changes prosocial behavior (Martin, Sokol & 
                                                 
1 Prosocial behavior refers to "voluntary actions that are intended to help or benefit another 
individual or group of individuals" (Eisenberg and Mussen 1989, p. 3). These behaviors include a 
broad range of activities such as sharing, reciprocating, helping and abiding social norms.  
2 The processes of perspective-taking and self-regulation are not considered mutually exclusive or 
collectively exhaustive in explaining social development. That is, they are not mutually exclusive 
because it is not perspective-taking or self-regulation alone but in most cases the two processes 
together that will determine social development. Further, they are not collectively exhaustive 
because these two processes are also not the only driving forces in social development, for 
instance affective development (for a broader overview see; Steinberg, 2009; Ernst et al., 2008). 
3 Perspective-taking is sometimes called ‘mentalizing’, and comprises the ability to recognize 
others and evaluate their mental states (intentions, desires and beliefs), feelings, enduring 
dispositions and actions (Blakemore, 2008). 
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Elfers, 2008). In support of this hypothesis there is experimental evidence that 
adolescents become more skilled in taking the perspective of others (Choudhury 
et al., 2006; Dumontheil et al., 2010). These studies show that while the most 
basic theory of mind tasks are passed at around age four (Frith & Frith, 2007), 
the ability to take the perspective of the other still develops until late 
adolescence. More importantly, there is evidence for a modest positive 
correlation between perspective-taking and prosocial behavior in adolescence 
(Underwood & Moore, 1987).  
Note, however, that an increased perspective-taking ability can also be used 
for strategic or anti-social purposes, such as lying and cheating (Rotenberg, 
1991; Beate & Frith, 1992). Thus, although perspective-taking has generally 
been related to increases in prosocial behavior in the context of everyday 
scenarios (Underwood & Moore, 1987) it can, in specific situations, also lead to 
a decrease in prosocial behavior (e.g. in interactions with disliked peers) 
 
Self-regulation 
Self-regulation in context of social behavior refers to the capacity to alter one’s 
own behavior, in accordance to certain standards, ideals or goals either 
stemming from internal or societal expectations (e.g. personal or social norms; 
Baumeister & Vohs, 2007). The two important aspects of self-regulation are 
monitoring and adaptation. First, monitoring is necessary because the social 
environment is dynamic and constantly changing over the course of 
performance (Zimmerman, 2000). An important aspect of monitoring behavior 
is attending to, and processing, internally or externally generated feedback 
signals. Second, feedback signals may indicate behavioral change is needed; in 
that case control needs to be exercised in order to successfully adapt behavior. 
In the context of complex social environments, the ability to control the 
expression of emotional tendencies in the service of goal achievement 
represents a particularly important skill. For instance, in a social context, 
individuals need to be able to inhibit appetitive or angry behavior (Blair & 
Cipolotti, 2000). In general, studies show gradual increases in the capacity for 
self-regulation through adolescence, with gains continuing into young 
adulthood (Steinberg et al. 2008). These developmental improvements of self-
regulation are shown to be related to increases in social competence or adaptive 
social behavior (Kopp, 1982; Nelson et al., 2005; Steinberg, 2009). For 
instance, the increase in prosocial behavior across adolescence is related to an 
increased capacity to suppress selfish impulses and forgo short term benefits, in 
order to acquire the long term benefits of cooperative behavior (Steinberg, 
2009). Although, developmental change in self-regulation is often attributed to 
an increase in the strength of regulatory systems involved in the adaptation of 
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behavior (e.g. for the suppression of selfish impulses), it may also be attributed 
to the maturation of monitoring processes (e.g. tracking the dynamic changes in 
the social environment). Finally, similar to perspective-taking, the capacity to 
self-regulate will not necessarily lead to increased prosocial behavior. The need 
to self-regulate is dependent on the internal or external goals, and these might 
be set to achieve anti-social ends.  
 
In sum, the developing capacities for perspective-taking and self-regulation 
are important factors in the developmental changes in prosocial behavior across 
adolescence. Although these skills are in and of themselves neutral, an increase 
in either of these skills is generally positively related to prosocial behavior 
during normative adolescent development. 
It is the hypothesis that structural changes in the developing brain are 
associated with functional changes in brain networks underlying perspective-
taking and self-regulation, and that these changes make an important 
contribution to the development of adolescent social behavior (Nelson et al., 
2005; Steinberg, 2005; Ernst et al., 2008). The next section will summarize 
recent findings on adolescent structural brain development, and subsequently 
present recent neurodevelopmental models that will provide a framework for 
understanding the link between brain changes and changes in behavior.  
 
1.3 Adolescent Brain Development 
Early studies of post-mortem brain tissue revealed that the prefrontal cortex of 
the human brain still shows great changes in synaptic development well into the 
adolescent period (Huttenlocher, 1979). Additionally, Huttenlocher’s work has 
shown that different areas in the brain show different developmental trajectories 
in synaptic density (Huttenlocher & Dabholkar, 1997). For instance, the 
synaptic density of the auditory cortex stabilizes at around age twelve, whereas 
the prefrontal cortex showed development until at least mid-adolescence.  
Grey matter as measured with MRI is proposed to represent the cell bodies, 
synapses, unmyelinated axons and neuropil. The developmental pattern of grey 
matter is thought to reflect, at least in part, the processes of synaptogenesis 
followed by synaptic elimination, or pruning (Huttenlocher, 1979). Several 
studies have reported a non-linear ‘inverted -U’ shaped pattern of grey matter 
development (Giedd et al., 1999; Shaw et al., 2008; Gogtay & Thompson, 
2010). The general pattern of grey matter development shows an increase across 
the cortex prior to puberty, followed by a post-puberty decline. The rise and 
decline in grey matter follows non-linear patterns and varies depending on the 
region. The first to mature are the sensorimotor regions, followed by other parts 
of the cortex in a posterior to anterior direction, with the prefrontal cortex being 
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one of the last areas to develop (Gogtay & Thompson, 2010). Furthermore, the 
developmental trajectories of GM vary also within the prefrontal cortex (Gogtay 
& Thompson, 2010), which could account for differences in rate of 
development of different control functions associated with these areas (Crone et 
al., 2006). Correlational studies have shown that differences in prefrontal grey 
matter volume are associated with individual differences in (anti-)social 
behavior (Sterzer et al., 2007), suggesting that local quantities of grey matter 
density may be related to the regulation of social behavior.  
In contrast to grey matter, white matter development follows a more linear 
trajectory, increasing in volume and density during the first two decades of life 
(Paus et al., 2001). Increases in white matter volume have often been associated 
with the myelination of axons, but recently it has also been suggested that this 
could be an effect of increases in axon caliber (Paus, 2010). Both myelination 
and increases in axon caliber are thought to be associated with increases in 
processing speed. Studies which focused on structural connectivity using 
diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) demonstrated that there are still large changes in 
the fiber tracts that link different brain regions, particularly a rewiring of 
subcortical-cortical and a strengthening of cortico-cortical connectivity 
(Supekar et al., 2009; Schmithorst & Yuan, 2010). These connectivity measures  
have been related to individual differences in adolescent risk-taking (Berns et 
al., 2009), impulsivity (Olson et al., 2008) and resistance to peer influence (Paus 
et al., 2008). Thus, there is robust evidence that besides changes in cortical grey 
matter there are also relations between white matter/structural connectivity and 
individual differences in traits or behaviors (Cohen et al., 2009).  
This brief review showed that there are still substantial changes in brain 
structures during adolescence4. Importantly, some studies showed a relationship 
between structural differences and individual differences in behavior. This 
raises the question how changes in brain structure relate to changes in behavior. 
Although the relation between changes in brain structure and brain function is 
currently not well understood, most of the current developmental models 
hypothesize that these structural changes contribute to the development of 
adolescent behavior via changes in brain function (Nelson et al., 2005; 
Steinberg, 2005; Ernst et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2011).  
 
 
                                                 
4 It is important to note that these developmental changes in brain structure are considered to be 
the result of an interaction between genetic programs and experience. When viewing the images 
of structural changes in the brain it is tempting to interpret them as the result of a genetically 
predetermined building plan but in many cases this is incorrect. Take for example synaptic 
pruning; during this process the synaptic connections that are used are kept and those that are not 
used are pruned, thus, the result is strongly determined by environmental input and behavior. 
Introduction 15
Frameworks for understanding development of brain and behavior 
Most of the earlier models that were inspired by the novel findings of 
developmental MRI research hypothesized that the regional differences in 
structural brain development result in separable developmental trajectories of 
the specialized functions related to these brain areas. According to this 
framework brain areas are considered mature when they show an adult pattern 
of functional activity. Furthermore, because structural development shows 
linear as well as non non-linear patterns, these models predict linear and non-
linear developmental changes in brain function and cognitive skills5.  
In support of these models, the earliest studies on the development of brain 
function have shown to broadly parallel the findings of structural brain 
development. Most of these studies that have used functional MRI (fMRI), a 
technique that makes it possible to examine brain functioning in vivo while 
participants are performing certain tasks. Consistent with the predictions of the 
earlier models, neuroimaging research on developmental populations has shown 
that children and adolescents often use the same network of areas as adults, but 
that the levels and extent of activity may differ between age groups (Casey et 
al., 2005). Furthermore, these studies indicated that those brain areas that 
showed the latest structural development also showed prolonged patterns of 
functional development.  
However, over the past decade several results appeared that seem difficult 
to reconcile with these models. First of all there are brain areas that show an 
adult pattern of activity at a very early age in one task but not in others (Bunge 
& Crone, 2009). Related to these findings are areas that show adult patterns of 
activation long before they would be considered anatomically mature (for 
review see Johnson, 2011). Additionally, a strand of research using novel 
network modeling techniques have investigated the developmental trajectories 
of several brain networks. These studies on the development of large-scale 
functional brain networks have shown that in general short-range connections 
become weaker (segregation) and long-range connections become stronger 
(integration) with age (Fair et al., 2008; Kelly et al., 2008; Supekar et al., 2009). 
These findings emphasize that current neurodevelopmental models should take 
also into account the importance of interregional connectivity, next to the 
maturation of intraregional connections.  
One model that addresses these issues, the model of interactive 
specialization, assumes that functional brain development involves a process of 
organizing patterns of interregional interactions (Johnson, 2005; 2011). 
                                                 
5 Note that most of these theories agree that developmental changes in brain structure are 
considered to be the result of an interaction between genetic programs and experience, and 
therefore that functional changes are also a function of both intrinsic and external factors. 
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According to this view, the response properties of a specific region are partly 
determined by its patterns of connectivity to other regions and, in turn, by the 
patterns of activity of these other regions. During development, activity-
dependent interactions between regions results in functional specialization of 
areas and networks, which may be reflected in both regional changes in 
activation patterns and changes in connectivity between regions. Thus, because 
the function of a brain region is co-determined by its place in a network its 
pattern of activity is also dependent on: (1) the strength of the connectivity with 
other areas, and (2) the level of activity in these other areas. As a result, it is 
possible that in certain situations an area may show similar levels of activations 
for children and adults, but not in others6. 
Additionally, specialization is thought to result in cortical regions or 
networks becoming more specialized in their response properties; they will 
therefore respond less to the non-preferred stimulus or task contexts with 
increasing age. This specialization process may be reflected in changes from 
distributed to focal activation of certain brain areas with age (Durston et al., 
2006), or in the number of areas that are activated within a certain network 
(Scherf et al., 2006; Johnson, 2010).  
From this developmental framework follows the prediction that 
developmental changes in social interactions are related to (1) regional changes 
in activation patterns and (2) changes in connectivity between regions or 
networks that underpin perspective-taking and self-regulation. Before turning to 
a more detailed description of the neural underpinnings of perspective-taking 
and self-regulation, the question how to experimentally study the development 




                                                 
6 This view even further complicates inferring cognitive function from brain activity. As Russel 
Poldrack (2006) argued ‘reverse inference’ from brain activation to cognitive function (2006) is 
not deductively valid, but rather reflects the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent. 
Furthermore, Poldrack proposes a Bayesian approach for estimating the likelihood a specific 
function is associated with a specific brain area. However, according the IS framework it is 
possible that a certain areas functions differently at different stages of development due to its 
changing connections to other areas. That makes ‘regressive reverse inference’ even more 
dangerous because even if there is substantial evidence for cognitive function A being related to 
activation in area B in adult studies this does not tell us how probable it is that cognitive function 
A is also related to function B in children. Thus we should be extra cautious with ‘regressive 
reverse inference’, however, as Poldrack suggested we should not completely refrain from it. And 
in an emerging field, such as developmental neuroimaging, it is probably a necessary evil. 
Nevertheless, it emphasizes the need for strong theoretical predictions when interpreting 
neurodevelopmental data, because these are currently the best protections against misinformed 
inferences.  
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1.4 Studying Social Interactions  
Previous research in developmental psychology on perspective-taking and 
prosocial behavior is mainly based on self- or other-reports. (e.g. parents, peers 
or teachers) Currently, there are a few studies which have shown that there are 
subtle developmental changes on experimental measures of perspective-taking 
during adolescence (e.g. Choudhury et al., 2006; Duhmontheil, et al.2009), but 
these studies did not examine perspective-taking in a social context. 
Furthermore, the correlations between perspective-taking skills and prosocial 
behavior are stronger for self or other-report indices than for responses to 
hypothetical social scenarios (Eisenberg & Schell, 1986). Importantly, this 
suggests that the relation between perspective-taking and social behavior is best 
studied using real social interactions rather than hypothetical social scenarios 
(Gummerum, Hanoch & Keller, 2008). Similarly, most of the research on the 
development of self-regulation is based on questionnaires, and although there 
are some experimental measures, these are not related to social interactions 
(Steinberg, 2009). 
The challenge is therefore to find experimental paradigms which allow for 
the study of the development of perspective-taking and self-regulation in the 
context of social interactions. Additionally, for the purposes of this thesis, these 
paradigms also needed to be suitable for both developmental populations and 
the constraints of MRI research.  
To investigate the psychological and neural correlates of prosocial behavior 
in social interactions, the experiments in this thesis are based on Game 
Theoretical paradigms (economic games) derived from experimental economics 
(Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) and social psychology (Camerer, 2003; 
Sanfey, 2007). In these experiments participants interact with other people in 
simple bargaining or exchange games with real monetary consequences. These 
games often simulate single interactions between two anonymous individuals, 
focusing on the motivations of prosocial behavior. However, the games can also 
consist of multiple interactions over time in order to study the regulation of 
social behavior in a dynamic environment (Kishida et al., 2010). 
The advantage of economic games is that their structural simplicity yields 
precise characterizations of complex social behavior, which makes the 
paradigms also suitable for neuroimaging experiments. A second strength of 
games is that behavior can be operationalized in the same way across age 
groups (Gummerum et al., 2008). Finally, the ecological validity of these games 
has been well assessed in prior work (for a review, see Camerer, 2003). For 
example, prosocial behavior in these games is predicted by participants’ actual 
prosocial behavior in the past (Glaeser et al., 2000) and by their estimation of 
their expected prosocial attitude in real-life situations (van Lange et al., 1997).  
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Next, two economic games, the Trust and Ultimatum Game, will be 
presented in more detail. These two games are used often in the neuroimaging 
literature, and zoom in to several important aspects of prosocial interactions: 
trust, reciprocity and fairness. 
 
Trust, Reciprocity & Fairness in Economic Games 
In the Trust Game (Berg et al., 1995) two players can share a certain amount of 
money. The first player can choose to divide the money equally between herself 
and the second player, or to give it all to the second player with the advantage 
that the stake increases in value (see Figure 1.1). The second player has the 
choice to reciprocate and share the increased amount of money with the first 
player, or to defect and exploit the given trust by keeping the money for herself. 
As a result, the Trust Game models both the decision to trust and to reciprocate 
trust. The Trust Game can be played a single interaction or as an iterated 
multiple-round game. Game Theory predicts that the second player in a single 
interaction Trust Game would never reciprocate the trust given by the first 
player because taking all the money will have no negative future consequences. 
Taken this into account, the first player will therefore also never trust the second 
player. In contrast with these predictions experimental data show that most 
people trust the second player, and also that the second player’s trust is 
generally reciprocated (Camerer, 2003).  
In iterative multiple round Trust Games, when the same participants interact 
over a number of rounds, the theoretical predictions and actual behavioral 
strategies change (Axelrod, 1984). Studies with multiple round games have 
shown that participants often play a tit-for-tat like strategy (Wedekind & 
Milinski, 1996; Nowak & Sigmund, 1992). That is, if the second player shared 
in the previous round the first player will trust in the following round (positive 
reciprocity), and if the second player did not share in the previous round the 
first player will react by not trusting in the next round (negative reciprocity). 
Because of their dynamic nature, these types of games are a useful tool for 
investigating the processes involved in the monitoring and regulation of social 
interactions (King-Casas et al., 2008; Kishida et al., 2010).  
The second economic game of interest, the Ultimatum Game (Guth et al., 
1982), is a bargaining game in which the first player (proposer) is given a sum 
of money to share with the second player (responder). If the responder accepts 
the amount offered by the proposer, the money is split between the two as 
proposed. However, if the responder considers the proposed split unfair and 
rejects the offer, neither player receives any money (See Figure 1.1). Game 
Theory predicts that responders will always accept offers that are larger than 
zero, because rejecting would leave them with less. However, on average, 
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responders already start rejecting offers less than 40% of the stake, suggesting 
that their decisions are not only driven by material interests but are also based 























Figure 1.1 An example of the Trust Game and the Ultimatum Game. The graph of 
the Ultimatum Game represents two possible offers that a first player can make: an 
unfair (8 for self 2 for the other) and a fair (equal split, 5 for each) offer. If the 
second player rejects both players end up with nothing, regardless of the offer. 
 
To conclude, these two simple games have been successfully applied in 
many studies to investigate different aspects of prosocial behavior in social 
interactions. The one-shot single interaction Trust and Ultimatum games have 
proven to be useful to study the role of perspective-taking in social decision-
making (Pillutla, et al., 2003; Malhtora et al., 2004; Sutter, 2007; Falk et al., 
2008), whereas the multiple-round versions of these games are useful for 
studying the monitoring and adaptation of social behavior in dynamic social 
environments (Delgado et al., 2005; King-Casas et al., 2005; Krueger et al., 
2007; Behrens et al., 2009). Both types of games are therefore able to capture 
the processes of interest related to the development of social behavior. The next 
    Trust Game            Ultimatum Game 
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section reviews what recent neuroimaging studies have revealed about neural 
mechanism of social decision-making in adults.  
 
1.5 Social Decision-Making and the Brain 
To start, one important insight from neuroimaging studies with economic games 
is that social decision-making is the product of multiple interacting systems 
(Sanfey, 2007; Behrens et al., 2009; Frank et al., 2009). This section will focus 
on those networks of which the associated functions are related to the cognitive 
processes identified earlier as underlying developmental changes in social 
behavior, namely perspective-taking and self-regulation. First, studies of social 
interactions emphasizing the importance of a specific ‘social brain’ network 
(Amodio & Frith; 2006; Hampton et al., 2008) will be addressed. These are 
followed by a review of social interaction studies that have emphasized the 
importance of brain regions with a general role in monitoring (Delgado et al., 
2005; King-Casas et al., 2005) and regulating behavior (van 't Wout et al., 2005; 
Knoch et al., 2008). The function of the different brain networks will be 
discussed in the context of economic games, followed by a review of recent 
evidence of developmental changes within these networks. 
 
First, the ‘social brain’ network (Frith & Frith, 2003; Van Overwalle, 2009), 
thought to be involved in thinking about other people’s believes and intentions, 
consists of the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC), temporal poles (TP), 
posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) and the temporal parietal junction 
(TPJ, see Figure 1.2). Prior neuroimaging studies have shown that specifically 
the aMPFC and the TPJ are involved in processes related to perspective-taking. 
For example, neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that aMPFC and TPJ are 
active during theory-of-mind tasks, such as tasks that require participants to 
infer mental states of characters in stories (Fletcher et al., 1995) and cartoons 
(Gallagher et al., 2002) or while watching animations (Castelli et al., 2000). In 
addition, prior studies have suggested that in context the context of social 
interactions the aMPFC is involved in evaluating the mental content of others in 
relation to the self (Amodio & Frith, 2006), whereas the TPJ is thought to be 
important for redirecting or focusing attention on the other (Saxe et al., 2004; 
Mitchell, 2008; Hampton et al., 2008; Blakemore, 2008; Van Overwalle, 2009). 
For instance, aMPFC activity has been reported when participants trust another 
individual, with the expectation of increasing their own pay-off (McCabe et al., 
2001). On the other hand, the TPJ activity was increased when participants 
considered the intentions of other player in a competitive game (Halko et al., 
2009). These results suggest that in social interactions the aMPFC is important 
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for the evaluation of own outcomes, whereas TPJ activation may indicate a 
focus on the outcomes of others.  
 
Figure 1.2 Schematic representation of the networks of brain areas involved in social 
decision-making: aMPFC = anterior Medial Prefrontal Cortex, TPJ = Temporal 
Parietal Junction, pSTS = posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus, TP = Temporal Poles, 
Vstr = Ventral Striatum, A = Amygdala, VMPFC = Ventro Medial Prefrontal Cortex 
OFC = Orbito frontal Cortex, dACC = dorsal Anterior Cingulate, DLPFC = 
Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortrex, VLPFC = Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortrex, PPC = 
Posterior Parietal Cortex.  
 
Second, this ‘social brain’ network is found to work together with areas that 
are involved in the regulation of social behavior. This regulatory network 
includes the lateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC & DLPFC), dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex (dACC) and the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) (Botvinick et 
al. 2001, Miller & Cohen, 2001, Pochon et al. 2008). In the context of social 
interactions it is thought that the dACC is involved in signaling a conflict of 
interest. For instance, the dACC is more active in case of an unfair offer in the 
ultimatum game, when there is a conflict between social norms (it is unfair) and 
personal interest (it is an amount of money for me) (Sanfey et al., 2003). Other 
studies have shown that the DLPFC is also more active when a norm is violated, 
such as an unfair offer in the Ultimatum Game (Sanfey et al., 2003; van't Wout 
et al., 2005; Knoch et al., 2006; Tabibnia et al., 2008). It has been suggested that 
in those cases when there is conflict between different motivational drives the 
higher level control areas, such as the DLPFC, have a role in regulating social 
behavior (Sanfey, 2007; Frith & Singer, 2008). In this example, the DLPFC is 
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thought to have a role in controlling the selfish impulse to accept a small 
amount of money, in order to (costly) punish the other player for violating a 
social norm (Knoch et al., 2008).  
Additionally, there is a network that includes the striatum, ventral medial 
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and insula, which is involved in monitoring the 
behavior of self and others in multi-round games (Delgado et al., 2005; King-
Casas et al., 2005; Krueger et al., 2007; Behrens et al., 2009). The neuroimaging 
studies of social interactions showed that the insula is engaged when social 
norms are violated. For example, the insula shows increased activity during 
unreciprocated trust (Montague & Lohrenz, 2007; Rilling et al., 2008) and 
unfair proposals in the Ultimatum Game (Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia et al., 
2008). In contrast, striatum and VMPFC activity correlate positively with 
cooperation choices in the Trust Game (Rilling et al., 2004; Krueger et al., 
2008). Thus, these areas seem to be involved in signaling and learning the 
pleasant and unpleasant aspects of social interactions, which may explain how 
lower level affective processes contribute to  the regulation of social behavior 
(Sanfey, 2007). 
 
Social Decision-Making and the Developing Brain 
Finally, although the development of these networks has not been studied 
specifically in the context of social interactions, age related changes in brain 
function have been observed in each of these networks separately.  
First, a series of studies have investigated functional changes in the social 
brain network during adolescence in passive social paradigms that involved 
thinking about self and others. In general, these studies showed an age related 
shift in activation from the aMPFC to the TPJ (for review see Blakemore, 
2008). It can be hypothesized that this age related shift in pattern of activity 
reflects that early adolescents still rely more on self-reflective processes 
performed by the aMPFC, whereas later in adolescence they are more engaged 
in other-focused processes performed by the TPJ. This shift in processing of 
social stimuli is consistent with descriptive theories that suggest an important 
relation between a shift in perspective-taking and the development of prosocial 
behavior during adolescence (Eisenberg et al., 1995, 2001). 
Second, developmental studies of performance monitoring have shown that 
networks involved in the regulation of behavior, such as the ACC and DLPFC 
develop until late adolescence. First, age related increases in the error-related 
negativity (ERN), a scalp potential thought to reflect dACC activity, are 
consistently reported across studies (Davies et al., 2004; Ladouceur et al., 
2004). These changes in the ERN are suggested to reflect an age related 
increase in the ability to monitor feedback signals and regulate subsequent 
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behavior. Consistent with these results, recent neuroimaging studies have shown 
age related changes in dACC, DLPFC and PPC in performance monitoring until 
late adolescence (Crone et al., 2008; van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2008). Given the 
role of the these areas in adult social decision-making, it can be hypothesized 
that the reported developmental changes in brain activation contribute to the 
ability to monitor and regulate social behavior in relation to internal and 
external goals (e.g. personal and social norms).  
 
In sum, adult neuroimaging studies of social interactions have shown that 
there are multiple networks of brain areas that are related to the capacities of 
perspective-taking and self-regulation in social decision-making. Furthermore, 
there is evidence that developmental changes take place in these networks until 
late adolescence. From these results follows the prediction that the 
developmental changes in perspective-taking will be related to the function of 
the ‘social brain’ network, whereas developmental changes in self-regulation 
are expected to be found in networks involved in monitoring and regulating 
social behavior. Furthermore, the prediction from these studies, and neuro-
developmental models, is that developmental outcomes are also the result of the 
interplay between these different networks. The experiments described in this 
thesis aimed at investigating the developmental changes in functional activity, 
and connectivity within these networks, to further our understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying social development across adolescence.  
 
1.6 Outline of current thesis and publications 
In the first empirical chapter (Chapter 2) a child friendly version of the Trust 
Game is developed. The Developmental Trust Game (DTG) is a Trust Game 
with outcome manipulations that allowed testing the sensitivity for the 
perspectives of others. In the following chapter (Chapter 3) the DTG paradigm 
was used to explore the neural correlates of reciprocating trust in relation to 
individual differences in social value orientation and perspective-taking 
manipulations in an adult population. The two subsequent chapters describe 
developmental changes in neural correlates of perspective-taking in reciprocal 
behavior (Chapter 4) and fairness judgments (Chapter 5). In Chapter 6 a 
child friendly behavioral paradigm to study developmental changes in multiple 
social interactions is introduced; the Simultaneous Trust Game (STG). The two 
subsequent studies have investigated the neurodevelopmental changes of 
feedback processing while performing a probabilistic learning task. The first 
study (Chapter 7) investigated the developmental changes in feedback 
processing in the context of learned rules, focusing on the dACC, PCC and 
DLPFC network, whereas the second study (Chapter 8) investigated the 
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neurodevelopmental changes of feedback during the learning phase in the same 
task. The second study focused on the developmental changes in connectivity 
strength within the striatum-medial prefrontal network. Although the latter two 
studies of feedback processing are not conducted in the context of social 
decision-making paradigms, they provide important building blocks for 
interpreting the developmental changes in the processes underlying self-
regulation in social behavior. In the final chapter (Chapter 9) the results of the 
empirical studies will be summarized and discussed   
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We investigate the development of two types of prosocial behavior, trust and 
reciprocity, as defined using a game-theoretical task that allows investigation 
of real-time social interaction, among 4 age groups from 9 to 25 years. By 
manipulating the possible outcome alternatives, we could distinguish among 
important determinants of trust and reciprocity that are related to the risk and 
benefit of trusting. The results demonstrate age related changes in sensitivity 
to outcome for others from late childhood until late adolescence, with 
different developmental trajectories for trust and reciprocity and differential 





Adolescence is a developmental period characterized not only by physical and 
hormonal changes but also by substantial changes in social behavior (Steinberg, 
2005). Most notable is change in the nature of social interactions, from 
competitive to more prosocial behavior (Eisenberg, Carlo, Murphy, & van 
Court, 1995; Eisenberg, Miller, Shell, McNalley & Shea, 1991; O’Brien & 
Bierman, 1988; Schaffer, 1996; Van Lange, Otten, de Bruin & Joireman, 1997). 
Developmental theorists suggest that a prosocial attitude develops during 
adolescence as a part, or as a consequence of, the development of increased 
capability for social perspective-taking (Eisenberg et al., 1991, 1995; Kohlberg, 
1981; Selman, 1980). 
With development, adolescents learn to better understand the perspective of 
the other and to coordinate between the different perspectives of self, others and 
society (Martin, Sokol & Elfers, 2008).Perspective-taking is a complex, multi-
factor construct; yet there is evidence for at least a weak correlation between 
perspective-taking and prosocial behavior in adolescence (Underwood & 
Moore, 1982). Notably, these correlations are stronger for self-report indices 
than for responses to hypothetical scenarios of prosocial behavior (Eisenberg & 
Schell, 1986), suggesting that prosocial behavior is best studied using real-life 
rather than hypothetical social scenarios. Here, we study the development of 
Chapter 2 28 
prosocial behavior using a two-person interaction game, and we define 
perspective-taking as the ability to consider outcomes for self in relation to 
outcomes of others. 
Game-theoretical studies can provide an authentic social interaction context 
in which a ‘theory of mind in action’ can be investigated experimentally 
(Gummerum, Hanoch & Keller, 2008). In contrast to studies involving 
hypothetical scenarios, decisions in games have real consequences. Players 
allocate real money between themselves and the other player and are paid 
according to their decisions.Consequently, behavior in games may be more 
similar to that in real-life contexts. Another strength of using games as a 
measure of prosocial behavior is that behavior can be operationalized in the 
same way across age groups (Gummerum et al., 2008). One such game, the 
Trust Game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995), is of particular interest for 
understanding the changes in social cognition that occur during adolescence 
because it allows us to separately examine two important types of prosocial 
behavior, trust and reciprocity. 
Trust and reciprocity can be considered key elements of prosocial behavior. 
Proscocial behavior is often characterized by exchanges of favors between non-
related individuals (Camerer, 2003). Often these exchanges of favors are 
separated in time, such that a favor will only be returned on a future occasion. 
Trust in positive reciprocity at future times is therefore essential to initiate a 
cooperative interaction. Additionally, reciprocity is necessary to maintain social 
relationships; if favors are not returned relationships may be short-lived (Lahno, 
1995). 
In the Trust Game, two anonymous players are involved in dividing an 
amount of money. The first player, the trustor, has the possibility of dividing a 
certain amount of money between self and other. However, the trustor can also 
decide to give all the money to the other who then is able to divide the money; 
in that case the total amount that is divided between the two players increases. If 
the second player gets the chance to decide how the money is divided, he or she 
is confronted with two options—to equally share the money (reciprocate) or to 
keep most of the money and to give only a small amount to the first player 
(exploit)7. As a consequence, the first player has the possibility of gaining more 
money if he or she decides to give the money to the second player. However, in 
doing so the first player also takes the risk that the second player will not 
reciprocate. Typical findings in the Trust Game are that adults often choose to 
trust and reciprocate, even when doing so is potentially costly (Berg et al., 1995; 
                                                 
7 Following Malhotra (2004), we use the terms ‘reciprocate’ and ‘exploit’ to describe the two 
options of player 2. Other common terminology is ‘honoring trust’ versus ‘abuse of trust’ (e.g., 
Buskens, 2003). Note that these labels were not used to explain the paradigm to the participants. 
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Bolle, 1995; Dufwenberg & Gneezy, 2000; Ortmann, Fitzgerald, & Boeing, 
2000; McCabe, Houser, Ryan, Smith, & Trouard, 2001). 
In this study, we examine the development of trust and reciprocity in the 
context of social interaction with anonymous others in the Trust Game. The 
study is different from studies in which the social interaction examined is with 
friends, peers or parents (Bernath & Feshbach, 1995; Brett & Willard, 2002; 
Laursen & Hartup, 2002; Rotenberg et al., 2005; Youniss, 1980). The 
anonymous method allowed us to examine amore generalized form of trust and 
reciprocity, underlying all forms social interactions (Rotenberg et al., 2005). 
The ecological validity of these games has been well assessed in prior work (for 
a review, see Camerer, 2003). For example, trust behavior in the Trust Game 
has been shown to be predicted by participants’ actual trust behavior in the past 
(Glaeser et al., 2000) and by their estimation of reliability in real-life situations 
(Rotenberg et al., 2005).  
A prior developmental study using the Trust Game has demonstrated an 
increase in trust and reciprocity with increasing age among participants of 6 age 
groups (8, 12, 16, 22, 32, and 68 years; Sutter & Kocher, 2007). With age, 
participants offered more money and also returned more money; this behavior 
stabilized between 16 and 22 years of age. 
Both trust and reciprocity as defined here are hypothesized to require social 
perspective-taking abilities, in order to recognize the intentions of the trustor 
and predict whether the trusted person is likely to reciprocate (Pillutla, Malhotra 
& Murnighan, 2003; Malhotra, 2004). Based on the theoretical framework that 
presupposes a relation between development of prosocial behavior and social 
perspective-taking (Martin et al., 2008), our goals were to investigate the 
processes related to perspective-taking that may account for changes in trust and 
reciprocity and to identify the developmental trajectories. 
To address these questions, we developed a developmentally appropriate 
version of the Trust Game (Berg et al., 1995), the Developmental Trust Game 
(DTG). The DTG is presented in a computerized format and is appropriate for 
younger participants because the monetary amounts players must divide 
between themselves are represented with coins instead of numbers and the 
amounts are relatively small (1–20). The task thus poses a similar level of 
cognitive difficulty for the youngest children and for late adolescents (for other 
examples, see Crone & van den Molen, 2004). As in prior studies with adults 
(Malhotra, 2004), we presented participants with a fixed two-choice paradigm, 
in which player 1 (the trustor) has the possibility to either trust or not trust the 
other player. Player 2 (the trustee) also has two choices, to reciprocate and 
divide money about equally, or to exploit and keep most of the money (see Fig. 
2.1). 




Figure 2.1: The sequence of visual displays that represent the different stages of the 
Children’s Trust Game (DTG). Each round starts with the identification of each player 
and the designation of player 1 and player 2. Then the game starts and each player is 
presented with the complete decision tree. At this point player 1 can decide not to trust 
and the game ends. If player 1 decides to trust, the box with the name of player 2 is 
highlighted. Subsequently player 2 ends the game by either exploiting or reciprocating. 
The stakes are represented by a number of 10-cent coins in boxes next to the names of 
the players. Note that the labels on this figure are for illustrative purposes only and were 
not visible to the participants. 
 
To examine the role of perspective-taking, defined as the ability to consider 
the intentions of and consequences for others, we added experimental 
manipulations to the original Trust Game that may reveal whether participants 
are taking the intentions of others and consequences for others into account 
(Pillutla et al., 2003; Malhotra, 2004). We manipulated two factors that may 
affect trust and reciprocity decisions: the risk of making a decision to trust (risk) 
and the extent to which a decision to trust is beneficial to the trustee (benefit). 
Therefore, this design has the potential to reveal more specific developmental 
changes relative to reports on the average levels of trust and reciprocity among 
different age groups. 
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Risk, benefit and perspective-taking: developmental paths in trust and 
reciprocity. 
Trusting always involves a certain amount of risk. When a favor is provided, 
there is always a chance that it will not be reciprocated. Following Malhotra 
(2004), we therefore manipulated risk for the trustor by varying the outcome 
that player 1 can obtain if player 1 decides not to trust player 2 (see Fig. 2.2).  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Visual representation of the 4 experimental conditions: (A) high risk and 
high benefit, (B) high risk and low benefit, (C) low risk and high benefit and (D) low 
risk and low benefit. 
 
In the high-risk conditions, player 1 ensures a high outcome by deciding not 
to trust player 2. A decision to trust player 2 means that player 1 takes a high 
risk by forfeiting assurance of this high outcome. In the low risk conditions, 
player 1 stands to gain only a relatively low outcome. A decision to trust player 
2 means that player 1 takes only a low risk by forfeiting assurance of a 
relatively low outcome (Fig. 2.2). 
Consistent with Malhotra (2004), who used a similar manipulation to vary 
risk, we predicted that player 1’s trust decisions would be affected by our risk 
manipulation. Participants should less often opt to trust player 2 when facing a 
high-risk decision than when facing a low-risk decision. Because the risk 
manipulation only affects own outcome for the trustor, and therefore does not 
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require extensive perspective-taking skills, we expected to see a similar effect of 
increased risk on player 1’s decision to trust at all ages. 
With regard to player 2’s decisions to reciprocate, we did expect age 
effects. Increased risk for the trustor may increase the amount of reciprocity by 
the trustee. In that case the trustee will reciprocate the risk taken by the trustor. 
Note, however, that it requires the trustee to take the perspective of the other in 
order to recognize the risk taken by the trustor. Because perspective-taking is 
thought to develop in adolescence, we expected that that the increase of 
reciprocity with risk would be larger for adults than for younger participants. 
In addition to the risk for the trustor, we also considered the extent to which 
a decision to trust would benefit the trustee (Malhotra, 2004). Being trusted 
always involves a certain benefit, which one might or might not reciprocate. 
Following Malhotra (2004),we therefore also manipulated the benefit for the 
trustee (player 2) by varying the outcome that player 2 obtains if player 1 
decides not to trust player 2. In the low-benefit conditions, player 2 is already 
assured a high outcome if player 1 decides not to trust player 2. A decision to 
trust player 2, is therefore only of limited benefit to player 2. In the high-benefit 
conditions, player 2 receives only a relatively low outcome if player 1 decides 
not to trust player 2. A decision to trust player 2 is therefore highly beneficial to 
player 2 (Fig. 2.2). 
It is important to distinguish between decisions to trust (player 1 decisions) 
and decisions to reciprocate (player 2 decisions). With regard to decisions to 
reciprocate, it seems likely that trustees are more likely to reciprocate when the 
benefit for being trusted is higher. In other words, we anticipated that 
participants would value the fact that the trustor takes their benefit into account 
by subsequently reciprocating. Note, however, that for the trustee to recognize 
that the trustor took their benefit into account requires perspective-taking. 
Furthermore, we predict that trustors are more likely to trust when the benefit 
for the trustee is higher, anticipating the previously proposed increased 
generosity. Note again that this effect requires the trustor to take the perspective 
of the trustee; it requires making an inference of the effect of benefit on the state 
of mind, and subsequent behavior, of the trustee. Thus, in contrast to the risk 
manipulation, an effect of benefit always requires a certain amount of 
perspective-taking for both trustor and trustee. Therefore, we expect high 
benefit to lead to an increase in trust and reciprocity. We expect this benefit 
effect to be stronger for adults and possibly even absent for the youngest 
participants. 
In addition to the manipulation of benefit and trust we included a control 
condition to make sure that participants of all ages, especially the youngest, 
understand the structure of the game. In the control condition it was always best 
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to trust and to reciprocate, because this would lead to the highest gains for both 
parties. Therefore, we expect no age differences in trust or reciprocity in the 
control condition. 
We designed the experiment such that participants played multiple games as 
both trustor and trustee. This design allowed us to examine both trust and 
reciprocity in the same individual. Importantly, participants were instructed that 





Our sample included 92 participants (49 male) in four age groups: late 
childhood (M age = 9.43, SD = .59, 12 male, 11 female), early adolescence (M 
age = 12.35, SD = .56, 17 male, 9 female), middle adolescence (M age = 15.65, 
SD = .58, 9 male, 14 female) and late adolescence (M age = 22.3, SD = 2.4, 11 
male, 9 female). Chi-square analyses indicated that gender distributions did not 
differ significantly by age. Children and adolescents were recruited from local 
schools. Adults were university students. 
Participants were selected from schools whose populations have common 
Dutch ethnicity and were mostly Caucasian. Child and adolescent participants 
were selected with the help of their teachers (children with learning or 
psychiatric disorders were excluded); informed consent was obtained from a 
primary caregiver. 
 
2.2.2 Developmental Trust Game 
The Developmental Trust Game (DTG, Fig. 2.1) is a version of the Trust Game 
(Berg et al., 1995; Malhotra, 2004) appropriate for a wide age range. The DTG 
presents small amounts of money with a number of 10-cent coins in each box of 
a decision tree.  
In each trial, participants were randomly assigned to the role of player 1 (the 
trustor) or player 2 (the trustee) by a display that was presented for 2500 ms. 
This screen displayed the first name and picture of both players. After the roles 
of the participant and the other player were assigned, the trial started. The other 
player was always matched for age and gender. Participants were told that a 
different anonymous individual would be paired with them at each trial. 
However, they actually played against a computer simulation. 
Player 1: Trustor. When the participant was assigned the role of player 1 
(trustor), the task involved two steps. First, at the beginning of the trial the 
participant saw the complete decision tree and had to choose between two 
options: to trust or not to trust. The whole decision tree was represented such 
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that the player could always see the risk and benefit for each possible choice. If 
the participant decided not to trust, the coins were divided between the players 
as represented by the number of coins in each box. If the participant decided to 
trust, the number of coins in the game was increased and the control of the 
outcome was in the hands of player 2 (trustee). The choice of the participant 
(player 1) was presented on the outcome screen by a change in the color of the 
boxes. The participant then waited for the choice of player 2. The participant 
was told that the other player made his or her decisions through an internet 
connection but in reality the choice was made by the computer program after a 
variable delay of 2–4 s (see Table 2.1 for computerized response pattern). The 
presentation of this decision was displayed by changing the color of the box 
representing the choice of the other player. The presentation of the outcome of 
the trial was displayed for 3 s. 
Player 2: Trustee. When the participant was assigned the role of player 2 
(trustee), the task also involved two steps. First, the participant awaited the 
choice of player 1. The participant was told that player 1 would make a decision 
through an internet connection. In reality, the choice was made by the computer, 
and the choice was presented within a 3–5 s interval. At this stage, if player 1 
chose to trust, the participant was presented with two options: reciprocate or 
exploit. If player 2 decided to exploit, player 2 would take most of the money 
and player 1would get fewer coins than in the no-trust option. If player 2 
reciprocated the coins were shared equally and both players received more 
coins, compared to the no-trust option. Risk for the trustor (high versus low) 
and benefit for the trustee (high versus low) were manipulated, similar to the 
paradigm used by Malhotra (2004) (see Fig. 2.2). The risk manipulation 
determined the risk involved in trusting for player 1. If the risk was low, player 
1 could potentially lose a small number of coins by trusting player 2 if player 2 
chose to exploit the trust (e.g., a loss of 1 coin compared to the no-trust option, 
see Fig. 2.2 C and D). In contrast, when the risk was high, player 1 could 
potentially lose a relatively large number of coins by trusting player 2 (e.g., a 
loss of 4 coins, see Fig. 2.2 A and B). The benefit manipulation determined the 
benefit for player 2 of being trusted by player 1. In the low-benefit condition, 
player 2 would get a large number of coins in the no-trust option; therefore the 
benefit of being trusted was rather small (Fig. 2.2 B and D). The number of 
coins for player 2 in the no-trust option in the high-benefit condition was small. 
As a result, there was a large increase of coins (benefit) for player 2 in the case 
of trust (Fig. 2.2 A and C). The control condition entailed a decision tree in 
which the option to trust always resulted in a higher pay-off than the no-trust 
option, regardless of the choice made by player 2. 
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Table 2.1. Computer simulations of trust and reciprocity for each condition. 
 High Risk Low Risk 
 Trust Reciprocate Trust Reciprocate 
High Benefit 47% 73% 60% 67% 
Low Benefit 33% 27% 53% 20% 
 
A fixed schedule was used for each of the roles and conditions (Table 2.1), 
following previous work (Malhotra, 2004). In total, the task consisted of 15 
low-benefit–low-risk trials, 15 low-benefit–high risk trials, 15 high-benefit–
low-risk trials, 15 high-benefit–high-risk trials, and 10 control trials, for both 
the trustor role and the trustee role. Consequently, for each participant the task 
consisted of 140 trials in total. The rounds were presented in random order, and 
there were breaks after every 20 rounds. The experiment was self-paced and 
took between 30 and 45 min to complete. At the end of the experiment a screen 
was presented which displayed the pay-off. The individual pay-off was a 
variable amount between 3 and 5 Euros. Because previous research with the 
trust game paradigm has shown that the size of the stakes does not significantly 
change behavior within different age groups between 8 and 68 years old (Sutter 




Child and adolescent participants were individually tested at their school in a 
quiet room and adult participants were tested in a laboratory, using a standard 
desktop computer or a laptop. All participants received initial verbal 
instructions and filled out a questionnaire to assess whether they understood the 
structure of the game. Subsequently, they played 18 practice rounds to become 
familiar with the interface. The experimenter personally went over the 
participant’s answers and provided any necessary additional explanation; if 
necessary an additional set of practice rounds was presented. 
Participants were instructed that they were going to play an interactive 
game with a number of anonymous other players withwhomthey were 
connected via the internet. It was emphasized that the other participants were 
unfamiliar to them, coming from other schools or universities participating in 
the experiment. Only the first name and the first letter of the surname were 
presented on the screen to identify the other player (e.g. Wouter B.). We used a 
set of avatars showing silhouettes of real people, instead of real pictures, to 
prevent their influence on judgments. 
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Participants were told that at the end of the experiment the computer would 
randomly select four rounds and the total outcome for the participant in those 
rounds determined the pay-off. Participants were also reminded that the same 
rule applied to all the other players they would encounter in the game, to 
emphasize that their decisions had potential consequences for themselves and 
others. Participants were paid directly after the experiment. All participants 
were debriefed at the same time. 
Following the DTG, all participants completed the Raven Standard 
Progressive Matrices (SPM), a non-verbal test of general intellectual ability 
(Raven et al., 1998). SPM scores were transformed, correcting for age, to IQ 




2.3.1 Raven SPM 
We first examined whether the different age groups differed in general 
intelligence and the effect of IQ differences on performance. As expected, the 
number of correct solutions on the Raven SPM task increased with age. Raven 
scores were z-transformed, using different transformation for different ages, to 
enable comparisons across age groups. The individuals of all age groups had 
above average IQs as estimated by transformed Raven SPM scores; 9–10-year 
olds (M= 118.34, SD = 8.6), 12–23-year olds (M= 123.77, SD = 7.4), 15–16-
year olds (M= 122.78, SD = 7.9) and 18–25-year olds (M= 121.30 SD = 10.6). 
Importantly, the different age groups did not differ in z-transformed IQ scores, 
F(3,88) = 2.36, p = .075.  
Correlations were computed to determine whether IQ estimates were related 
to trust and reciprocity patterns. There was no significant correlation between z- 
transformed Raven SPM scores and the average percentage of trust (r = .14, p = 
.17) or reciprocity (r = .17, p = .08) decisions over all age groups or within each 
age group (all p’s > .08). Nor were there significant relations between raw 
scores on the Raven SPM and trust or reciprocity (all p’s > .1). Therefore these 
factors were not examined further. 
 
2.3.2. Age differences in trust 
Age groups differed in general trust percentage, F(3,88) = 2.85, p < .04, (see 
Fig. 2.3). Regression analysis across all participants with age as a covariate 
revealed a highly significant quadratic trend, F(2,89) = 7.20, p = .006, r = .32, 
and a mildly significant linear trend, F(1,90) = 2.02, p < .037, r = .11, between 
age and trust. 
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To investigate whether there was an effect of risk and benefit on trust 
decisions, we performed a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
with risk (high versus low) and benefit (high versus low) as a within-
participants factor and age as a between-participants factor. For each participant 
we calculated the percentage of trust choices in each of the conditions8. In our 
initial analyses we also included gender as a between-participants factor. 
Because there were no significant effects of gender(all p’s > .1) this factor was 
omitted from further analysis. Similarly we added IQ as a covariate to our 
ANOVA in order to control for differences in general intelligence. Doing so did 
not alter our results for the experimental manipulations and it was therefore also 














Figure 2.3: The mean percentage of trust and reciprocity decisions over the four 
experimental conditions for each of the four age groups (error bars represent S.E.). 
 
 
                                                 
8 Because the percentage scores were not always normally distributed (confirmed with Shapiro–
Wilk tests, with Lilliefors significance correction), we also analyzed the data using an arcsine 
transformation. These analyses yielded the same results as the ANOVAs on the untransformed 
data. To keep the statistics consistent with the behavioral data presented in the graphs, we present 
the analyses of untransformed data here. 
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As expected, high-risk trials resulted in fewer trust decisions than low-risk 
trials, F(1,88) = 102.68, p < .001. Performance did not differ significantly 
across age groups, F(3,88) = 1.66, p = .18. Although we observed no main 
effect of benefit, F(3,88) = 2.34, p = .129, we did observe a significant age by 
benefit interaction effect, F(3,88) = 5.73, p < .001. To further investigate the 
nature of the interaction with age we performed separate ANOVAs by age 
group. As seen in Fig. 2.4, 22-year olds trusted significantly more when the 
benefit for player 2 was high compared to low, F(1,19) = 41.43, p < .001, 
Bonferroni corrected. This difference was not significant for any of the younger 
age groups (all p’s > .1). 
In addition, when ANOVAs were performed for each age group separately, 
an interaction between risk and benefit was found in the youngest group, 
F(1,22) = 16.14, p < .001, Bonferroni corrected. Interestingly, 9-year-old 
children trusted less often when the risk was low and benefit was high, in 
contrast to all other age groups (Fig. 2.4). Note that no trust in the low-risk–
high-benefit condition resulted in more money for player 1 than for player 2 
(Fig. 2.2C). It is likely that the youngest age group trusted more often in this 




















Figure 2.4: The mean percentage of trust and reciprocity decisions in each of the four 
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To summarize, in addition to a general increase of trust with age we 
observed more trust decisions when there was (a) smaller risk for the participant 
and (b) higher benefit for the other player. The latter effect was only found for 
22-year olds, showing that they differentiated more between high and low-
benefit settings. 
 
2.3.3. Age differences in reciprocity 
Age groups differed in general reciprocity percentage, F(3,88) = 5.69, p < .001; 
see Fig. 2.3. Regression analysis across all participants with age as a covariate 
revealed a quadratic trend, F(2,89) = 8.55, p < .001, r = .41, and a linear trend, 
F(1,90) = 16.33, p < .001, r = .37, between age and reciprocity. 
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed with risk (high versus low) 
and benefit (high versus low) as within-participants factors and age as between-
participants factor for the percentage of reciprocal choices. Again, gender and 
IQ were dropped from these analyses because our initial analysis revealed no 
significant effect of gender or IQ on reciprocity (all p’s > .1). 
As expected, we found an effect of benefit on reciprocity, F(1,88) = 24.14, 
p < .001. Participants reciprocated more often when their benefit of being 
trusted was high rather than low. The effect of benefit on reciprocity differed 
between age groups: age x benefit F(3,88) = 4.75, p < .005. Post-hoc ANOVAs 
revealed that the effect of benefit was found in all age groups (all p’s < .001, 
Bonferroni corrected), except for the 9-year olds who were insensitive to the 
benefit manipulation, F(1,22) < 1, p = .50.  
In addition, we found a significant main effect of risk on reciprocity, 
F(1,88) = 20.77, p < .001. Participants were more willing to reciprocate when 
the risk taken by the other player was high. The risk effect was qualified by an 
age × risk interaction, F(3,88) = 9.24, p < .001. In general, participants 
reciprocated more often when the risk for the other player was high rather than 
low, but this difference was only significant for 16- and 22-year olds, F(1,22) = 
10.26, p < .005, and F(1,19) = 13.23, p < .005, respectively, Bonferroni 
corrected. There was no risk effect for the two younger age groups (both p’s > 
.1). 
To summarize, in addition to a general increase of reciprocity with age we 
observed that increased benefit for the participant led to increased reciprocity 
and increased risk for the other player also led to more reciprocity. Increased 
benefit resulted in increased reciprocity in all age groups except for the 9-year 
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2.3.4. Control condition 
In the control condition we expected high levels of trust as player 1 and high 
levels of reciprocity as player 2, because these choices resulted in highest gain 
for both players. The results confirmed our expectations – all groups perform 
well above chance level – but there were also subtle differences across age 
groups. A univariate ANOVA with age as fixed factor and percentage of trust 
choices as dependent variable revealed a group difference, F(3,88) = 7.95, p < . 
001, showing that the youngest age group (9–10-year olds) made fewer trust 
decisions (75%) in their role as player 1 relative to the other age groups, 
confirmed by post hoc tests (12-, 16-, and 22-year olds; 92%, 95% and 98%, 
respectively), but they still performed well above chance level. A similar 
ANOVA for the percentage of reciprocal decisions by player 2 also resulted in 
significant age differences, F(3,88) = 3.48, p < .02. Post hoc tests revealed that 
the 9-year olds (88%) did not differ from the 12-year olds (96%), but the 9-year 
olds chose to reciprocate significantly less often than the two oldest age groups 
(16- and 22-year olds, 97% and 98%, respectively). 
The lower trust scores by the youngest age group was unexpected, and 
therefore we reanalyzed the data including only the best performing half of the 
youngest group, based on a median split of the control scores. A comparison of 
the high-performing 9-year-old children and the other age groups no longer 
revealed age differences in the control condition: control trust, F(3,72) = .72, p 
= .54, and control reciprocity, F(3,72) = .65, p = .58. However, the effects on 
general trust and reciprocity, as well as those on risk and benefit, were not 
altered when the lower performing 9-year olds were removed from the analyses. 
This suggests that although there are developmental differences in performance 




Because age groups showed differences in types of decisions, they also obtained 
different amounts of coins during the game. There occurred an increase of total 
coins with age for the trustor and a decrease for trustee (Table 2.2). This is 
caused by the fact that trusting yields more coins than not trusting and 
exploiting yields more coins than reciprocating. Although the patterns of pay-
offs differ, there are no significant differences between groups in total earnings, 
F(3,88) = 1.67, p = .07. Recall that the players knew that only the pay-off of a 
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2.3.6 Time-on-task effects 
Time-on-task effects were examined by dividing the task in three equal blocks. 
The original ANOVAs were repeated with blocks as an additional within-
participants factor of three levels. All reported effects, for trustor as well as 
trustee, remained significant and did not result in any significant effects for 
block (all p’s > .1). This result shows that participants did not change their 
patterns of behavior during the task. 
 
Table 2.2 Average pay-off for each role for each age group. 
 Player 1 Player 2 
9 years 135.3 (7.0) 146.4 (9.3) 
12 years 152.4 (7.5) 138.5 (8.5) 
16 years 161.0 (8.1) 128.0 (9.0) 
22 years 149.8 (8.8) 127.5 (9.8) 
 
2.4 Discussion 
This study had two main goals: (a) to develop a new version of the trust game 
that would allow us to examine the developmental trajectory of trust and 
reciprocity between late childhood and late adolescence, and (b) to examine the 
extent to which these processes are sensitive to the risk for the trustor and 
benefit of being trusted. To this end, the discussion is organized according to 
these main goals. 
 
2.4.1 Developmental Trust Game 
The Developmental Trust Game differs from most previous versions of the 
Trust Game in three important ways. First, the task was changed into a child-
friendly game by making use of small amounts that were visually represented 
by coins, making sure the task had the same difficulty level for all age groups. 
Second, the computerized design made it possible to let the participants play 
multiple games against many different presumed players. This, in turn, made it 
possible to test each participant in each of the 5 conditions (experimental + 
control) multiple times, which allowed for robust within participant 
comparisons. Because we did not find any changes in behavior during the task, 
we are confident that our results are not due to time-on-task effects, which are 
possible side-effects of multiple rounds. Third, to our knowledge this is the first 
study in which participants played the role of trustor as well as trustee in an 
experiment with multiple trials. The performance of adults resembles the pattern 
typically seen in past work. That is, participants often chose to trust, suggesting 
that they expected others to reciprocate, even when decisions were anonymous. 
Also in line with previous results, adults often reciprocated even when doing so 
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was costly (Berg et al., 1995; McCabe et al., 2001). We made use of a fixed 
binary choice paradigm which allowed independent manipulation of risk and 
benefit in the DTG. As expected, both risk and benefit independently influenced 
the percentage of trust and reciprocal choices.  
In accordance with past work (Malhotra, 2004), we found that adults were 
sensitive to risk manipulation as trustor and to benefit manipulation as trustee. 
As expected, participants were more willing to trust when risk was low and 
more willing to reciprocate when benefit was high. In addition, our study 
yielded two novel findings.  
First, the benefit manipulation also influenced the decisions of the trustor. 
That is, 22-year olds trusted more often when the benefit for the other player 
was high rather than low. This increase in trust could be motivated by either 
altruistic inclination – participants care more about the welfare of the other with 
age – or by strategic intuition—they expect a higher change on reciprocity and 
therefore are more willing to trust in service of their own interest. Both 
explanations rely on more advanced forms of perspective-taking. In both cases 
the outcome for the other is valued, either intrinsically or instrumentally and 
integrated in the decision-making process. 
Second, in 22-year olds risk manipulation also influenced the decisions of 
the trustee. In other words, the trustee was more willing to reciprocate when the 
risk for the trustor was high rather than low. This result suggests that the trustee 
appreciates the risk taken by the trustor and returns the favor by reciprocating. 
Playing both roles could have facilitated taking the perspective of the other 
player, which can be an explanation for the effects of risk and benefit present in 
the oldest age group but which are absent in a previous study with an adult 
population (Malhotra, 2004). 
Together, the results of this study suggest that for adults trust and reciprocal 
decisions are not only dependent on their own outcome but also on the 
consequences for the other. The behavioral pattern of adults provides the 
framework for understanding developmental changes in trust and reciprocity. 
 
2.4.2 Developmental changes in social decision-making 
All age groups scored above chance level on the control task, indicating that the 
Developmental Trust Game is suitable for developmental research. However, 
the 9-year-old group scored lower than the adolescent groups. Given that they 
scored greatly above chance level and given the extensive training and the 
requirement of correct answers to assessment questions prior to the task, it 
seems unlikely that 9-year olds did not understand the task. A possible 
explanation is that 9-year olds did not want to wait for the ‘trust’ outcome and 
failed to show delay-of-gratification. This is consistent with several studies that 
show developmental differences on simple delay-of-gratification tasks that last 
until at least mid-adolescence (Green, Fry & Meyerson, 1994; Green, Myerson 
& Ostaszewski, 1999). However, future research is needed to investigate this 
hypothesis in more detail.  
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Consistent with earlier reports, there was an increase in both trust and 
reciprocity with age (Sutter & Kocher, 2007). Interestingly, although there were 
no age differences in overall earnings, children did earn more as the second 
player by not reciprocating as often as the older age groups. The decrease in 
earnings with age for the second player could be interpreted as a decrease in 
‘rational self-interest’ behavior and potentially reflects an increase in showing 
socially desirable behavior. These results are important because they are 
consistent with prior reports suggesting that there is a general increase of 
prosocial behavior during adolescence that stabilizes between middle and late 
adolescence (Eisenberg et al., 1991, 1995; Schaffer, 1996). 
In addition to these general developmental changes in trust and reciprocity, 
we also observed specific changes in trust and reciprocity related to the outcome 
manipulations as a function of age. First, there were important age related 
changes in trust decisions. Although all age groups were more willing to trust 
when the risk was low rather than high, there were age related changes in 
sensitivity to the benefit of the other player in trust decisions, as was evident for 
the 22-year olds. The possible motivations to take the consequences of the other 
player into account require a level of perspective-taking that appears to be 
present only in the oldest age group (late adolescence). In addition, although all 
age groups were more willing to trust when the risk was low rather than high, 
the 9-year-old children showed a slightly different pattern. They were more 
willing to trust when the risk was low and the benefit was low. This strategy 
might be explained by the fact that in the low-risk–high-benefit condition, the 
no-trust option resulted in a relatively higher outcome for player 1 than player 2, 
a situation which the youngest participants might wish to avoid. As such, this 
pattern suggests that they were also motivated by competitive motives. This is 
consistent with previous literature showing that competitive social value 
orientation – preference for increasing relative gain over others – decreased 
during adolescence (Van Lange et al., 1997) and another study by Fehr, 
Bernhard and Rockenbach (2008) showing that children are competitively 
oriented in social situations.  
Second, there were also age related changes in reciprocal decisions. The 
effect of benefit on reciprocity was present in early adolescence, indicating that 
in this period basic reciprocity emerges. In contrast, 9-year-old children do not 
yet show this type of behavior. From middle adolescence onwards, amore 
elaborate form of reciprocal behavior appeared. At this point participants also 
chose to reciprocate the risk taken by the other player (trustor).  
A comparison of age differences in sensitivity to risk and benefit for trust 
and reciprocity suggests that, besides a general increase of prosocial behavior, 
considering the outcomes for the other becomes more important in social 
decision-making during adolescence. Here this type of perspective-taking was 
examined in the context of prosocial behavior, but it should be noted that 
increased perspective-taking ability can also be used for strategic or anti-social 
purposes, such as lying and cheating (Rotenberg, 1991; Beate & Frith, 1992). 
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To our knowledge, there are no experimental studies that have investigated both 
the development of on-line prosocial behavior and development of perspective-
taking during adolescence. Prior studies have suggested that there are subtle 
developmental changes on experimental measures of perspective-taking during 
adolescence (Choudhury, Blakemore, & Charman, 2006; Duhmontheil, Apperly 
& Balkemore, 2009), but these studies did not examine perspective-taking in a 
social context. Our data also suggest that later in adolescence there is no general 
increase in prosocial behavior but rather a sophistication of prosocial behavior. 
Although trust and reciprocal behavior were at a stable level at mid-
adolescence, there were still changes in the effect of the outcome manipulations 
until late adolescence. Thus, with age, prosocial behavior becomes more context 
dependent, leading to more prosocial behavior in one context (e.g. a high-risk 
and high-benefit situation) but less in another (a low-risk and low-benefit 
situation).  
Finally, our current results do not speak to the issue of a presumed relation 
between behavioral measures of taking into account the intentions of and 
consequences for the other and other direct measures of perspective-taking. It 
would therefore be interesting for future studies to include additional measures 
of perspective-taking. One way to shed more light on this research question 
would be to ask participants to think aloud while performing these tasks. 
Furthermore, it would be interesting to extend the present research involving a 
generalized other by studying interaction with specific others such as peers or 
parents. 
 
3. What motivates repayment?  






Reciprocity of trust is important for social interaction and depends on 
individual differences in social value orientation (SVO).Here, we examined 
the neural correlates of reciprocity by manipulating two factors that influence 
reciprocal behavior: (1) the risk that the trustor took when trusting and (2) the 
benefit for the trustee when being trusted. FMRI results showed that anterior 
Medial Prefrontal Frontal Cortex (aMPFC) was more active when 
participants defected relative to when participants reciprocated, but was not 
sensitive to manipulations of risk and benefit or individual differences in 
SVO. However, activation in the right temporal parietal-junction (rTPJ), 
bilateral anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was modulated 
by individual differences in SVO. In addition, these regions were 
differentially sensitive to manipulations of risk for the trustor when 
reciprocating. In contrast, the ACC and the right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex were sensitive to the benefit for the trustee when reciprocating. 
Together, the results of this study provide more insight in how several brain 
regions work together when individuals reciprocate trust, by showing how 






One of the key components of human social interaction is cooperation or the 
exchange of favor or goods between individuals for the attainment of mutual 
benefit. Cooperation depends to a large extent on trust and reciprocity. Trust is 
required because cooperative exchanges are often separated in time, whereas 
reciprocity, or the repayment of what others have provided us, is thought to be 
important for the maintenance of social relationships. That is, if favors are not 
returned relationships may be short-lived (Lahno, 1995). 
Both the trustor and the trustee may obtain higher outcomes when trust is 
given relative to when no trust is given. However, trusting also involves a 
component of risk, because the trustor may attain higher personal benefit when 
not reciprocating. Consequently, trusting may result in a smaller outcome for 
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the trustor relative to when the trustor would not have trusted (Rousseau et al., 
1998). Thus, the decision to trust another party involves risk for the trustor and 
the decision to reciprocate trust depend on the offset between maximizing 
personal outcomes relative to the appreciation of the trust that was given (i.e. 
repayment). This study will focus on different motives involved in reciprocal 
behavior. 
Researchers have demonstrated that even for single anonymous 
transactions, individuals often reciprocate trust even when this leads to a smaller 
personal monetary outcome (Berg et al., 1995; McCabe et al., 2001). It has 
therefore been suggested that our motivation to reciprocate trust is not only 
guided by goals to maximize personal outcomes, but also by other-regarding 
preferences (Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr and Camerer, 2007; Fehr and 
Gintis, 2007; Van Lange, 1999). According to these studies, the decision to 
reciprocate is dependent on evaluating consequences for both self and others. 
Importantly, reciprocal behavior is dependent on individual differences in social 
value orientation (SVO), the general tendency of individuals to value the 
outcome of others (McClintock and Allison, 1989; De Dreu and Van Lange, 
1995; Van Lange et al., 1997). Furthermore, decisions to reciprocate trust are 
not only motivated by outcome considerations but also involve considerations 
of the intentions of others, such as the risk that the trusting party took when 
trusting or the benefit for the trusted party when being trusted. Therefore, these 
decisions are thought to be dependent on our ability to take the perspectives of 
others.  
Neuroimaging studies in combination with game theoretical paradigms have 
investigated the neural correlates of the cognitive processes involved in 
cooperation and reciprocal exchange (e.g. King-Casas et al., 2005; Krueger et 
al., 2007; McCabe et al., 2001; Rilling et al., 2002). Several of these 
neuroimaging studies have reported activation in the anterior medial prefrontal 
cortex (aMPFC) when participants are involved in interactions with another 
person relative to a computer (McCabe et al., 2001; Rilling et al., 2004), and 
when participants decide to trust relative to when they decide not to trust 
(McCabe et al., 2001; Delgado et al., 2005; King-Casas et al., 2005; Krueger et 
al., 2007; Baumgartner et al., 2008). Prior neuroimaging studies have 
considered the aMPFC together with the temporal-parietal-junction (TPJ) to be 
important for mentalizing and theory-of-mind. For example, neuroimaging 
studies have demonstrated that aMPFC and TPJ are active during theory-of-
mind tasks, such as tasks that require participants to infer mental states of 
characters in stories (Fletcher et al., 1995) and cartoons (Gallagher et al., 2002) 
or while watching animations (Castelli et al., 2000). In addition, prior studies 
have suggested that in a social context the aMPFC is involved in evaluating the 
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mental content of others in relation to the self (Amodio and Frith, 2006), 
whereas the TPJ is thought to be important for redirecting or focusing attention 
on the other (Mitchell, 2008). However, the mentalizing requirements during 
these theory-of-mind tasks are complex, and therefore it is difficult to dissociate 
the putative roles of the aMPFC and TPJ in social interaction (Hampton et al., 
2008). Therefore, it remains to be determined how activation in aMPFC and 
TPJ can be associated with the different processes, which may underlie 
reciprocal exchange.  
Besides the aMPFC and TPJ, neuroimaging studies of social decision-
making have also suggested that brain regions that are associated with reward 
processing and arousal can mark social interactions as positive or aversive. For 
example, one neuroimaging study demonstrated that activation in the ventral 
striatum correlates positively with cooperation choices in a Prisoners Dilemma 
Game (Rilling et al., 2004). Two other neuroimaging studies showed that unfair 
treatment by a partner in the Ultimatum Game results in increased activation in 
the insula (Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia et al., 2008), and this region has also 
been engaged during unreciprocated trust (Rilling et al., 2008). A recent study, 
which examined iterated two-person trust exchanges, demonstrated that the 
insula is more active for low relative to high levels of reciprocity. This finding 
was explained by suggesting a role of the insula in signaling personal norm 
violations (King-Casas et al., 2008). Thus, the ventral striatum and the insula 
seem to be involved in the pleasant and unpleasant aspects of social 
interactions, which may explain how lower level affective processes can result 
in encouragement or discouragement of social behavior (Sanfey, 2007). 
However, even though this pattern of activity is consistent over a wide range of 
social interactions paradigms, it has not been shown how these regions are 
associated with the choice and motivation to reciprocate. 
Finally, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the right dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC) are typically engaged when individuals make 
decisions in which there is conflict between social norms and personal interest 
(Sanfey et al., 2003; Spitzer et al., 2007) or when individuals make decisions 
that may be counter to their own response tendencies (Rilling et al., 2002, 
2007). In addition, transcranial magnetic stimulation of the right DLPFC lead to 
an increase of accepting unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game (Knoch et al., 
2006). These control-related structures may therefore be involved in overriding 
self-oriented impulses.  
Neuroimaging methods may allow us to examine the possible dissociations 
between different processes that underlie an individual’s decision to reciprocate. 
Indeed, the review of prior neuroimaging studies suggests that the brain regions, 
which have been reported in social interaction studies, may indeed contribute in 
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different ways to different motives for reciprocity. However, to date, most 
neuroimaging studies of social interaction have examined the neural correlates 
of different types of choices (e.g. reciprocate vs defect) but have not attempted 
to dissociate between processes that may underlie the decision to reciprocate or 
defect, such as the risk that the trusting party took or the benefit the trusted 
party gained by being trusted. Therefore, the question remains how the brain 
regions, which have previously been associated with lower-level cognitive and 
affective processes and have been suggested to be involved in social interaction, 
are differentially involved in reciprocal behavior. This question can be 
addressed by investigating how these brain regions are differentially sensitive to 
the putative motives for reciprocity, which have been outlined above. In this 
study, we will manipulate the risk for the trustor and the benefit for the trustee, 
and we will examine the effects of these manipulations on the neural correlates 
of reciprocal behavior under these conditions. Thus, the goal of the current 
study was to determine whether the appreciation of different motives for 
reciprocity can be dissociated on a neural level by manipulating the risk that the 
trustor took when trusting and the benefit for the trustee when being trusted. 
Participants played several one-shot rounds of the Trust Game, in which 
they had to make the decision whether or not to reciprocate trust given by 
another individual (Berg et al., 1995). In the Trust Game, two anonymous 
players are involved in dividing a certain amount of money. The first player 
(trustor) has two options. One option is to divide the money according to a 
predetermined scheme (e.g. eight for first player and seven for second player; 
see Figure 3.1 A), the other option is to trust the second player (trustee) and to 
give him/her the choice to divide the money. The latter option potentially leads 
to a higher pay-off for both players. If trusted, the second player has two 
options: (1) reciprocate the trust given by the first player (e.g. 11 for first player 
and 10 for second player) or (2) defect and maximize personal gains (e.g. 5 for 
first player and 17 for second player). All participants were assigned to the role 
of the second player and always had two fixed choices. This design allowed us 
to (a) concentrate on the decision to reciprocate or not and (b) systematically 
vary the main variables of interest: the risk for the trustor and the benefit for the 
trustee.  
We predicted that the extent to which second players are motivated to 
reciprocate depends on the risk that the first player has taken (i.e. the amount of 
money the first player can lose by trusting) and the benefit that the second 
player receives when being trusted (i.e. the amount of money that the second 
mover receives when trusted relative to not being trusted) (Pillutla et al., 2003; 
Malhotra, 2004; van den Bos et al., 2010). More specifically, we expected that 
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participants were more motivated to reciprocate when either the risk or the 
benefit was high rather than low.  
Figure 3.1: A) Presentation of task conditions. In four different conditions the risk that 
the trustor took when trusting and the benefit that the trustee received when being 
trusted were manipulated independently (Malhotra, 2004). B) Timing of the events in 
the scanner task in milliseconds. 
 
We hypothesized that regions that are involved in mentalizing would be 
modulated by both risk and benefit manipulations. However, we expected that 
the type of perspective-taking would be associated with distinct neural 
correlates. In particular, we posited that regions that are important for taking the 
perspective of the other would be especially sensitive to the risk manipulation 
because the risk manipulation requires participants to take into account the 
outcomes of the other (first) player. Thus, the risk manipulation focused on 
neural correlates of mentalizing about how the different outcomes affect the 
Chapter 3  50 
first player. In contrast, we posited that regions, which are associated with self-
referential thought, would be sensitive to the benefit manipulation, because the 
benefit manipulation involves taking into account the second player’s own 
increased outcome in case of trust. Thus, the benefit manipulation focused on 
neural correlates of mentalizing about the cooperative intentions of the first 
player, which benefits the second player. 
We predicted that aMPFC and TPJ would exhibit a pattern consistent with 
their suggested roles in perspective-taking. In particular, we expected that the 
risk manipulation, motivating participants to take the perspective of the 
outcomes for the other, would result in a shift in attention from self to the other 
and thus would be associated with changes in TPJ activity (Lamm et al., 2007). 
On the other hand, we expected that the aMPFC would be more engaged by the 
benefit manipulation, because this manipulation motivated the participants to 
consider their own outcomes and the cooperative intentions of others (McCabe 
et al., 2001; Gallagher et al., 2002; Hampton et al., 2008). 
We expected that the ACC and rDLPFC would also be sensitive to risk and 
benefit manipulations and would exhibit a pattern consistent with a role in 
overcoming selfish impulses (Rilling et al., 2002, 2007; Knoch et al., 2006). 
Therefore, we expected that these regions were most engaged when the 
participants reciprocated in situations where the incentive to reciprocate was 
low (low-benefit condition).Finally, we predicted that the insula would be 
sensitive to situations, which involved violations of one’s own behavioral norms 
(Montague and Lorenz, 2007; King-Casas et al.,2008). Therefore, we expected 
a pattern of activation partly overlapping with activation observed in ACC and 
rDLPFC. In the insula, we expected increased activation when reciprocating in 
both low-benefit and low-risk conditions.  
Finally, we expected that the need and/or engagement of the affective and 
control regions would also be dependent on the internal motivations to 
reciprocate. As such, the individual differences in reciprocal behavior in the 
current task were related to scores on the SVO questionnaire (van Lange, 1999), 
which is a personality variable that indicates how people evaluate outcomes for 
themselves and others. This questionnaire has shown significant external 
validity in a variety of settings (McClintock and Allison, 1989; De Dreu and 
van Lange, 1995; van Lange et al., 1997). Prosocial personalities were expected 
to reciprocate more often than the proself personalities (Kramer et al., 1986). 
We posited that the activity in regions, which are associated with affective 
processes, would also correlate with individual differences in SVO. The insula 
and striatum were predicted to be sensitive to individual predispositions to 
reciprocate or defect reflecting differences in social norms and preferences. By 
the same token, we expected that prosocial participants would show less activity 
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in the control network (DLPFC, ACC) when reciprocating than the proself 
individuals and that proself participants would show more activation in the 





Twenty-two healthy right-handed paid volunteers (11 female, 11 male; age 18–
22, M = 19.7, SD. = 1.3) participated in the fMRI experiment. Four of the 
participants were excluded from the analysis, because there were missing cases 
in one or more conditions (i.e. only reciprocal choices or only defect choices, 
see supplementary data). Subsequent fMRI analyses were based on the 
remaining 18 participants (nine female, nine male; age 18–22, M = 19.7, SD. = 
1.4). All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and an 
absence of neurological or psychiatric impairments. All participants gave 
informed consent for the study, and all procedures were approved by the Leiden 
University Department of Psychology and the medical ethical committee of the 
Leiden University Medical Center. In accordance with Leiden University 
Medical Center policy, all anatomical scans were reviewed by the radiology 
department following each scan. No anomalous findings were reported. 
Standard intelligence scores were obtained from each participant using the 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices test. All participants had average or above 




Trust Game. During the fixed choice Trust Game (Berg et al., 1995; Malhotra, 
2004), participants were instructed that in an earlier phase of the study, other 
individuals had been assigned the roles of first player and that they would 
complete the second phase of the study in the role of second player. They were 
instructed that they were not playing directly with first players, but that they 
played with the implementation of answers of first players which were gathered 
in the previous part of the experiment. They were explained that their decisions 
would have consequences for the first player and that the payment of all 
participants would take place after completion of the experiment. 
Each round, participants were paired with a different, anonymous player to 
exclude reputation effects or strategy use, and the other players were matched 
for gender. For those trials where the first players had decided to trust, the 
participant was presented with two options: reciprocate or defect. If the 
participant decided to defect, the participant would maximize his/her own gains 
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and the first player would receive less money than in the no-trust option. In case 
the participant reciprocated, the money was shared almost equally and both 
players received more money compared to the no-trust option, but the second 
player received less money compared to when he/she would have defected (see 
Figure 3.1A). Participants were instructed that at the end of the experiment the 
computer would randomly select the outcome of five trials, and the sum of these 
trials would determine the pay-off for the participant and for the first players. 
Consequently, their decisions had implications for both their own pay-off as 
well as that of the other players. 
Each trial started with a 3 s display of the choice alternative for the first 
player, followed by the trust or no-trust decision of the first player. For those 
trials on which the first player chose not to trust, the no-trust decision was 
visually presented for 3 s. For those trials on which the first player chose to 
trust, the defect and reciprocate options were presented, and participants were 
instructed to make their decision by pressing the middle or index finger of the 
right hand. Participants were instructed to respond within a 5 s window (see 
Figure 3.1B). The 5 s decision-display was followed by a 3 s display of their 
choice. 
Risk for the trustor (high vs low) and benefit for the trustee (high vs low) 
were manipulated separately (Malhotra, 2004) (see Figure 3.1A). The risk 
manipulation determined the risk for the first player. In the high-risk condition, 
the first player could lose a large amount of money by trusting the participant in 
case the second player chose to defect. In contrast, in the low-risk condition, the 
first player could lose only a small amount of money by trusting the second 
player. The benefit manipulation determined the benefit for the second player 
when being trusted. In the low-benefit condition, the difference between money 
gained by player 2 when being trusted relative to not being trusted was small. In 
contrast, in the high-benefit condition, the increase of money for the second 
player by being trusted was large. The risk and benefit manipulations were 
based on the Malhotra (2004) paradigm. 
The computer played a fixed strategy that was based on behavior of 
participants in previous studies (van den Bos, et al., 2010). In total, the task 
consisted of 43 high risk-high benefit trials (25 trusted, 18 not-trusted), 44 high 
risk-low benefit trials (23 trusted, 21 not trusted), 48 low risk-high benefit trials 
(35 trusted, 13 not-trusted) and 53 low risk-high benefit trials (42 trusted, 11 
not-trusted). Consequently, for each participant, the task consisted of 188 
rounds in total, with 125 trusted trials, which required a decision from the 
participant. The trials were divided over five blocks, each block lasted  ~8.5 
min. The trials were presented in pseudo-random order with a jittered 
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interstimulus interval (min. = 1.1s, max. = 9.9s, mean = 3.37s) optimized with 
OptSeq2 [surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq/, developed by Dale (1999)]. 
 
Social Value Orientation. All participants completed the SVO questionnaire. 
The SVO is a brief measure of allocation choices between self and other and has 
shown significant external validity in a variety of settings. The questionnaire 
consists of nine tables or ‘decomposed games’ [for more details, see van Lange 
(1999)]. In these decomposed games, the participant determines the outcome for 
both himself and a hypothetical other. 
The three different decompositions correspond to three different types of 
SVOs: (1) a cooperative orientation, reflecting a preference for joint outcomes, 
(2) an individualistic orientation, reflecting a preference for own outcomes and 
(3) a competitive orientation, reflecting a preference for a large positive 
difference between own and other outcomes. When participants make six or 
more consistent choices in nine games, they are classified as belonging to one of 
three types of SVO: cooperative, individualistic or competitive. In prior studies, 
cooperative participants have been categorized as a ‘prosocial’ group, and 
individualistic and competitive participants have been categorized as a ‘proself’ 
group. The reason for the latter categorization is based on the observation that 
both individualistic and competitive individuals value outcomes for self higher 
than outcomes for others (van Lange, 1999). 
 
Task Procedure. Prior to the experiment, participants received oral instructions 
and completed a practice session (20 trials). The stimuli and timing of the 
practice sessions were the same as in the fMRI experiment. The Raven SPM 
and SVO questionnaire (Van Lange, 1999) were administered after the scanning 
session. The total duration of the experiment was ~2 h. 
 
MRI Procedure. Data were acquired using a 3.0T Philips Achieva scanner at the 
Leiden University Medical Center. Stimuli were projected onto a screen located 
at the head of the scanner bore and viewed by participants by means of a mirror 
mounted to the head coil assembly. First, a localizer scan was obtained for each 
participant. Subsequently, T2*-weighted EPI (TR = 2.2 s, TE = 30 ms, 80x80 
matrix, FOV = 220, 352.75-mm transverse slices with 0.28mm gap) were 
obtained during five functional runs of 232 volumes each. The first two scans 
were discarded to allow for equilibration of T1 saturation effects. A high 
resolution T1-weighted anatomical scan and a high resolution T2-weighted 
matched-bandwidth high-resolution anatomical scan (same slice prescription as 
EPI) were obtained from each participant after the functional runs. Stimulus 
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presentation and the timing of all stimuli and response events were acquired 
using E-Prime software. 
 
fMRI Data Analysis. Data were preprocessed using SPM2 (Wellcome 
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London). The functional time series were 
realigned to compensate for small head movements. Translational movement 
parameters never exceeded 1 voxel (< 3 mm) in any direction for any subject or 
scan. Functional volumes were spatially smoothed using a 6mm full-width half-
maximum Gaussian kernel. Functional volumes were spatially normalized to 
EPI templates. The normalization algorithm used a 12-parameter affine 
transformation together with a nonlinear transformation involving cosine basis 
functions and resampled the volumes to 3mm cubic voxels. The MNI305 
template was used for visualization and all results are reported in the MNI305 
stereotaxic space (Cosoco et al., 1997), an approximation of Talairach space 
(Talairach and Tourneaux, 1988). 
Statistical analyses were performed on individual participants’ data using 
the general linear model in SPM2. The fMRI time series data were modeled by 
a series of events convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function 
(HRF). The start of the first player’s choice display and the start of the second 
player’s choice display (only for trust trials) of each trial were modeled as zero-
duration events. The second player’s choice display condition was divided in 
trust and no-trust choices and the trust choices were divided into reciprocate and 
defect decisions. Finally, those choices were further divided in four 
experimental conditions (high vs low risk high vs low benefit). These trial 
functions were used as covariates in a general linear model, along with a basic 
set of cosine functions that highpass filtered the data and a covariate for run 
effects. The least-squares parameter estimates of height of the best-fitting 
canonical HRF for each condition were used in pairwise contrasts. The resulting 
contrast images, computed on a subject-by-subject basis, were submitted to 
group analyses. At the group level, contrasts between conditions were computed 
by performing one-tailed t-tests on these images, treating participants as a 
random effect. Mean reciprocity levels were used in regression analyses to test 
for brain–behavior relations. We applied AlphaSim (Ward, 2000) to calculate 
the appropriate threshold significance level and cluster size. A significance 
threshold of p < 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons was calculated by 
performing 10 000 Monte Carlo simulations in AlphaSim resulting in an 
uncorrected threshold of p < 0.001, requiring a minimum of 12 voxels in a 
cluster. 
 
Neural correlates of reciprocity 55
Region-of-Interest (ROI) Analyses. ROI analyses were performed to further 
characterize sensitivity to risk and benefit manipulations. Averaging the signal 
across voxels, as is done in ROI analyses, captures the central tendency and 
tends to reduce uncorrelated variance. Thus, ROI analyses have greater power 
than whole-brain statistical contrasts to detect effects that are present across a 
set of voxels. ROI analyses were performed with the Marsbar toolbox in SPM2 
(Brett et al., 2002; http://marsbar.sourceforce.net/).  
The contrast used to generate functional ROIs based on a priori hypotheses 
was that of all choices > fixation, unless otherwise specified in the text. 
Functional maps were masked with anatomical masks from the Marsbar 
toolbox. For all ROI analyses, effects were considered significant at an α of 
0.008, based on Bonferonni correction for multiple comparisons (p = 0.05/0.06 
ROIs (aMPFC, rTPJ, rDLPFC, ACC, anterior insula and ventral striatum), 
unless reported otherwise. For each ROI, the center of mass is reported. 
 
3.3 Results  
 
3.3.1 Behavioral data 
Trust Game. On average, participants reciprocated half of the trials (M = 51%), 
but there were large individual differences in behavior (SD = 18%, min. =  22%, 
max. = 78% see supplementary results). To investigate whether there were 
effects of the risk and benefit manipulations on reciprocity decisions, we 
performed a repeated measures ANOVA with risk (high vs. low) and benefit 
(high vs. low) as within-subject factors. As expected, high risk for the first 
player resulted in more reciprocal choices (59%) than low risk for the first 
player (43%) (main effect risk, F(1,18) = 26.85, p < 0.001) and high benefit for 
the second player resulted in more reciprocal choices (61%) than low benefit for 
the second player (40%) (main effect benefit F(1,18) = 22.03, p < 0.001). In 
addition, there was a significant risk x benefit interaction [F(1,18) = 9.92, p < 
0.01]. This interaction demonstrated that the difference between high- and low 
benefit reciprocal choices was larger for low risk trials (high benefit: 58%, low 
benefit: 27%) than for high-risk trials (high benefit: 64%, low benefit: 53%). 
Thus, when the risk to trust was high for the first player, participants focused 
less on their own benefit when deciding to reciprocate. Finally, there were no 
differences in mean reaction times for defect (M = 1.77 s, SE = 0.13) vs. 
reciprocate (M = 1.76 s, SE = .12) choices [t(21) = 0.044, P = 0.96]. 
 
Social Value Orientation. Classification of participants by SVO (Van Lange, 
1999) resulted in 8 proself and 10 prosocial-oriented individuals. The SVO was 
a strong predictor of reciprocal behavior in the Trust Game as administered in 
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the scanner session. A t-test for reciprocity level demonstrated that prosocial 
individuals reciprocated significantly more (M = 62%, SD = 11%) than proself 
individuals [M = 39%, s.d. = 10%; t(1,16) = 3.72, p < 0.002]. When reciprocity 
levels in the Trust Game were divided based on a median split analysis, the low-
reciprocity group consisted of all eight proself classified participants and one 
prosocial classified participant. The high-reciprocity group consisted of only 
prosocial classified participants. Thus, performance in the current version of the 
Trust Game had high external validity as demonstrated by a high correlation 
with SVO. 
 
3.3.2 fMRI data 
Whole Brain Results - Main effects. To examine the neural correlates of 
reciprocity, we examined neural activity for reciprocate and defect choices for 
those trials on which the participant was trusted. The comparison of defect 
choices > reciprocate choices revealed activity in the aMPFC (BA 32; Figure 
3.2A, Table 3.1) and the primary visual cortex (MNI 6,-93, 12), whereas the 
opposite contrast (reciprocate > defect) resulted in significant activation only in 
primary visual cortex (MNI 9, -63, 12). It should be noted that defect and 
reciprocate alternatives were always displayed on the same location of the 
screen, which may explain the consistent activation in the visual areas for the 
separate contrasts. 
 
Regression analysis. The second set of contrasts aimed at revealing individual 
differences in neural activation by adding average reciprocity level as a 
predictor variable to a regression analysis. This analysis revealed a positive 
correlation between levels of reciprocity and BOLD activity for defect > 
reciprocate choices in the dorsal ACC, bilateral anterior insula, right TPJ (rTPJ) 
and precuneus (Figure 3.2B). Those individuals who generally showed 
prosocial behavior by reciprocating more often also showed increased activation 
in these areas when defecting. In contrast, those individuals who reciprocated 
less often showed more activation in these areas when reciprocating (see also 
supplementary results). Thus, these areas were sensitive to the less frequently 
chosen alternative, regardless of whether the less frequent alternative was to 
reciprocate or to defect. 
There were no regions that showed a negative correlation between 
reciprocity and BOLD activation for defect > reciprocate at a p < 0.001 
threshold. However, lowering the threshold to an uncorrected threshold of p < 
0.05 revealed a negative correlation between reciprocity and the defect > 
reciprocate contrast in the ventral striatum. Here, individuals who reciprocated 
more often showed increased activation when reciprocating, and individuals 
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who reciprocated less often showed less activation when reciprocating (see 
supplementary results for performance correlations).  
 
 
Figure 3.2: A) The contrast defect > reciprocate resulted in activation in aMPFC (MNI 
-6, 51, 15). B) A regression analysis for the defect – reciprocate contrast for reciprocity 
levels resulted in activation in rTPJ (MNI: 45, -43, 32), ACC (MNI: -3, 27, 33), and 
bilateral insula (MNI: 36, 24, 0 &  -33, 21, 1). 
 
Table 3.1: Brain Regions revealed by whole brain contrasts and regressions analysis 
Anatomical region L/R Volume 
(mm) 
Z MNI coordinates 
    x y z 
Main effect of Choice       
Defect > Reciprocate       
   Paracingulate cortex, VMPFC L 666 5.84 -6 51 15 
   Visual Cortex L/R 1006 6.06 6 -93 12 
Reciprocate > Defect       
   Visual Cortex  L/R 720 4.43 9 -63 3 
       
Regression Defect > Reciprocity    Z    
Positive corr.  avg.  reciprocity       
   Anterior Cingulate Cortex L/R 917 4.10 -3 27 33 
   Anterior Insula R 371 4.06 36 24 0 
   Anterior Insula L 286 3.97 -33 21 1 
   Temporal Parietal Junction R 862 4.06 45 -43 32 
   Precuneus L 423 3.32 -24 -72 45 
   Thalamus R 223 3.91 6 -30 0 
Negative  corr.  avg.  reciprocity**       
Ventral Striatum  R 171 1.63 14 12 -5 
MNI coordinators for main effects, peak voxels reported at p < .001, at least 10 
contiguous voxels.** peak voxel reported at p <.05 
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ROI analyses. ROI analyses were performed to further characterize sensitivity 
to risk and benefit manipulations. For these analyses, we focused on six a priori 
defined regions: aMPFC, rTPJ, rDLPFC, ACC, anterior insula and ventral 
striatum. rDLPFC, ACC and ventral striatum were derived from the all choices 
> fixation contrast. Not all regions were revealed by this contrast; therefore, 
aMPFC was selected based on the defect > reciprocate contrast, and the right 
TPJ and right insula were derived from the regression analyses.  
Because our hypotheses concerned the modulations of the neural correlates 
of reciprocal choices, we analyzed the effects of the risk and benefit 
manipulations for reciprocal choices. We used ANOVA to analyze BOLD 
differences that accompanied the choices to reciprocate and to characterize 
possible interactions with risk and benefit manipulations.These analyses 
revealed main effects of benefit in the ACC [F(1, 17) = 5.46, p = 0.01, Figure 
3.3A] and the rDLPFC [F(1, 17) = 9.98, p < 0.003; Figure 3.3B]. These 
analyses demonstrated that there was greater activation in both the ACC and the 
rDLPFC when participants chose to reciprocate when the benefit for themselves 
was low relative to when the benefit for themselves was high. Thus, ACC and 
rDLPFC were more active when participants decided to reciprocate, even 
though the benefit of being trusted was low. 
There was also a main effect of risk in the right TPJ [F(1, 17) = 6.43, P = 
0.01, Figure 3.4A]. In this region, more activation was observed for reciprocate 
choices when the risk for the first player was high relative to when the risk for 
the first player was low. Finally, there was a main effect of risk in the right 
insula [F(1, 17) = 8.80, P < 0.005, Figure 3.4B], but opposite to the risk effect in 
the rTPJ, this region was more active when participants chose to reciprocate 
when the risk for the first player was low relative to when the risk for the first 
player was high. Thus, rTPJ was more active when participants decided to 
reciprocate and repaid the risk that was taken by the first player. In contrast, the 
right insula was more active when participants reciprocated despite the low 
need for repayment. Finally, there were no effects of risk or benefit for the 
aMPFC or the striatum. 
 
Frequency Effects. Because the changes in activation can be influenced by 
frequency effects, we correlated activation in the ROIs with the frequency of 
different types of behavior to test whether the reported effects of risk and 
benefit can be explained by frequency differences. In addition, we added the 
frequency of behavior as a covariate of interest in ANCOVAs. Together, these 
effects showed that the risk and benefit effects were not correlated with 
frequency of choices, except for neural activation in the insula (see 
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supplementary data). That is, activation in the insula was highest for the least 




Figure 3.3: ROI parameter estimates and time series for regions that were sensitive to 
the benefit manipulation (error bars represent standard error). ACC (MNI: -3, 27, 33) 
and right DLPFC (MNI 51, 18, 30) were more active for reciprocate choices where the 
benefit of being trusted was low relative to high. The time-series plots show the data 
collapsed over conditions, gray area represent decision window of participant. 
 
 
Chapter 3  60 
 
Figure 3.4: ROI parameter estimates and time series for regions that were sensitive to 
the risk manipulation (error bars represent standard error). rTPJ (MNI: 45, -43, 32) was 
more active for reciprocate choices when the risk that the first player took by trusting 
was high rather than low. In contrast, the right anterior Insula (MNI: 36, 24, 0) was 
more active for reciprocate choices when the risk that the first player took was low 
relative to high. The time-series plots show the data collapsed over conditions, gray area 




The goal of this study was to investigate the neural correlates of reciprocity 
motives in brain regions that have previously been associated with mentalizing 
(aMPFC, rTPJ), reward and arousal (ventral striatum and insula) and inhibition 
of selfish impulses (ACC, rDLPFC). As expected, our behavioral results 
showed that participants reciprocated more when the first player took a high risk 
to trust and when the benefit of being trusted was high for the trustee, indicating 
that when reciprocating participants took into account both the consequences for 
the other as well as for themselves (Pillutla et al., 2003; van den Bos et al., 
manuscript submitted). Consistent with previous studies, our brain imaging data 
demonstrated that several brain regions worked together when individuals 
reciprocated trust and, in addition, provided more insight into how these regions 
were differentially sensitive to reciprocity motives. 
First, separate analyses revealed that the two important areas of the 
mentalizing network, the aMPFC and rTPJ (Frith and Frith, 2003) have 
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separable functions in reciprocal behavior. Consistent with previous studies, the 
aMPFC was more active when participants defected compared to when they 
reciprocated (Gallagher et al., 2002; Decety et al., 2004). As such, the aMPFC 
was more active when the personal outcome of the decision was the greatest. 
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the aMPFC is important for 
self-referential processing (Northoff et al., 2006; Ochsner, 2008) and with the 
interpretation that the aMPFC may havea general role in the evaluation or 
representation of reward information (Harris et al., 2007; van den Bos et al., 
2007; Hampton et al., 2008). However, supplementary analyses revealed that 
the activation in aMPFC was not sensitive to the magnitude of personal gain 
(see supplementary data). Contrary to our predictions, there was no effect of the 
benefit manipulation on the activity in the aMPFC. Apparently, activation in the 
aMPFC is not directly sensitive to changes in cooperative intentions of the other 
player, but this region is sensitive to increases in personal outcome (defection). 
In future studies, it will be important to not only test motives for reciprocity, but 
also motives for defection. 
In contrast to the aMPFC, the right TPJ was not sensitive to the type of 
choice but was sensitive to the risk manipulation when reciprocating. Activity in 
this area was higher when participants reciprocated when the risk was high 
rather than low. In the high-risk condition, the consequences of the participants’ 
decision to reciprocate were fairly large for the first player compared to the low-
risk condition. This finding indicates that, in line with our hypotheses, the rTPJ 
is involved in the shifting attention from the self to the other (Lamm et al., 
2007) in order to distinguish between the consequences for self and other in a 
social decision-making paradigm (Lamm et al., 2007). This interpretation is 
consistent with a recently postulated hypothesis that argues that the rTPJ is 
involved in the reorientation of attention from self to other (Decety and Lamm, 
2007; Mitchell, 2008). 
Interestingly, our results also show that the activity in the rTPJ is sensitive 
to individual differences in SVO. That is, proself individuals showed more 
activation in the rTPJ when reciprocating, whereas prosocial individuals showed 
more activation in the rTPJ when defecting. Different processes may underlie 
these differences in neural activation for prosocials and proselfs, but one 
explanation may be that individuals with a prosocial orientation have their goals 
more aligned with those of the other, leading to less attention shifting when 
reciprocating, but more attention shifting when defecting (Decety and Hodges, 
2006). These hypotheses should be further tested in future research. 
The ventral striatum and insula were hypothesized to be sensitive to reward 
and arousal manipulations and were expected to be particularly sensitive to 
individual differences in reciprocal behavior. Indeed, regression analyses 
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demonstrated that activity in the striatum was higher for reciprocal choices than 
for defective choices for the prosocial participants (albeit at an unconservative 
threshold, but confirmed by unbiased ROI analyses, see supplementary results), 
whereas the proself participants showed the opposite pattern. The pattern of 
activation for the prosocial individuals is consistent with prior studies, which 
showed that cooperative choices are associated with ventral striatum activity 
(Fehr and Camerer, 2007). Even though the choice to reciprocate resulted in 
larger mutual gain, it also yieled a smaller monetary personal reward. Possibly, 
for prosocial individuals reciprocating in itself has a higher reward value 
whereas for proself individuals the personal gain has a higher reward value. 
This interpretation should be treated with caution, because it relies on reverse 
inferencing (Poldrack, 2006), but the results fit with a hypothesis postulated in a 
recent review analysis on other-regarding preferences (Fehr and Camerer, 
2007). This hypothesis suggests that the ventral striatum represents the positive 
experienced utility of cooperation. 
The insula was also sensitive to individual differences in SVO. However, 
the insula showed the opposite pattern of activity compared to the striatum. 
Furthermore, the insula showed sensitivity to the risk manipulation. The pattern 
of activation suggests that the insula is indeed sensitive to norm violations 
(King-Casas et al., 2008). That is, prosocial participants showed more activation 
in the insula when they defected (the unlikely alternative given their SVO), 
whereas the proself participants showed more activation in the insula when they 
reciprocated (again, the less likely option given their SVO). In addition, the 
insula was activated on those trials where participants chose to reciprocate when 
the risk that the first player took was low. In that case, there was less incentive 
to reciprocate than in the high risk situations. However, even though the choice 
to reciprocate occurred less frequently when the risk was low compared to when 
it was high, our supplementary analyses, using the frequency of the choice as 
covariate, revealed that these effects could not be attributed to a nonspecific 
effect of frequency. Together, these findings support the hypothesis that the 
insula is most active when a personal norm is violated (which can be a 
reciprocate norm for prosocial individuals or a defect norm for proself 
individuals) (Singer et al., 2006; Montague and Lohrenz, 2007). As such, the 
anterior insula have a more general role in social decision-making besides 
marking events as negative, such as pain, disgust or unfair offers (Sanfey et al., 
2004; de Vignemont and Singer, 2006). Rather, the insula may be sensitive to 
the arousal associated with norm violations, which could also explain why the 
anterior insula are activated following other types of unexpected events such as 
a risk prediction error (Preuschoff et al., 2008). Alternatively, the insula 
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responses to violation of personal norms may serve as control signals, which 
mark social expectation violations (King-Casas et al.,2008). 
Prior studies have suggested that cooperative behavior involves not only 
brain regions which are sensitive to mentalizing or reward representation, but 
also the control of impulses and actions. These studies have suggested that the 
ACC and the rDLPFC are important for regulating impulses to either defect or 
cooperate (Knoch et al., 2006; Rilling et al., 2007). Consistent with these earlier 
studies, in the current study, we showed that indeed the ACC and the rDLPFC 
were most active when social impulse control was required. In particular, ACC 
and rDLPFC were activated when participants reciprocated even though the 
benefit of being trusted was low. In other words, when the external incentive to 
reciprocate was low, the ACC and the rDLPFC were more engaged in 
reciprocal decisions. Inspection of the figures shows that the pattern of results 
observed for the insula follows a similar pattern as observed for ACC and 
rDLPFC, regions thought to be important for cognitive control (Ridderinkhof et 
al., 2004) and inhibition of self-oriented impulses (Knoch et al., 2006). It should 
be noted that, in this study, we could not distinguish between brain activity 
related to the actual choice and the appraisal of this choice. Thus, it is possible 
that ACC and rDLPFC activation is associated with the decision phase and the 
insula activation with the appraisal phase. These are important questions to test 
in future research. 
Furthermore, activation in the ACC but not the rDLPFC, was also 
modulated by SVO. In prosocial individuals, the ACC was more active when 
reciprocating than when defecting, whereas in proself individuals, the ACC was 
more active when defecting than when reciprocating. One explanation for its 
role in both overriding the tendency to defect when the benefit is low, and the 
modulation of defecting vs. reciprocating depending on SVO, may be associated 
with the experience of response conflict (Botvinick et al., 1999). Importantly, 
activation in ACC and rDLPFC was not correlated with the frequency of 
making specific choices, arguing against the possibility that the effects can be 
explained by non-specific frequency effects. 
 
Conclusion 
Together, the results of this study demonstrated that several brain regions are 
differentially sensitive to reciprocity motives. We demonstrate that even though 
several brain areas are sensitive to individual differences in SVO (ACC, insula, 
rTPJ), these regions are differentially sensitive to the risk and benefit 
manipulations. The combined interpretation of sensitivity to SVO and 
modulation by risk and benefit manipulations allowed for advanced inference of 
the putative roles of these regions in reciprocal behavior. Our analyses revealed 
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the different motives for reciprocity, the risk for the trustor and the benefit for 
the trustee could be dissociated on the neural level. This study suggests a 
number of directions for future research as well as testable hypotheses. The 
differential involvement of the reported regions in reciprocal exchange 
demonstrates that neuroimaging methods may provide insight in the neural 
correlates of behavioral differences between individuals. It is possible that 
similar social interaction tasks could be used to explore social processing in a 
variety of populations, including developmental populations as well as 
individuals who fail to take the intentions of others into account. 
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3.5 Supplementary material 
 
Supplementary Table 3.1: Percentage of average reciprocity in the four conditions. 
Standard errors between brackets.  
 
 High Benefit Low Benefit 
High Risk 64% (.06) 53% (.06) 
Low Risk 58% (.06) 27% (.04) 
 
Supplementary Table 3.2: percentage of cooperative choices per factor level and 
participant. Participants in red are excluded from further fMRI analysis because there 





High Risk  
Low Benefit 
Low Risk  
High Benefit 
Low Risk  
Low Benefit 
101 9 (36%) 11 (48%) 17 (49%) 15 (36%) 
102* 43 (100%) 44 (100%) 48 (100%) 5 (12%) 
103 19 (76%) 17 (74%) 17 (49%) 21 (50%) 
104 22 (88%) 19 (83%) 32 (91%) 26 (62%) 
105 17 (68%) 11 (48%) 22 (63%) 18 (43%) 
106 14 (56%) 8 (35%) 15 (43%) 23 (55%) 
107 13 (52%) 7 (30%) 23 (66%) 6 (14%) 
108 22 (88%) 20 (87%) 29 (83%) 12 (29%) 
109* 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
110 8 (32%) 13 (57%) 4 (11%) 6 (14%) 
111 23 (92%) 8 (35%) 29 (83%) 10 (24%) 
112 12 (48%) 9 (39%) 9 (26%) 5 (12%) 
113* 43 (100%) 44 (100%) 45 (94%) 25 (48%) 
114 21 (84%) 17 (74%) 23 (66%) 27 (64%) 
115 22 (88%) 12 (52%) 26 (74%) 10 (24%) 
116 22 (88%) 19 (83%) 31 (89%) 11 (26%) 
117 21 (84%) 16 (70%) 30 (86%) 9 (21%) 
118 20 (80%) 8 (35%) 29 (83%) 6 (14%) 
119 13 (52%) 10 (43%) 14 (40%) 5 (12%) 
120* 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
121 7 (28%) 7 (30%) 6 (17%) 5 (12%) 






Chapter 3  66 
Relation reciprocity level and activation in ROIs 
The relation between individual differences in reciprocity and BOLD responses 
are further illustrated based on ROI values in Supplementary Figure 3.1. Based 
on the results of the regressions analysis the following reported results are all 
from the defect > reciprocate contrast. Subsequent post hoc analyses revealed 
that the reported effects were also significant for the reciprocate > fixation 
contrast but not for the defect > fixation contrast. Thus, these effects were 
primarily driven by differences in neural activation associated with reciprocity 
choices. 
 The patterns reported in Suppl. Figure 1 demonstrate a positive correlation 
between reciprocal behavior and activation in the anterior Insula (bilateral), the 
ACC and the right TPJ(r = .79, p<.001, r = .59, p<.005 and r = .65, p<.001 
respectively). These patterns demonstrate that the individuals who reciprocated 
less (pro-self oriented) recruited these areas more when reciprocating compared 
to defecting whereas the prosocial individuals recruited these areas more when 
defecting compared to reciprocating.  . 
In contrast, there was a negative correlation with reciprocity scores and 
activity in the ventral striatum (r = -.64, p<.001, see Supplementary Figure 3.1). 
These patterns show that the individuals who reciprocated more (prosocial 
individuals) activated these areas more when reciprocating, 
 
Frequency effects 
The results above show that the changes in activation can be influenced by 
frequency effects. To test whether the reported effects of Risk and Benefit 
correlated activation in the ROIs can be explained by frequency differences we 
performed several additional analyses. 
First, we correlated the beta values for Low Benefit and High Benefit 
conditions with the frequency of these choices in the right DLPFC and the 
ACC.  In all cases there was no significant correlation between the frequency of 
the choice and the beta values (all p’s >.3). The same analysis for the anterior 
insula resulted in a negative correlation between High Benefit Reciprocate 
frequency and beta values for neural activation in this condition (r = -.588 p < 
.05) and for Low Benefit Reciprocate frequency and neural activation in this 
condition (r = -.719, p < .001). This negative correlation indicates that the less 
frequent a choice was made, the higher the beta value for that choice. 
 Finally, we analyzed the effect of High and Low Risk in the anterior insula 
and TPJ in a similar manner. There were no correlations between frequency and 
beta values in the TPJ and Insula (all p’s >.1). This result was expected because 
activation in TPJ follows a pattern of activation opposite of frequency 
sensitivity.  
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Subsequently, we performed ANCOVAs with the frequency of the 
decisions as covariate. The results of these analyses show that all the effects 
reported in the original manuscript remain significant (at p<.05 threshold), 
furthermore the frequency covariates were never of significant influence (all p’s 
>.1).  There was again one exception and that was the anterior insula; when 
testing for the effects of risk and benefit with frequency as covariate we found 
that the frequency of high benefit trials was significant (F(1,13) = 4.972, p< 
.044). 
Together, these effects show that risk and benefit effects are not correlated 
with the frequency of choices, except for neural activation related to benefit, but 




























Supplementary Figure 3.1:  Correlations between average level of reciprocity in brain 





































































































































































To further explore our interpretation of aMPFC function we further analyzed its 
sensitivity to reward magnitude. The small difference in the pay-off between 
trials made it possible to look at the neural correlates of the relative difference 
in gain for defect choices. For this analysis we divided the defect trials into 
either low or high gain trials (the difference only being one coin, or ten cents). 
For these analyses we contrasted the high gain defect choices with low gain 
defected choices. These analyses did not yield any significant effects at our 
p<.001 & 12 voxels threshold. Lowering the threshold for exploratory reason 
did not resulted in activation in aMPFC. 
 
 4. Changing brains, changing perspectives:  







Adolescence is characterized by the emergence of advanced forms of social 
perspective-taking and substantial changes in social behavior. Yet, little is 
known about how changes in social cognition are related to changes in brain 
function during adolescence. This study investigated the neural correlates of 
social behavior in three phases of adolescence using fMRI while participants 
played the second player in a Trust Game. With age, adolescents were 
increasingly sensitive to the perspective of the other player as indicated by 
their reciprocal behavior. These advanced forms of social perspective-taking 
were associated with increased involvement of the left temporal parietal 
junction (TPJ) and the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). In 
contrast, young adolescents showed more activity in the anterior medial 
prefrontal cortex (aMPFC), a region previously associated with self-oriented 
processing and mentalizing. These findings suggest that the asynchronous 







"When I was a boy of 14, my father was so ignorant I could hardly stand to 
have the old man around. But when I got to be 21, I was astonished at how 
much the old man had learned in seven years." (Arnett, 2000) 
 
This quote by Mark Twain (1835-1910) illustrates the importance of 
understanding changes in perspective-taking across adolescence. Although this 
phenomenon has attracted attention for centuries, the question how these 
changes arise is still as debated today as it was 100 years ago. For example, it is 
well known that early in adolescence, individuals are still more inclined towards 
self-oriented thought and actions (Eisenberg, Carlo, Murphy, & Van Court 
1995; Elkind, 1985), whereas later in adolescence individuals become more 
inclined towards thinking about others, taking social responsibility and 
controlling their impulses (Steinberg, 2009). Additionally, recent studies have 
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shown that functional changes occur in ‘social brain’ regions (for a review see 
Blakemore, 2008). It is, however, not yet known how changes in brain function 
contribute to specific changes in social behavior and perspective-taking. 
Understanding the emergence of social behavior and perspective-taking in 
adolescence is of high importance to society, as it is the critical transition period 
during which children gradually become independent individuals.  
Recently, reciprocal exchange in social interaction has been examined with 
a simple economic exchange game; the Trust Game (Berg, Dickhaut, & 
McCabe, 1995) (see Figure 4.1). In the Trust Game two players can share a 
certain amount of money. The first player can choose to divide the money 
equally between herself and the second player, or to give it all to the second 
player with the advantage that the amount then increases in value. The second 
player has the choice to reciprocate and share the increased amount of money 
with the first player (act prosocial), or to defect and exploit the given trust by 
keeping most of the money for herself (act proself). This game touches on a 
central issue in the development of social perspective-taking; it requires the 
ability to understand intentions of and benefits for others. 
Prior studies with adults using functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) demonstrated different neural circuits for the receipt and the display of 
prosocial behavior in the Trust Game (King-Casas et al., 2005; Krueger et al., 
2008; van den Bos, van Dijk, Westenberg, Rombouts, & Crone, 2009b). In 
particular, when the second player receives trust from the first player, a network 
of areas including the temporal parietal junction (TPJ) is activated. Several 
meta-analyses have shown that in social contexts the TPJ is important for 
shifting attention between own and other perspectives and inferring intentions 
(Mitchell, 2008; van Overwalle, 2009). It has therefore been suggested that 
within the context of the trust game, receiving trust might result in a shift in 
perspective from self to the other (King-Casas et al., Krueger et al., 2008, van 
den Bos et al., 2009b).  
In contrast, a different network is activated when the second player decides 
to either reciprocate or exploit trust. In particular, anterior medial prefrontal 
cortex (aMPFC) activity has been reported when individuals exploit trust and 
maximize own gains (van den Bos et al., 2009b). This region has also been 
reported to be important for first players when they trust another individual, 
with the expectation of increasing their own pay-off (McCabe et al., 2001). It is 
suggested that the aMPFC activity in context of the Trust Game reflects the 
evaluation of own outcomes or thinking about one’s reputation (Frith & Frith, 
2008).  
Thus, the TPJ and the aMPFC, which together have been described as part of 
the ‘social brain’ network (van Overwalle 2009), seem to have separable roles 
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in reciprocal behavior. Importantly, these regions work in concert with brain 
circuits which are important for regulation of thought and action such as the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (Miller & Cohen, 2001). In particular, 
the DLPFC was found to be important for the control of selfish or self-oriented 
impulses in several economic games (Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, & 
Fehr, 2006; Rilling et al., 2007). Importantly, DLPFC is one of the brain regions 
that shows the most protracted structural as well functional development 
(Crone, 2009). 
One of the predictions that follows from these prior studies is that adolescent 
development of perspective-taking in social decision-making is associated with 
different recruitment of aMPFC, TPJ and DLPFC. Our specific hypotheses 
about the neural developmental brain changes related to social behavior were 
informed by studies showing developmental changes in the brain during 
childhood and adolescence. In prior studies using simple tasks that involve 
thinking about different social scenarios, young adolescents showed less activity 
in TPJ, but increased activity in aMPFC compared to adults (Blakemore et al., 
2007; Pfeifer, Lieberman, & Dapretto, 2007; Wang, Lee, Sigman, & Dapretto, 
2006).We predicted that defecting (a self-oriented act) would be associated with 
increased aMPFC activity, given its role in thinking about self-motives relative 
to intentions and goals of others. Under the hypothesis that especially in early 
adolescence individuals are more inclined towards self-oriented thought and 
action (Eisenberg et al., 1995; Elkind, 1985), we predicted higher defection in 
early adolescents and more activity in self-related brain areas (aMPFC), relative 
to mid adolescents and adults. Furthermore, under the hypothesis that 
adolescents show late changes in intention consideration (Blakemore, 2008), we 
predicted that activity in TPJ when receiving trust would increase between early 
adolescence and adulthood. Finally, based on developmental studies that 
demonstrated increased activity in cognitive control and emotion regulation 
tasks with increasing age (Crone et al., 2006; Steinberg, 2005), we expected that 
DLPFC would be increasingly engaged during adolescence in intention 
consideration and reciprocity. 
To test these hypotheses, we examined behavioral choices and neural 
responses of second players in the Trust Game in three age groups selected 
based on adolescent developmental stage; pubertal early adolescents (12-14 
years), post-pubertal mid adolescents (15-17 years) and young adults (18-22 
years). Based on our own and other behavioral studies with economic games, 
we expected an increase in the general level of reciprocity with age (Sutter & 
Kocher, 2007; van den Bos, van Dijk, Westenberg, & Crone, 2009a).  
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Figure 4.1: A: Each trial started with a 3-second display of the two choice alternatives 
for the first player; trust or no trust. After 3 seconds the trust or no-trust decision was 
shown to the participant. When the first player chose not to trust, the no-trust outcome 
was visually highlighted for 3- sec and the trial ended. For those trials on which the first 
player chose to trust, participants were instructed to make their decision within a 5-
second window. The 5-sec decision-display was followed by either a 3-sec display of 
the outcome of their decision (reciprocate or defect) or a “too late” screen in case the 
participant did not respond within 5 seconds. In case of trust the total amount of money 
increased with a factor between 1.8 and 2.2.   
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To further test the ability to understand others’ intentions, we added a task 
condition in which we manipulated the amount that the first player could lose 
by trusting the second player (the participant) (Malhotra, 2004; van den Bos et 
al., 2009a, 2009b, see Figure 4.1). In the analyses the trials on which the first 
player could lose a relatively large amount were labeled high-risk choices, and 
the trials on which the first player could lose only a small amount were labeled 
low-risk choices. Higher level of reciprocity in the high-risk context is 
hypothesized to reflect the recognition of the positive intentions of the first 
player, relative to the low-risk context (Malhtora, 2004; Pillutla, Malhotra, & 
Murnighan, 2003). As a consequence, this additional manipulation enabled us to 
obtain a behavioral measure of social perspective-taking within the task, with 
the expectation of larger risk-related reciprocity differentiation (RDS) for the 
older participants who are more capable of identifying intentions and integrating 





Sixty-two healthy right-handed paid volunteers (30 female, 32 male; ages 12-
22, M = 16.2, SD = 2.9) participated in the fMRI experiment. Eight participants 
were excluded from the fMRI analysis because they had an unreliable number 
of observations in one of the conditions (n<4). Age groups were based on 
adolescent development stage, resulting in groups composed of early 
adolescence/pubertal (12- to 14-year-olds, N=21, 11 females), mid 
adolescence/post-pubertal, (15- to 17-year-olds, N=15, 7 females) and young 
adults (18- to 22-year-olds, N=18, 9 females). A chi square analysis indicated 
that the gender distribution was similar across age groups (X2 (2) = .114, p = 
.94). The data from the adults were also reported in another study (van den Bos 
et al., 2009b). Participants gave informed consent for the study, and all 
procedures were approved by the medical ethical committee of the Leiden 
University Medical Center (LUMC).  
Participants completed the Raven Standard Progressive Matrices (R-SPM) 
for an estimate of their reasoning skills (Raven, 1941), and the Tanner scale 
(Tanner, 1975) for an estimate of their stage of pubertal development (see Table 
S4.1). There were no significant differences in IQ between the different age 
groups (F (2, 51) = .62, p = .54), and the Tanner stage development 
demonstrated a significant difference in puberty levels between age groups 12-
14 (M = 2.95, SE = .24) and 15-17 (M = 4.11, SE = .22, t(1,33) = 3.89, p < 
.001).  
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4.2.2. Task Procedure 
The procedure for the Trust Game was similar to the previously reported 
imaging study with adults (van den Bos et al., 2009b, see Figure 4.1). 
Participants were instructed that in an earlier phase of the study, other 
individuals had been assigned the roles of first player, and that they would 
complete the study in the role of second player inside the scanner. Furthermore, 
they were instructed that both the participant and the other players were 
financially rewarded based on the choices made during experiment. In each 
round of the experiment, participants were paired with a different, anonymous 
player who was matched for age and gender. At the end of the experiment the 
computer randomly selected the outcome of 5 trials and the sum of these trials 
determined the participants’ payoff. 
Unknown to the participant the decisions of the first player were not the 
decisions of real other participants, but were preprogrammed to reflect the 
behavioral pattern that was displayed in an earlier study (van den Bos et al, 
2009a). In total, the task consisted of 145 trials; 96 trust trials and 49 no trust 
trials. The trials were divided over 4 blocks of 8.5 minutes each. The trials were 
presented in pseudo-random order with a jittered interstimulus interval 
(min=1.1-sec, max=9.9 sec, mean= 3.37 sec). 
Before the experiment participants received a written explanation of the task, 
filled out a questionnaire and played 12 “practice” rounds. None of the 
participants failed this test.  
 
4.2.3. fMRI Data Acquisition and Analysis 
Data were acquired using a 3.0T Philips Achieva scanner at the LUMC. T2*-
weighted EPIs (TR= 2.2 sec, TE= 30ms, 80 x 80 matrix, FOV = 220, 35 
2.75mm transverse slices with 0.28mm gap) were obtained during 4 functional 
runs of 232 volumes each. A high-resolution T1-weighted anatomical scan was 
obtained from each participant after the functional runs. Data were analyzed 
using SPM2 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London). The 
functional time series were realigned, normalized to EPI templates, and spatially 
smoothed using a 8 mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian kernel. There were 
no significant differences in movement parameters between age groups (F (2, 
51) = 1.03, p = .36).  
Statistical analyses were performed on individual participants’ data using the 
general linear model in SPM2. The fMRI time series data were modeled by a 
series of events convolved with a canonical haemodynamic response function 
(HRF). The start of the first player’s choice display, no-trust and trust outcomes 
were modeled as 0-duration events. The trust outcomes were divided into 
reciprocate and defect decisions. These trial functions were used as covariates in 
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a general linear model, along with a basic set of cosine functions that high-pass 
filtered the data, and a covariate for run effects. The least-squares parameter 
estimates of height of the best-fitting HRF for each condition were used in 
pairwise contrasts. At the group level, contrasts between conditions were 
computed by performing one-tailed t-tests on these images, treating participants 
as a random effect. Results were considered significant at an uncorrected 
threshold p > .001 and k >10 voxels.  
 We further performed voxelwise ANOVAs to identify regions that showed 
age related differences in relation to social decision-making.  The 
developmental patterns in the behavior and fMRI data we constrained to a 
specific set of contrasts that captured developmental trends (linear increase [-1 1 
0] ∩ [0 -1 1], early increase [-2 1 1], late increase [-1 -1 2], and their inverse) in 
the trust vs. no trust and defect vs. reciprocate comparisons. For the age 
analyses we used a more stringent threshold of p < .0002, using a Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons (p < .001 / 6). 
We used the MARSBAR toolbox for SPM2 (Brett et al., 2002) to extract 
BOLD activity time series in Regions of Interest (ROI) to further characterize 
patterns of activity. We created ROIs of the regions that were identified in the 




4.3.1. Behavioral Results 
 
Increasing effect of intentions on behavior. On average participants reciprocated 
about half of the trials (M = 53%), but there were large individual differences in 
behavior (SD = 17%, Min = 12%, Max = 87%; see Figure 4.2A). As predicted, 
the analyses of risk showed that participants reciprocated more when the risk for 
player 1 was high compared to when it was low (F (2, 51) = 25.22, p < .001, see 
Figure 4.2B). Even though there were no age related differences in mean 
reciprocal choices (F (2, 51) < 1, p = .66; see Figure 4.2A), there was an age x 
risk interaction for percentage of reciprocal choices (F (2, 51) = 5.44, p < .007, 
see Figure 4.2B). As expected, a post hoc Tukey test confirmed that all groups 
differed significantly from each other in RDS score at p < .05. Furthermore, 
only for the older adolescents and adults there was more reciprocity for high-
risk than for low-risk trials (both p’s < .01), whereas the youngest adolescent 
group did not differentiate between high- and low-risk trials (p = .8, Figure 
4.2B).  
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Figure 4.2: A) Average level of reciprocity for the total duration of the experiment 
displayed separately for each age group. Error bars represent standard deviation. Testing 
for outliers at 95% confidence interval did not yield any outliers for any of the age 
groups. B) The risk differentiation score (high-risk reciprocity – low-risk reciprocity) 
for each age group. This graph shows that the RDS increased with age, a post hoc 
Tukey test revealed that all groups differed significantly from each other (p < .05). Error 
bars are standard errors.  
 
4.3.2 fMRI Results 
 
Receiving Trust. To identify the neural correlates of receiving trust, which was 
hypothesized to be associated with consideration of the intentions of the other, 
we compared the [Trust – No Trust] contrast across all participants. This 
analysis revealed increased activity in a large network of areas associated with 
cognitive control; the DLPFC, parietal cortex and dorsal medial frontal 
cortex/anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (see Table 1). Subsequently, we tested 
the hypothesis of age related changes in activity related to receiving trust by 
performing mixed linear and non-linear ANOVAs with age group as between 
participant factor. As anticipated, the conjunction contrast [-1 1 0] ∩ [0 -1 1] 
demonstrated age related changes in left TPJ. Additionally, the contrast [-1 -1 2] 
revealed activity in right DLPFC (see Figure 4.3, Table 4.1). Time-series 
analyses of l-TPJ showed heightened activity for both reciprocate and defect 
choices compared to no-trust trials, however this difference was not significant 
in early adolescence, whereas it was present for late adolescents and greatest for 
the young adults (see Figure 4.3). In contrast, the time series analysis for 
DLFPC revealed heightened activity for reciprocate and defect choices relative 
to no-trust trials only for the young adults.  The correlations between individual 
risk difference scores (RDS) and activity in these areas (r = .37, p < .006 for l-
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TPJ and r = .45, p < .001 for r-DLPFC, see Figure S4.1) strengthens the 
hypothesis of a relation between l-TPJ and r-DLPFC function and intention 




Figure 4.3: Age differences in l-TPJ and r-LPFC activity associated with receiving 
trust. A) Activation maps with the clusters that show significant linear [-1 1 0] ∩ [0 -1 
1] and non-linear [-1 -1 2] increases in trust related activation with age. B) Showing the 
time-course of activation in the l-TPJ and the r-DLPFC related to defect, reciprocate and 
no trust. Along the x-axis 0 seconds indicates 1) the onset of the choice for the 
participant in case of trust, or 2) the outcome of the experiment in case of no trust. 
 
Defect vs. Reciprocate. Next, we investigated the neural correlates of proself 
versus prosocial motivated acts, by examining differences in neural activity for 
reciprocate and defect choices following trust outcomes. As expected, the 
[Defect – Reciprocate] contrast across all participants revealed increased BOLD 
response in the aMPFC (Figure 4.4 and Table 4.1). Additional activity was 
found in the left anterior Insula and the right inferior frontal gyrus. Consistent 
with our previous findings (van den Bos et al., 2009b), the opposite contrast 
[Reciprocate – Defect] did not result in significant changes in neural activity.  
To further investigate whether there were age related changes in [Defect - 
Reciprocate] activity, we performed linear and non-linear ANOVAs with age 
group as between subjects factor on the [Defect – Reciprocate] contrast. The 
contrast [-2 1 1] revealed an age related change which was specific for the 
aMPFC (see Figure 4.4 and Table 4.1). These findings demonstrate that the 
differential engagement of the aMPFC increases between early and mid 
adolescence and then remains stable in mid to late adolescence/early adulthood.    
 The time-series of the aMPFC region revealed increased activity compared 
to baseline for defect choices in all age groups. Closer inspection of the 
activation patterns revealed that early adolescents also demonstrate heightened 
activity for reciprocal choices compared to baseline. Thus, consistent with the 
hypothesis of heightened aMPFC activity in early adolescence, we demonstrate 
a decrease in aMPFC activity related to reciprocal choices with age. This was 
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further confirmed by a significant negative age correlation for reciprocate > 
fixation (r = .56, p < .02). No such correlation was observed for defect > 
fixation (r = .06, p = .72).  
 
 
Figure 4.4: Age differences in aMPFC activity associated with defect vs. reciprocate 
decisions. A) Activation maps with the clusters that show an early increase [-2 1 1] in 
the difference in defect vs reciprocate activation. B) Showing the time-course of 
activation in the l-TPJ and the r-DLPFC related to defect, reciprocate and no trust.  
Along the x-axis 0 seconds indicates 1) the onset of the choice for the participant in case 
of trust, or 2) the outcome of the experiment in case of no trust. 
 
Table 4.1: Brain Regions revealed by whole brain contrasts. 
Anatomical region L/R vxls Z MNI coordinates 
    x y z 
Receiving Trust       
[Trust  - No Trust]       
   Superior Parietal Lobule R 71 4.14 21 -66 54 
   Precuneus L 121 4.18 -30 -45 42 
   Caudate / Dorsal Striatum L/R 431 5.20 -15 0 15 
ANOVA [Trust  - No Trust]  
 [-1 1 0] ∩ [0 -1 1] 
      
   TPJ L 44 4.06 -44 -46 29 
ANOVA [Trust  - No Trust]  
 [-1 -1 2] 
      
   DLPFC R 56 4.01 44 16 21 
Choice Type       
[Defect – Reciprocate]       
   anterior Medial Prefrontal Cortex L/R 774 4.89 0 42 6 
   Visual Cortex L/R 733 8.82 6 -93 12 
   Insular Cortex L 63 4.82 -36 24 -12 
   Inferior Frontal Gyrus R 27 3.95 62 21 0 
[Reciprocate – Defect]       
   Visual Cortex  L/R 490 7.72 6 -73 6 
ANOVA [Defect – Reciprocate]  
 [-2 1 1] 
      
   anterior Medial Prefrontal Cortex L/R 78 5.84 2 42 15 
MNI coordinators for main effects, peak voxels reported at p < .001, at least 12 
contiguous voxels. Age contrasts were corrected for multiple comparisons; p < .001 / 6. 
For each ROI, the center of mass is reported. 
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Individual differences. A final question concerned the relation between neural 
activity and the average level of prosocial behavior displayed in the task. A 
whole-brain regression analyses on the [Defect – Reciprocate] contrast with 
average reciprocity per individual as predictor revealed activation in bilateral 
anterior Insula, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and r-DLPFC (Table 
S4.2, Figure 4.5). Higher reciprocity was thus associated with more activation 
in these areas when defecting, and higher defection was associated with more 
activation in these areas when reciprocating. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Activation maps for the regression analysis on the [Defect – Reciprocate] 
contrast with average level of reciprocity as covariate for all participants, threshold at p 
< .001. Separate scatter plots representing the correlations between the [Defect-
Reciprocate] parameter estimate and average reciprocity for each age group separately, 
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4.4 Discussion  
We investigated adolescence as a transitional period, during which linear as 
well as non-linear changes in social reasoning and associated brain circuitry 
take place (Casey et al., 2008). Indeed, analyses of age differences demonstrate 
that the regions implicated in social behavior followed asynchronous 
developmental patterns, with faster maturation of aMPFC but late maturation of 
l-TPJ and r-DLPFC. This asynchronous pattern of functional brain development 
may bias adolescents towards different social behavior in daily life (Casey et al., 
2008; Paus,  Keshavan, & Giedd, 2008; Steinberg, 2005).  
The behavioral data are consistent with prior observational studies which 
marked adolescence as a transition period for social behavior (Eisenberg et al., 
1995, 2005). Interestingly, these results highlight that adolescence is not 
necessarily characterized by general increases of prosocial behavior, but rather 
by an increase in the sensitivity to the perspective of others in social decision-
making (see also Blakemore 2008; Kohlberg, 1981; Selman 1980). That is, 
increased consideration of consequences for others (i.e., increased RDS) was 
accompanied by both an increase in reciprocity on high-risk trials and a 
decrease of reciprocity for low-risk trials, and importantly the youngest 
adolescents did not show sensitivity to the perspective of the other. 
Alternatively, the age related increase in risk differentiation could be the result 
of increased inequity aversion (Fehr & Schmidt 1999). Both explanations are 
consistent with the notion of advanced forms perspective-taking in adolescence. 
Our reasoning that receiving trust was associated with more active 
deliberation of the motives of others was further supported by increased activity 
in the l-TPJ, an area that is implicated in taking the perspective of others and 
inferring intentions (Mitchell, 2008; van Overwalle, 2009). In support of the 
hypothesized shift in attention from self to the other during adolescence, we 
observed an increase in the engagement of the l-TPJ with age. Moreover, the 
suggested role of the l-TPJ in shifting perspective from self to other was further 
supported by the correlation between l-TPJ activity and the behavioral index of 
perspective-taking (RDS); the more participants differentiated between the low 
an high-risk context, the more active the l-TPJ was after receiving trust. In 
addition, the pattern of activation of the l-TPJ, and the absence of an effect of 
risk on behavior for the youngest adolescents, suggests that in early adolescence 
focus of attention is not (yet) on the outcomes and intentions of others, and that 
there are still changes between mid adolescence and young adulthood in the 
focus on the other. These findings are in line with prior social scenario reading 
studies, which also demonstrated an increase in the l-TPJ activity between ages 
10-18 and 22-32-years (Blakemore et al., 2007). Furthermore, recent studies 
revealed that TPJ is correlated with self reports of altruism (Tankersley et al., 
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2007) and charitable giving (Hare et al., 2010), consistent with the presumed 
role of shifting attention from self to others in a social context. 
Besides activity in the l-TPJ, we found that young adults, when receiving 
trust, showed increased activity in the r-DLPFC, an area previously found to be 
involved in tasks requiring cognitive control (Miller & Cohen, 2001) and the 
control of selfish or self-oriented impulses in context of social dilemmas 
(Rilling et al., 2007). This activity may indicate a regulatory role of r-DLPFC in 
social exchange as it was more active for adults for the non-preferred response 
alternative (Knoch et al., 2006). Consistent with studies which employed 
cognitive control paradigms (Crone et al., 2006) our results indicated an 
increase in the engagement of the r-DLPFC with age.  Apparently, over the 
course of adolescence not only the development of the l-TPJ, but also the r-
DLPFC contributes to a refinement in social behavior, which is supported by 
the finding that activity in the r-DLPFC also correlated with the ability to infer 
intentions of others (risk difference score). Thus, the differential involvement of 
l-TPJ and r-DLPFC marks mid adolescence (15-17-years) as an important 
transition period for intention consideration and social behavior, during which 
not all children are yet recruiting the associated brain regions to the same extent 
as adults, but during which emerging intention consideration is on its way. 
If the changes in social behavior are associated with increased consideration 
of the outcomes for the other, what then motivated adolescents to act selfish? 
What are the neural correlates of self-oriented behavior? These questions were 
tackled by the comparison of defect and reciprocate choices which revealed 
increased activity in the aMPFC for defect choices in young adults and mid 
adolescents. Given the role of the aMPFC in processing self-referential and self-
relevant events (for a review see van Overwalle, 2009), these findings suggest 
that participants were more involved in self-oriented thought when they defect 
and thus maximize personal outcome. The question then arises; how does this 
region support self-oriented acts in early adolescence; do adolescents show 
increased activity for defect choices? Intriguingly, this was not the case. When 
acting pro-self (i.e., when defecting), early adolescents showed similar activity 
in aMPFC as mid adolescents and young adults. When reciprocating, however, 
young adolescents also showed activity in aMPFC. This activity was not found 
in mid adolescents and adults. One of the fascinating questions for future 
research is to test the hypothesis that even when reciprocating young 
adolescents are engaged in self-referential thoughts. Prior research has 
demonstrated that in late childhood/early adolescence, social interaction is 
considered from an egocentric perspective (Eisenberg et al., 1995; Elkind, 
1985). Possibly it is not until mid adolescence that a prosocial act becomes 
more automatic and less self-engaged.  
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Although meta-analyses of social cognition for adults (Lieberman, 2007; van 
Overwalle 2009) and adolescents (Blakemore, 2008) have indicated the 
importance of the aMPFC in self referential processes, other research has 
implicated this region in mentalizing, or thinking about what others are thinking 
about you (Amodio & Frith, 2006). In particular, in the context of social 
interactions the role of the aMPFC has been related to considering one’s 
reputation (Frith & Frith, 2008). Future studies should unravel which of these 
aspects of self-referential processing is changing in early to mid adolescence. 
This study brings us a step closer towards understanding why Mark Twain 
started to understand his father better when he was 21 than when he was 14. 
Most likely this was associated with increased perspective-taking skills 
subserved by interacting brain regions important for social reasoning. Future 
research could benefit from analyzing connectivity between these areas to better 
understand how these regions contribute to social behavior (Burnett & 
Blakemore, 2009). Finally, prior studies have shown that the combined use of 
neuroimaging and game theoretical paradigms can further the understanding of 
the neural underpinnings of psychopathology (Chiu et al., 2009).Therefore, the 
current findings on normative social development can also be the basis for 
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4.5 Supplementary Material 
 
Table S4.1. Group scores for IQ, reaction times (RT), head movement and 
gender distribution (SD = Standard Deviation; mm= millimeter). None of the 
group differences are significant (all p’s > .5) 
 
Group differences 
 12-14 years 15-17years 18-22years 
Raven IQ (SD) 121.2 (5.2) 121.5(6.2) 119.2(8.1) 
RT in seconds (SD) 1.6(0.6) 1.7(0.6) 1.8(0.5) 
Movement (mm) 0.75 0.76 0.73 
Female (Male) 11(10) 7(8) 9(9) 
 
Table S4.2. : Brain Regions revealed by regression analysis 
Anatomical region L/R voxels Z MNI 
coordinates 
    x y z 
Regression [Defect – Reciprocity] w/    Z    
avg.  reciprocity       
   anterior Cingulate Cortex L/R 335 4.70 -9 27 36 
   anterior Insula R 241 5.12 33 21 0 
    L 133 4.72 -33 24 0 
Superior parietal cortex R 150 4.04 21 -66 54 
   DLPFC  R 84 4.38 48 18 24 
       
MNI coordinates for main effects across all participants, peak voxels reported at 







Figure S4.1:Plots showing the correlation between parameter estimates for the Trust -  
No Trust contrast and the risk differentiation scores (RDS), in the l-TPJ and the r-
DLPFC.










































5. Dissociable brain networks involved in 






In this functional magnetic resonance imaging study, we examined 
developmental changes in the brain regions involved in reactions to unfair 
allocations.  Previous studies on adults suggested that reactions to unfairness 
are not only affected by the distribution itself but also by the ascribed 
intentionality of the proposer. In the current study, we employed the mini 
Ultimatum Game (Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2003) to examine responder 
behavior to unfair offers of varying degrees of intentionality. Sixty-eight 
participants from four age groups (10-, 13-, 15-, and 20-year-olds) carried out 
the task while fMRI data were acquired. Replicating previous findings in 
adults, participants of all ages showed activation in the bilateral insula and 
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) during rejection of unintentional but 
acceptance of intentional unfair offers. Rejection of unintentional unfair 
offers involved increasing activation with age in the temporoparietal junction 
and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. These findings provide evidence for an 
early developing insula-dACC network involved in detecting personal norm-
violations and gradually increasing involvement of temporal and prefrontal 
brain regions related to intentionality considerations in social reasoning. The 
results are discussed in light of recent findings on the development of the 






Fairness consideration is a key component of social interactions and involves 
the comparison between outcomes for self and other. People prefer equitable 
distribution of resources and react strongly to inequitable distributions, which 
has also been termed as inequity aversion (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). In this sense, 
fairness forms a socially shared norm. Violations of norms, behaviors that 
deviate from the norm, are generally perceived to be aversive, where people 
want to be nice to those who treat them fairly and hurt others who do not treat 
them fairly (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). However, assessment of behaviors that 
deviate from the norm goes paired with a second process assessing its 
intentionality (Falk et al., 2008; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). For example, Blount 
 Chapter 5  86 
(1995) showed that behavioral reactions to unfairness are strongly modulated by 
the ascription of intentionality: people react less negative to disadvantageous 
inequity when they feel the inequity was not intentional. This process of 
intentionality understanding requires the ability to mentalize about other 
individuals’ goals and intentions. In human development, behavioral studies 
have suggested that inequitable distribution of resources (i.e., unfairness) is 
aversive from an age as early as 7-8 years (Fehr et al., 2008), followed by 
increased understanding of intentionality in adolescence (Güroğlu et al., 2009; 
Selman, 1980; van den Bos et al., 2010). The goal of this study was to examine 
the development of the neural correlates of intentionality understanding related 
to fairness considerations.  
Neuroscientific studies have identified separable brain regions involved in 
these different aspects of fairness considerations. These studies typically 
employ the Ultimatum Game (Güth et al., 1982), where two players are given a 
stake to share. The first player (the proposer) makes an offer that the second 
player (the responder) can accept or reject. Acceptance of the offer results in 
sharing the stake between the two players as proposed, whereas rejection of the 
offer yields both players to go empty-handed. On the one hand, functional 
magnetic resonance studies using the Ultimatum Game suggest that bilateral 
insula activation might reflect the detection of norm violations following unfair 
proposals (Güroğlu et al., 2010; Sanfey et al., 2003). In addition, transcranial 
magnetic stimulation and neuroimaging studies suggest that the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) might be important for overriding self-interest 
(accepting unfair offers in an Ultimatum Game) and thereby enable participants 
to act upon their inequity aversion, or violation of the fairness norm (Knoch et 
al., 2010; Knoch et al., 2006a; van 't Wout et al., 2005). 
On the other hand, considering others’ intentions involves the activation of 
the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) (Frith & Frith, 2007; van Overwalle, 2009). 
Activity in this region has been related to switching attention between different 
perspectives (Mitchell, 2008) and is also involved in competitive games (Assaf 
et al., 2009; Halko et al., 2009; Polezzi et al., 2008) and charitable giving (Hare 
et al., 2010). A neuroimaging study with adults showed that the insula, DLPFC 
and TPJ had dissociable patterns of activation during a fairness game which 
allowed for the separation of processes involved in fairness considerations 
(Güroğlu et al., 2010). In sum, neuroimaging findings suggest that the insula 
might be involved in detecting social norm violations, the DLPFC in the 
regulation social behavior (e.g., rejection of unfair offers), and the TPJ in 
intentionality considerations.  
Brain regions such as TPJ and DLPFC show protracted structural 
development (Gogtay et al., 2004), suggesting that the ability to understand 
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intentions and the control of selfish impulses mature relatively late. Indeed, 
recent behavioral and neuroimaging studies provide support for the 
development of perspective taking (Dumontheil et al., 2009) and the 
contribution of the TPJ to social reasoning across adolescence (Sebastian et al., 
2008; van den Bos et al., 2011). In previous behavioral research, we 
demonstrated that the ability to judge fairness develops at an early age, whereas 
the ability to understand intentions does not develop fully until late adolescence 
(Güroğlu et al., 2009).  
Accordingly, we hypothesized that that the slow emergence of intentionality 
consideration in fairness judgments is associated with protracted development 
of the DLPFC and TPJ. Using the mini-Ultimatum game, we examined 
intentionality understanding in unintended versus intended unfair offers. We 
predicted that responses to unintended unfair offers would require increased 
intentionality consideration and regulation of social behavior, and therefore 
would be associated with increased DLPFC and TPJ activation that emerges 
gradually over adolescence. Further, we hypothesize that TPJ activity might be 
increased during the rejection of unintentional offers, because the participants 
might then make additional considerations about what the proposer might think 
about their rejection, which is generally not considered to be the socially 





Sixty-eight participants from four age groups took part in the study: 10-year-
olds (N = 17, M age = 10.4, SD = 0.86; 6 females), 13-year-olds (N= 15, M age 
= 13.4, SD = 0.51; 8 females), 15-year-olds (N= 13, M age = 15.4, SD = 0.51; 5 
females), and 20-year-olds (N= 23, M age = 20.4, SD = 1.67; 13 females). 
Gender distribution was similar across age groups (χ2(3) = 2.39, p = .50). The 
data from the young adults have been previously reported (Güroğlu et al., 
2010). All participants were healthy and right-handed volunteers without 
neurological or psychiatric impairments. All participants provided informed 
consent; participants younger than 18 years-old were accompanied by their 
parents who also provided consent. A radiologist reviewed all anatomical scans; 
no anomalies were found.  
In order to obtain an estimate of intelligence, 10-year-olds completed two 
subscales (Block design and Similarities) of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for 
Children (WISC; Wechsler, 1991), 13- and 15-year-olds completed the same 
subscales of the (revised) adult version, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
(WAIS-R; Wechsler, 1997) and 20-year-olds completed the Raven Standard 
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Progressive Matrices (Carpenter et al., 1990). The scores were converted to 
Intelligence Quotient (IQ) estimates and participants had average IQ (M = 
107.93, SD = 11.53); there were no significant age differences (F (3, 66) = 1.69, 
p = .18) and IQ scores did not correlate with behavioral performance in terms of 
rejection rates of unfair offers (all r (67) < 0.14, p > 0.27).  
 
5.2.2 Task description 
Participants played the role of the responder in the modified version of the 
Ultimatum Game (UG) which incorporates intentionality considerations 
(Güroğlu et al., 2009; Güroğlu et al., 2010). In this version, the first player 
(proposer) is presented with a fixed set of two distributions for sharing the stake 
(here 10 coins) with the responder (i.e., the second player). There were three 
conditions in the game; in each condition one of the distributions was an unfair 
distribution of the stake with 8 coins for the proposer and 2 coins for the 
responder (i.e., 8/2 offer). The three conditions were termed depending on the 
alternative offer pitted against the 8/2 offer: a) 5/5 offer (fair-alternative), b) 2/8 
offer (hyperfair-alternative), and c) 8/2 offer (no-alternative). 
Participants practiced the task (24 trials) on a computer before the scanning 
session and subsequently they played 168 trials of the game with anonymous 
age and gender matched partners. These 168 trials consisted of 126 trials of 
unfair offers (42 per condition, 3 conditions: fair-, hyperfair-, and no-
alternative) and 42 alternative offers (21 for fair- and hyperfair-alternative 
conditions each). The trials were presented in three blocks of 42 trials lasting 
about 8.3 min each.  
Each trial started with the presentation of the fixation cross followed by the 
presentation of the set of offers available to the proposer, where the offer made 
by the proposer was encircled in red, and the Yes and No buttons (see Figure 
5.1). Participants could accept or reject the offer by pressing a button using the 
index and middle fingers of their right hand. If they failed to respond within 
5000 ms, a screen displaying ‘Too late!’ was presented for 1000 ms. Upon 
responding, the response was presented on the screen until the end of the 6000 
ms. Trials were randomized and presented with a jittered interstimulus interval 
(mean = 1530 s, min = 550 ms, max = 4950 ms; optimized with OptSeq2, 


















Figure 5.1: Visual display of events presented in the scanner task. Trials started with a 
jittered fixation screen lasting 550-4950 ms. The left panel in the decision screen 
displayed the name of the proposer in red (here ‘proposer’) and the name of the 
responder (here ‘responder’). Two offers each containing red and blue coins indicate the 
share for the proposer and the responder, respectively (here 8/2 vs 5/5) and the offer 
made by the proposer was encircled in red (here 5/5). The responder was a maximum 
response time of given 5000ms to select Yes or No to accept or reject the offer. Upon 
response, the feedback screen displayed the given response (here ‘Yes’) until 6000 ms 
after the start of the trial. 
 
 
Each trial was played with a new player to avoid learning and reputation 
effects. Only the first name and the first letter of the surname of the players 
were displayed on screen to ensure anonymity. Participants were told that the 
offers of the proposers had already been obtained in a previous part of the study 
and that at the end of the session the computer would randomly select ten trials 
that would determine their total earnings. In order to emphasize the interactive 
character of the game with consequences for them and the other players, 
participants were explained that the proposers’ earnings would be contingent 
upon their decisions. At the end of the session, a screen was presented 
indicating the pay-off (five euros for each participant).  In reality, the offers 
presented to the participants were computer simulated but were based on 
behavior reported in prior experiments (Güroğlu et al., 2009). After the scan 
session, none of the participants expressed doubts about the cover story. 
 
5.2.3 MRI data acquisition 
The scanning session was carried out at the university medical center using a 
3.0T Philips Achieva. Using E-Prime software, stimuli were projected onto a 
screen at the head of the scanner bore and participants viewed the stimuli by 
means of a mirror mounted on the head coil assembly. The scanning sessions 
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consisted of four types of scans in the following order: i) localizer scan, ii) T2*-
weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence measuring the bold-oxygen-
level-dependent (BOLD) signal (TR= 2.2 sec, TE= 30ms, slice-matrix= 80 x 80, 
slice-thickness=2.75mm, slice gap = 0.28mm gap, field of view (FOV) = 220 
mm), iii) high-resolution T1-weighted anatomical scan, and iv) high resolution 
T2-weighted matched-bandwidth high-resolution anatomical scan with the same 
slice prescription as the EPIs. Each of the three blocks of functional runs 
consisted of 200 volumes; the first two scans were discarded to allow for 
equilibration of T1 saturation effects.  
 
5.2.4 MRI data analysis 
SPM5 software (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk) was used for image preprocessing and 
analyses. Slice-time correction, realignment, spatial normalization to EPI 
templates, and spatial smoothing using a 8mm full-width half-maximum 3D 
Gaussian kernel were carried out. The youngest age group moved significantly 
more than the other three age groups (main effect of Age F (3, 67) = 3.21, p < 
.05, followed by posthoc Tukey comparisons). However, the total amount of 
movement was minimal: the maximum movement parameters were below 1.81 
mm for all participants and all scans. The functional time series were modeled 
by a series of events convolved with a canonical haemodynamic response 
function (HRF). The moment of stimulus presentation with zero duration was 
used to model the data. For the purposes of this study, the unfair offers (8/2 
offers) were modeled separately based on context (3 levels: fair-, hyperfair-, or 
no-alternative) and response (2 levels: accept or reject). Contrast images for 
each individual were used in the second-level random effects model to run full-
factorial analysis of variance and one-tailed post hoc t-tests. We further 
conducted regression analyses to test for brain-behavior relations using mean 
rejection levels per condition. Unless otherwise indicated, the fMRI analyses 
were conducted at the commonly used (Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia et al., 
2008) threshold of p < .001 uncorrected with a voxel threshold of 10 functional 
voxels. Results are reported in the MNI305 stereotaxic space. 
 
5.2.5 Region-of-interest (ROI) analyses 
In order to further examine the effects obtained in the whole-brain full factorial 
ANOVAs, Region of Interest (ROI) analyses were conducted using the 
MARSBAR tool in SPM5 (Brett et al., 2002). These analyses were conducted in 
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5.3 Results 
 
5.3.1 Behavioral results 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with context (3 levels: fair-, 
hyperfair-, and no-alternative) as the within subjects factor, age (4 levels: 10-, 
13-, 15-, and 20-year-olds) as between subjects factor and rejection rates of 
unfair offers as the dependent variable. There was a main effect of context (F (2, 
128) = 67.67, p < .001) as well as a context x age interaction (F (6, 128) = 3.00, 
p < .01) (see Figure 5.2). Rejection rates of unfair offers in the fair-alternative 
condition were highest, followed by the hyperfair-alternative (M = .79, SD = 
.25 and M = .73, SD = .27, respectively; F (1, 67) = 3.04, p = .05), and lowest 
rejection rates were observed in the no-alternative condition (M = .35, SD = .36; 




















Figure 5.2: Display of means and standard deviations of rejection rates of unfair offers 
in the three conditions for the four age groups. 
 
Tukey post-hoc analyses exploring the age x context interaction showed that 
rejection rates of unfair offers did not differ across age groups in the fair- and 
hyperfair-alternative conditions (both F (3, 64) < .37, p > .78) whereas they did 
in the no-alternative condition (F (3, 64) = 2.90, p < .05). Youngest participants 
rejected unfair offers in the no-alternative condition more often than oldest 
participants did (M = .55, SD = .32 and M = .23, SD = .27, respectively). 
Thirteen and 15-year-olds rated in between and did not differ from either age 
group (M = .32, SD = .34 and M = .33, SD = .45, respectively).  
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5.3.2 fMRI results 
Response x Intentionality Interaction across ages. First, we examined 
developmental differences in the role of intentionality (i.e., context) in 
responses to unfairness9. Whole brain analyses conducted with a 2 x 3 x 4 full 
factorial ANOVA with response (2 levels: accept / reject) and context (3 levels: 
fair- / hyperfair- / no-alternative) as the within subject factors and age (4 levels: 
10-, 13-, 15-, and 20-year-olds) as the between subject factor yielded no three-
way interaction between response, context and age. There was a response x 
intentionality interaction across all age groups (F(2,350) = 7.34, FDR p < .05, 
10 voxel threshold) in the dorsal ACC (MNI -3, 27, 36) and bilateral 
insula/inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; MNI (42, 24, -6 and -36, 15, -9), see Figure 
5.3A). To further examine the interaction effect, ROI analyses were conducted 
in the three regions involved in the interaction. These post hoc analyses showed 
that the activation in both the bilateral insula/IFG and dorsal ACC were higher 
during rejection than acceptance of unfair offers in the no-alternative condition 
(all F (1, 48) > 8.95, p < .004), but higher during acceptance than rejection of 
unfair offers in the fair- and hyperfair-alternative conditions (all F (1, 49) > 
7.79, p < .007 and F (1, 52) > 8.86, p < .004, respectively). These effects were 
found for all age groups, suggesting that these areas are sensitive to the response 
x intentionality interaction independent of age (see Figure 5.3B). In previous 
studies these brain regions are shown to play a role in personal norm violations, 
that is, related to behaviors that are not frequently displayed by the individual 
(Güroğlu et al., 2010; van den Bos et al., 2009). The role of these areas in 
personal norm violations was further supported by brain-behavior correlations. 
BOLD activity for the reject > accept contrast correlated negatively with mean 
rejection levels of unfair offers in the no-alternative (left insula r = -.35, p < 
.05), fair-alternative (right insula r = -.32, p < .05) and hyperfair-alternative 
condition (left insula r = -.46, p = .001, right insula r = -.39, p < .01, and dACC 
r = -.44, p = .001). In other words, participants who often accepted unfair offers 
(i.e., had low rejection rates) showed high levels of insula and/or dACC activity 
when they rejected these offers and vice versa. 
 
                                                 
1 Main effects of response and intentionality were also explored. Examination of the 
main effect of response yielded significant activation in bilateral Insula (MNI -33, 18, -
15 and 51, 15, 6; p< .001, 10 voxel threshold) for the Acceptance > Rejection contrast. 
There were no regions involved in the Rejection > Acceptance contrast (see 
Supplementary Table 1). Examining the main effect of intentionality, we only found 
activation in the occipital lobe (MNI 21, -96, 6; p< .001, 10 voxel threshold) for the fair-
alternative > no-alternative condition. See supplementary table for main effect of offer 
type (unfair > fair offers) per intentionality condition. 
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Figure 5.3: A) Results of the 
whole brain 2 (response) x 3 
(context) interaction, showing 
the dACC [MNI -3, 27, 36] 
and bilateral insula/IFG [MNI 
42,23, -6] at p < .001 10 voxel 
threshold. B) Contrast values 
in the right insula for 
acceptance and rejection of 
unfair offers in the three 
conditions for the four age 
groups. Results for left Insula 
and dACC showed similar 
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Age differences in rejection in the no-alternative condition.  
In order to examine developmental patterns in unintended versus intended 
unfair proposals we focused our analyses on brain areas that were specifically 
involved in rejection of unfair offers in the no-alternative condition with age 
included as a regressor in two separate contrasts.  
 
Figure 5. 4: A) Activation in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; MNI -48, 
27, 27) with positive correlation with age in the rejection no-alternative > acceptance 
no-alternative contrast; p < .001, 10 voxel threshold. B) Plot of contrast values for age 
and activity in left DLPFC for the rejection no-alternative > acceptance no-alternative 
contrast.  
 
For the rejection > acceptance contrast in the no-alternative condition, brain 
activity in the DLPFC (MNI -48, 27, 27) correlated positively with age (r = .57; 
T(60) = 3.23; see Figure 5.4A and 5.4B). Other areas of activation are listed in 
Table 5.1. There were no negative correlations with age and no brain areas were 
correlated with age for the rejection versus acceptance contrasts in the 
hyperfair- and fair-alternative conditions. Thus, the age related increase in the 
DLPFC response was specific for no-alternative rejection relative to no-
alternative acceptance trials. When no-alternative rejection behavior was added 
as covariate to the contrast, the DLPFC effect remained, showing that the 
effects are specific to age and cannot be solely explained on the basis of 
behavioral differences.  
 
Figure 5.5: A) Activation in the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ; MNI 54, -54, 36) 
with positive correlation with age in the rejection no-alternative > rejection fair-
alternative contrast; p < .001, 10 voxel threshold. B) Plot of contrast values for age and 
activity in right TPJ for the rejection no-alternative > rejection fair-alternative contrast.  
No alternative: reject >accept 
5  10    15      20             25 
Age
No alternative reject > Fair accept 
5  10    15      20             25 
Age
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Second, age was added as a regressor in the rejection no-alternative > 
rejection fair-alternative and rejection no-alternative > rejection hyperfair-
alternative contrasts. Both contrasts resulted in positive correlations between 
BOLD activity and age in the TPJ (MNI 54, -54, 36 and 57, -48, 33, 
respectively; r = .51 and r = .50, respectively; T (53) = 3.25; see Figure 5.5A, 
5.5B and Table 5.1). Other areas of activation are listed in Table 1. There were 
no negative correlations with age. Thus, age related increase in TPJ response 




To further investigate the relation between age, rejection rates in the no-
alternative condition, and brain activity in DLPFC and TPJ we have performed 
mediation analyses. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), mediation can be 
established by demonstrating that (a) there is a direct effect of the independent 
variable (i.e., age) on the dependent variable (i.e., punishment), (b) there is a 
significant effect of the independent variable on the proposed mediator (i.e., 
anger), (c) the proposed mediator is correlated with the dependent variable after 
controlling for the independent variable, and (d) the effect of the independent 
variable on the dependent variable drops significantly when the mediator is 
included in a simultaneous regression (Baron & Kenny, 1986). First we 
investigated the mediation effect of DPLFC activity. As can be seen in Figure 
5.5A, almost all the Baron and Kenny requirements are met. First, there is a 
significant effect of age on rejection rate (β = -.02), t(49) = -2.01, p < .05, and 
on the proposed mediator, contrast value [DLPFC reject – accept] (β = .29), 
t(49) = 4.8, p < .001. Second, DLPFC activity was borderline significantly 
correlated with rejection rate when controlling for age (β = -.05), t(49) = -2.0, p 
= .05. Third, the direct effect of age on rejection rate was no longer significant 
(β =-.006), t(49) = -.54, p =.6, when controlling for DLPFC activity. Finally, a 
Sobel test indicated that this reduction in significance was marginally 
significant, suggesting at least partial mediation (Sobel z = -1.81, p = .07).  
Next we investigated the mediation effect of TPJ activity. As can be seen in 
Figure 5.5B, all the Baron and Kenny requirements are met again. First, there is 
a significant effect of age on rejection rate (β = -.03), t(55) = -2.59, p < .02, and 
on the proposed mediator, contrast value [TPJ reject_no-alternative – reject fair-
alternative] (β = .21), t(55) = 4.3, p < .001. Second, TPJ activity was 
significantly correlated with rejection rate when controlling for age (β = -.07), 
t(55) = -2.3, p < .03. Third, the direct effect of age on rejection rate was no 
longer significant (β =-.1), t(55) = -1.13, p =.26, when controlling for TPJ 
 Chapter 5  96 
activity. Finally, a Sobel test indicated that this reduction was significant, 




Figure 5.5 (A) Beta coefficients in the model testing for the mediation effect of 
neural activation in DLPFC for the rejection no-alternative > acceptance no-
alternative contrast for the link between age and rejection of unfair offers in the 
no-alternative condition. (B) Beta coefficients in the model testing for the 
mediation effect of neural activation in TPJ for the rejection no-alternative > 
rejection fair-alternative contrast for the link between age and rejection of unfair 




The goal of this study was to gain a better understanding of the emergence of 
intentionality understanding in fairness considerations. Using the mini 
Ultimatum Game we were able to distinguish between responses to unfair offers 
of varying degrees of intentionality. Consistent with prior behavioral studies, 
participants rejected unfair proposals when the alternative for the proposer was 
a fair division (Güth et al., 1982). This behavior has previously been reported 
across age groups and shows that fairness perceptions already play an important 
role in social decisions in late childhood and early adolescence (Fehr et al., 
2008; Güroğlu et al., 2009; Sutter, 2007). However, the gradual emergence of 
intention-consideration in late childhood and adolescence was demonstrated by 
a decrease in rejection rates for unintentional unfair offers over the course of 
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thus provide further support for improving intentionality understanding across 
adolescence (Güroğlu et al., 2010). 
Importantly, we demonstrated that two different brain networks involved in 
fairness considerations develop at different rates and contribute to behavior in 
separate ways. First, a norm-violation network, including the anterior insula and 
the dorsal ACC, which develops relatively early in childhood, and second, a 
social brain network, including DLPFC and TPJ, which develops gradually over 
the course of adolescence, play a role in social decision-making involving 
fairness considerations. The developmental patterns of these networks set the 
stage for the interpretation of brain maturation during fairness considerations. 
 
Early maturation of the norm violation network 
Consistent with prior studies, anterior insula and dorsal ACC were differentially 
sensitive to acceptance and rejection responses, depending on the norm 
regarding the participant’s behavior in the particular context, as defined by 
intentionality (Güroğlu et al., 2010). Namely, the activation of this network was 
related to acceptance of intentional unfair offers (i.e., in the context of a fair 
alternative where normative behavior would be to reject), but also to rejection 
of unintentional unfair offers (i.e., in the context of no alternative where 
normative behavior would be to accept). It should be noted here that the norm 
violation here is not to be confused with the detection of a social norm 
violation, which would be responses to unfair offers in general. Our findings 
show that perception of an unfair offer and the performed ‘normative behavior’ 
is highly context dependent. In this sense, the way we refer to norm violations is 
closer to personal norms, which are self-based standards of behavior in specific 
situations and differ from general attitudes or social norms referring to 
internalized self-expectations (Schwartz, 1977; Schwartz & Fleishman, 1978). 
This interpretation is strengthened by the correlations between brain activation 
and individual task behavior. That is, the dACC and insula network response 
when rejecting an unfair offer where the proposer had no alternative was even 
stronger for individuals who mostly accepted these offers. This role of the 
insula in personal norm violations is also supported by the relation between 
insula activity during social norm violations and individual differences in 
Machiavellianism (Spitzer et al., 2007) and social value orientation (van den 
Bos et al., 2009). Furthermore, the general function of this network in detecting 
deviations from the personal norm is supported by several studies showing its 
involvement in betrayals of trust (van den Bos et al., 2009) as well as in non-
social norm violations such as risk prediction errors (Montague & Lohrenz, 
2007; Singer et al., 2009). In this sense, the neural network including the 
anterior insula and dorsal ACC is related to behavior that deviates from personal 
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standards that are shaped by what one normally does within a particular context, 
that is, accepting an unfair offer in the no-alternative context and rejecting an 
unfair offer in the fair- and hyperfair-alternative contexts.  
One limitation of the current study, and of social decision-making studies in 
general, is the relative low number of trials involved in the analysis. We should 
note that the analyses involving the acceptance of unfair offers in the fair- and 
hyperfair-alternative conditions may be suffering from low power, particularly 
in adults. The average number of trials for these conditions was relatively low 
(8.67 and 11.19, respectively). Although we have replicated our findings in an 
analysis which controlled for the number of trials, this is an issue that needs to 
be addressed in future research. 
Notably, the norm-violation effects in the insula and dorsal ACC were 
observed for all age groups, showing that norm-violation are already detected 
by this network in young children. Indeed, behavioral studies have reported that 
already at age 7-8-years there is a strong preference for social norms of strict 
equity (Fehr et al., 2008) and a basic understanding of fairness (Güroğlu et al., 
2009). It has been known for a long time that the rules for appropriate behavior 
are learned at a young age, as is shown by children’s concepts of social rules 
(Piaget, 1956). The current findings indicate that children also rely on the insula 
/ ACC network when judging their own social behavior in a particular context. 
These findings further suggest that the brain network related to fairness 
considerations including contextual information mature relatively early. 
However, the late maturing social brain network seems to incorporate extra 
information regarding intentionality into the decision-making process. 
 
Late development of the social brain network 
A crucial aspect of fairness considerations relates to our judgments of others’ 
intentionality. Prior work has demonstrated that understanding intentions is 
associated with activation in the TPJ (Assaf et al., 2009; Halko et al., 2009; 
Polezzi et al., 2008; van Overwalle, 2009). These regions have also been 
implicated in inference of mental states (Hampton et al., 2008) and redirection 
of our focus of attention to others (Mitchell, 2008). In the current study, we 
hypothesized that TPJ was specifically associated with the considerations of 
unfair offers when the proposer did not have an alternative. Whereas children 
and adolescent showed similar activation of the insula and dorsal ACC as adults 
when rejecting no-alternative offers, TPJ involvement emerged gradually across 
adolescence. The intentions of the proposer are least clear in the no-alternative 
condition, which makes it likely that this condition exerts the highest 
mentalizing and intention consideration demands. Furthermore, the increased 
involvement of TPJ was specific for rejection of unfair offers in the no-
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alternative condition. Whereas rejection of an unfair offer in the fair-alternative 
condition can be readily justified, this is not the case in the no-alternative 
condition. The consideration of self-interest and the related desire to reject an 
unfair offer, combined with the simultaneous (and automatic) consideration for 
lack of intentionality of the offer in this condition might also lead to feelings of 
guilt. Possibly, TPJ activation is related to these feelings of guilt towards others 
(Takahashi et al., 2004). This hypothesis needs further testing in future research. 
In a pioneering set of studies, Blakemore and colleagues (Blakemore, 2008; 
Dumontheil et al., 2009; Sebastian et al., 2008) showed that the TPJ is less 
active in adolescents than adults during tasks requiring mentalizing. The current 
findings are consistent with these previous studies, and show that TPJ 
involvement is context-dependent. Furthermore, older adolescents are 
increasingly better able to take context, and thus intentionality-related 
information, into account while making decisions.  
Besides TPJ, DLPFC was also more active during rejection of unintentional 
unfair offers in adults than in children, with an intermediate pattern for 
adolescents. In prior research, the slow maturation of DLPFC has been related 
to the emerging ability to control thoughts and actions (Bunge & Wright, 2007; 
Crone, 2009). Considering that the social norm is to accept unfair offers when 
there was no alternative, the increased DLPFC activation for rejection may 
indicate that adults override the tendency to accept (Knoch et al., 2006b). The 
negative correlation in children may indicate the opposite tendency; children 
may be inclined to reject unfair proposals (regardless of intentionality) and 
acceptance of unfair offers may require increased control. This interpretation 
should be tested in future research.  
Finally, mediation analyses importantly demonstrated the mediating role of 
neural activity in the link between age and rejection rates of unfair offers. As 
such, these findings contribute to an understanding of the developmental 
mechanisms underlying age related changes in behavior. Our results suggest 
that age related differences in neural activation are partially responsible for 
behavioral differences that vary with age. Future longitudinal studies that 
incorporate structural brain development in the social brain network are crucial 
for further understanding of the mechanisms underlying development. 
 
A new direction in understanding the development of fairness considerations 
Two advantages of the current approach in examining development of social 
decision-making relative to prior reports is that we 1) included participants of 
four age groups, which is uncommon in fMRI studies, but allows for more 
precise measurement of developmental change (Galvan, 2010), and 2) related 
changes social brain network activation to real social behavior. Prior studies on 
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the development of the social brain network have typically involved 
comparisons of two groups (adolescents versus adults) whereas our approach 
allowed us to assess gradual changes over time. In addition, relative to prior 
studies, the current approach reveals that it is important to relate thinking about 
fairness and moral scenario’s to actual social behavior in context, as behavior in 
the current task was modulated by intentionality considerations.  
In sum, the current approach demonstrated development of the dissociable 
brain networks contributing to social decision-making across childhood, 
adolescence and adulthood. Regions associated with norm-violations showed a 
different developmental trajectory in their involvement in social decision-
making than regions associated with perspective taking and intentionality 
consideration. The latter finding strengthens the claim that detection of norm-
violations related to inequity and intentionality considerations are dissociable 
components of fairness consideration. 
Finally, in future studies it is important to distinguish between different 
interaction partners in social interactions. In prior fMRI work in adults, it was 
demonstrated that interactions with friends was related to differential activation 
of a set of regions, including the ventral medial prefrontal cortex, the striatum 
and the amygdala (Güroğlu et al., 2008), and these regions may work together 
with the norm-detection and social brain networks reported here (e.g., Hare et 
al., 2010). Considering age differences in the social brain network (Blakemore, 
2008), it is important in future research to understand how quality of 
relationships modulate the development of brain activation in social interactions 
across adolescence.  
  
 
6. Who do you trust? 
Age comparisons of learning who to trust or 






How do people learn to trust or distrust others? In a repeated trust game setting, we 
investigated the development of trust within repeated interactions. In addition to 
this relation-specific development of trust, we also assessed the development of 
trust across different age groups, ranging from late childhood to young adulthood. 
The results demonstrated that within relations, people use a tit-for-tat like strategy, 
but this pattern was more pronounced at a young age. With increasing age both the 
anger towards and punishment of non-cooperative players decreased. Further 
analyses showed that the differential willingness to punish violations of trust was 








Trust plays an important role in almost all types of social interaction. In our 
daily lives trust is important in our relationships with family and friends, but 
also in many economic transactions with anonymous others (Rotter, 1967). 
Trust is important at all levels of society; it is often considered the ‘glue’ that 
holds society together (Fukuyama, 1995; Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Zak & 
Knack, 2001). Furthermore, trust is recognized to be of great importance for the 
development of social functioning throughout life, promoting moral behavior 
(Wright & Kirmani, 1997) and academic achievement (Imber, 1973; Wentzel, 
1991). 
Whereas the findings above indicate that trust is important for both social 
development and society, the origins of trust are still largely unknown. How do 
we learn to trust or distrust persons and anonymous institutions? To study the 
development of trust, social psychology has made extensive use of the Trust 
Game (TG). In the TG there are two players who can share a certain amount of 
money. The first player (trustor) has the possibility to divide a sum of money 
equally or to give it all to the second player (trustee). If the first player decides 
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to share the money, both players get their equal share and the game ends. 
However, if the first player gives all the money to the second player the total 
amount of money is tripled. Next, the second player has the possibility to 
reciprocate trust and share the increased amount of money with first player, or 
to exploit trust by keeping all the money (see Figure 6.1). It is clear that in the 
TG, player 1 faces the challenging question of whether or not to trust player 2: 
Will he/she reciprocate an act of trust? In more general terms, such an act of 
trust can be defined as the “willingness to make oneself vulnerable to others’ 
actions based on a certain expectation of positive reciprocity” (Colman, 2003). 
Insights from the research in which people played multiple Trust Games has 
revealed that trust in others generally increases after positive trust experiences, 
and decreases after experienced violations of trust (Delgado, Frank & Phelps, 
2005; King-Casas, Tomlin, Anen, Camerer, Quartz & Montague, 2005; King-
Casas, Sharp, Lomax-Bream, Lohrenz, Fonagy & Montague, 2008; De Cremer, 
Van Dijk & Pillutla, 2010). Whereas these findings address an important aspect 
of the development of trust, they do not address the general trust people may 
have in others. For example, these findings do not inform us to what extent 
people trust others in a first encounter, when they have not yet received any 
feedback on trustworthiness of the specific interaction partner. Interestingly, 
research shows that the initial trust in others is often high (Berg, Dickhaut & 
McCabe, 1995; Dufwenberg & Gneezy, 2000; McCabe, Houser, Ryan, Smith, 
& Trouard, 2001). Thus, in one-trial settings people often show high levels of 
trust, and in repeated settings they often show trust on the first encounter. 
These findings not only show that it is important to distinguish between 
general trust and relation-specific trust, but also raise the question of how 
people’s  decisions on the first encounter are best explained. Here, social 
psychology has tended to focus on individual differences (e.g., differences in 
generalized trust, Yamagishi, Cook, & Watabe, 1998), and acknowledged that 
general trust may be shaped by people’s personal histories of social interactions 
in the past (Rotter, 1967). In addition to these social psychological insights, it is 
interesting to see that recent research within developmental psychology, using 
one-trial game paradigms (Sutter & Kocher, 2006; Harbaugh, Krause, Liday & 
Vesterlund, 2002; van den Bos, Westenberg, van Dijk & Crone, 2009), has 
indicated that adults – i.e., the typical participants in social psychology studies - 
have higher levels of general trust compared to children. However, although 
these studies provided useful insights in how general trust changes with age, 
they do not inform us on age related changes in ‘relation-specific’ trust.  







Figure 6.1: The sequence of visual displays that represent the different stages of the 
Repeated Trust Game (DTG). Each round starts with the identification of the other 
player. Next, the participant can decide to either trust or not to trust the other player. 
Regardless of the decision of the participant the choice by the other player to reciprocate 
or defect will be revealed. If the player decided to trust the choice by the other player is 
indicated with blue arrows and represent the real outcome of the game, whereas if the 
participant decided not to trust these arrows are displayed in grey and represent the 
counterfactual outcome of the game. Note that in the real experiment photographs of 
other players were shown, in stead of the silhouette with a question mark 
 
Learning to trust and distrust 
So how does trust develop? From the above, it is clear that to answer this 
question; we should distinguish between the general trust and relation-specific 
trust. It is also clear that social psychology and developmental psychology have 
each addressed different parts, but currently, the literatures more or less stand 
alone. To provide a more comprehensive picture of the development of trust, we 
therefore set out to integrate insights from both fields. For this purpose, and to 
investigate how people across different ages learn who to trust or distrust we 
use a repeated Trust Game paradigm in which participants from different ages 
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(children, adolescents, and adults) interact with the same players for several 
rounds (King-Casas et al., 2005). Because, as Rotenberg (1980) emphasized, it 
is equally important to learn who not to trust as to learn who to trust, the 
participants in the current experiment interacted with three different 
preprogrammed personalities that displayed different levels of trustworthiness 
(low, medium and high). During the repeated interactions the participants were 
playing the role of the trustor, thus each round they had to decide whether or not 
to trust the other. Following the number of trust decisions of the participants, we 
were able to study how the level of trust for each player changed based on the 
outcome of a series of social interactions. 
In our studies, we distinguish between differences in general trust, which is 
observed at the first encounter in which one does not have any specific 
information about the interaction partner, and the subsequent ‘relation-specific’ 
changes in trust over time that occur after one has received feedback about the 
decisions made by one’s interaction partner. Based on previous developmental 
studies with one-shot games we expect that with age participants will show 
higher levels of general trust and thus will be more prone to start the interaction 
with a trust move (Berg et al., 1995; Sutter & Kocher et al., 2008; van den Bos 
et al., 2009).  
Subsequently, based on the outcomes of the social interaction with the three 
different players we expect that participants will learn how trustworthy each of 
the players is, and will act accordingly. Studies with similar paradigms have 
shown that adults often play a forgiving tit-for-tat like strategy (Wedekind & 
Milinski, 1996, Nowak & Sigmund, 1992). That is, if the other player shared in 
the last round the participant will trust in the following round (positive 
reciprocity), and if the other player did not share in the previous round the 
participant will react by not trusting in the next round (negative reciprocity). 
However, the forgiving tit-for-tat like strategy deviates from strict tit-for-tat by 
showing less negative reciprocity. Thus, adults may decide to trust the other 
even when that person did not share in the previous round, based on a history of 
positive reciprocity (Milinski & Wedekind, 1998).  
 We propose that although children display low levels of general trust on the 
first encounter, they are able to learn to trust and distrust their interaction 
partners based on a series of interactions. However we expect that children will 
use a different learning strategy than adults, particularly by focusing more 
strongly on the outcome of the most recent interaction. Research from the 
domain of developmental psychology suggests that trust relationships with 
peers already exist at a young age, but are initially very fragile and become 
more stable over the years. These studies on social relationships show that 
children typically understand the norm of direct reciprocity by 5 to 6 years of 
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age (Berndt, 1977; Youniss, 1980). Next, between ages 8 and 11, children still 
primarily base their estimation of trustworthiness on the most recent salient 
behavior of the other. Only at a later age trust is increasingly based on 
consistent patterns of behavior over time (Rotenberg & Pilipenko 1983-1984). 
At the latest stage of development, starting around early adolescence (12- 13 
years of age) and lasting until late adolescence, friendships become increasingly 
stable and resistant to violations of trust (Kahn & Turiel, 1998).  
 In sum, these results based on questionnaires and self-reports, suggest that 
children will focus more on the most recent interaction when deciding what to 
in the next encounter thus play more strict tit-for-tat like than adults. 
Furthermore, it is well known that children are less capable to regulate their 
emotions in social situations than adults (Eisenberg, 2000). And because 
emotion regulation is thought to develop until at least late adolescence/young 
adulthood (Blakemore, 2008, Casey et al., 2008), we expect that children will 
be particularly sensitive to trust violations compared to adults. As a result, 
children will show higher levels of negative reciprocity; if in the previous round 
a player decided not to share, even if that player predominantly decided to share 
in the last few rounds. We therefore expect that children will often decide not to 
trust in the subsequent round, whereas adults might be more forgiving. 
 
Trustworthiness, Anger and Punishment 
Although the main goal of the current experiment was to investigate the 
ontogeny of relation-specific learning of trust, the current set-up also allowed us 
to further address the relation between emotional reactions to violated trust, and 
subsequent (costly) punishment of the violator. Unreciprocated trust and non-
cooperative behavior in general are known to cause personal distress and, in 
particular, anger towards the non-cooperator (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; 
Stouten, De Cremer & van Dijk, 2009; Seip, van Dijk & Rotteveel, 2009). In 
addition, it is often assumed that the anger towards uncooperative norm 
violators, in this case of the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), may motivate 
people to punish the perpetrator (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996), even when this 
punishment is costly (Fehr, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher 2004). Although there is 
some evidence for a causal relation between anger and punishment, this is not 
yet well established (see Seip et al., 2009). Furthermore, to our knowledge there 
are currently no studies that have investigated the relation between negative 
affect and costly punishment in developmental populations.  
Based on two different strands of evidence we expect that children will show 
more negative affect towards norm violations than adults, and subsequently also 
higher levels of punishment. First of all, because children are less capable to 
regulate their emotions in social situations than adults (Eisenberg, 2000; 
 Chapter 6  106
Steinberg, 2008), we expect that the anger evoked by unfair behavior will be 
higher for children than for adults. The increased anger could in turn lead to an 
increase in the level of punishment. This hypothesis is supported by studies that 
show that reduced self-regulation is strongly related to increased levels of 
reactive aggression (Conner, Steingard, Cunningham, Anderson & Melloni, 
2004; Winstok et al., 2009). Reactive aggression is a particular form aggressive 
behavior that is evoked by perceived threat or provocation (Dodge & Coie, 
1987), in this experiment the violation of trust. 
Second, circumstantial evidence for our hypothesis that children will punish 
non-cooperators more than adults comes from developmental studies with the 
Ultimatum Game. In these studies participants are offered a split of a certain 
amount of money between themselves and another player. The results of these 
studies show that children reject unfair offers (unequal splits in advantage of the 
other player) more often than adults do (Murnighan & Saxon, 1998; Sutter, 
2007; Güroğlu, van den Bos & Crone, 2009). Such rejections have been 
interpreted as means to punish, as they directly reduce  the outcomes of the 
proposer.  
In sum, there is some evidence for higher levels of anger and punishment in 
children compared to adults. However, no previous study investigated the 
relation between these two concepts in developmental populations.  To 
investigate the relation between negative affect and costly punishment, we will 
measure the participants’feelings of anger towards the other players and their 





Our sample included 60 participants (30 male, 30 female) divided over three 
age groups; late childhood (M age = 11.33, SD = 0.48, 9 male, 9 female), mid 
adolescence (M age = 16.24, SD = 0.91, 13 male, 8 female) and young 
adulthood (M age = 21.06, SD = 2.27, 8 male, 13 female). Chi-square analyses 
indicated that gender distributions did not differ significantly between age 
groups, χ2(3) =5.69, p=.078. Children and adolescents were recruited by 
contacting local schools.  Child and adolescent participants were selected with 
the help of their teachers (children with learning or psychiatric disorders were 
excluded); informed consent was obtained from a primary caregiver. Adults 
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6.2.2 Simultaneous Trust Game 
To study how participants learn who to trust or distrust in a Trust Game setting 
we employed the Simultaneous Trust Game (STG) with repeated interactions. 
In the STG (Figure 6.1) the participants played multiple Trust Games in which 
both players simultaneously had to make their decision. Participants played the 
STG with three different players. At the start of each round the screen displayed 
the first name and photograph of the other player, who was always matched for 
age and gender. Next, the participant saw the complete decision tree and had to 
choose from two options: to trust or not to trust. If the participant decided not to 
trust, the coins were divided evenly, one euro each, between the players. If the 
participants decided to trust the other player the total money in the game was 
tripled in value (new total three Euros). When the other player had decided to 
reciprocate the 3 Euros was again divided evenly, one euro and fifty cents each, 
between the players. However, if the other player decided to defect she would 
take all the three Euros and leave the participant with nothing. The pay-off 
structure of the game was the same for every round (see Figure 6.1). 
In the STG both players independently made their decision before the 
decision of the other is revealed, and in the end both decisions were always 
revealed. Thus before the decision of the participant to trust or not is revealed, 
the other player already had to decide if she would share or take all the money if 
she was trusted by the participant. Because the choice of the other player was 
always revealed, it was possible for the participants to learn what the trust 
outcome would have been even if they decided not to trust the other. Thus, if 
the participant chose not to trust that could result in two counterfactual 
outcomes; either the second player would have reciprocated trust or she would 
have defected trust and taken all the money.  As a result, all participants (even 
those that never trusted) gained exactly the same information about the other 
players’ decisions to share or not during the experiment. 
The participants were told that the other player made his or her decisions 
through an internet connection but in reality the choice was made by the 
computer program and was displayed after a variable delay of 2-4 seconds. The 
presentation of this decision of the other player was displayed with an arrow by 
the outcome of choice. Blue arrows indicated a real outcome following a trust 
decision; grey arrows indicated a counterfactual outcome following a no trust 
decision. The presentation of the outcome of the trial was displayed for 3 
seconds.  
Participants were informed that during the experiment they were playing 
against three other unknown players. However, they actually played with 
computer-simulated agents with different pre-programmed strategies. The 
players were programmed with different percentages of sharing choices 
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(Trustworthy: 80%, Neutral: 50% and Untrustworthy: 20%). To represent the 
other players we used photographs of participants of the same age and gender. 
Prior to the experiment, the pictures where judged independently by 8 students 
on trustworthiness. Based on those judgments the most neutral faces on the trust 
dimension were selected for the experiment. To ensure that the individual 
characteristics of the faces did not bias trusting behavior we randomized the 
different faces over the different strategies. In total, the task consisted of 30 
interactions with the 3 computer players. Consequently, for each participant the 
task consisted of 90 rounds in total. In each round the computer randomly 
picked one of the three other players, and the total number of rounds was 
unknown to the participants. The experiment was self-paced and took about 15 
minutes complete.  
Finally, the participants were told that the money they earned in the game 
would be exchanged for real money they would receive at the end of the 
experiment. We did not mention what the exact exchange rate between game 
and real money would be, but emphasized that the more money they earned the 
higher their real pay-off would be. Furthermore, the participants were told that 
their personal income would be revealed only when all other participants 
finished the experiment.  
 
6.2.3 Post-Game Questionnaire 
Right after the last round of the STG the participants filled in a computer based 
questionnaire. This questionnaire was not mentioned to the participants before 
they played the STG in order not influence their behavior in the game. We 
asked 3 questions regarding the frequency of sharing decisions of the other, 
level of trustworthiness and feelings of anger. The first three questions could be 
answered on a 5 point scale, ranging from not at all to very (often). We asked 
the participants to indicate their estimations of the frequency of sharing and 
levels of trustworthiness of the other players in order to check whether the 
different age groups have a comparable perception of how the other players 
behaved during the game, and how perceived behavior of the others is related to 
perceived trustworthiness of those players.  
Finally, the participants had the opportunity to punish the other players by 
reducing some of their earnings. However, this punishment was costly; for each 
coin (€ 50 cents) paid by the participants the other player would lose 3 coins (€ 
1.50, cf. Fehr, 2002). For each of the other players the participant could choose 
to pay an amount between zero and two Euros in increments of € 50 cents. The 
of the presentation of the three other players was randomized across 
participants. 
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6.2.4 Procedure 
Child and adolescent participants were individually tested at their school in a 
quiet room and adult participants were tested in a laboratory, using a standard 
desktop computer or a laptop. Before the experiment started all participants 
received verbal instructions and had to fill out a questionnaire to test whether 
they understood the structure of the game. Subsequently, they played 10 
practice rounds to get familiar with the interface. In case participants made 
mistakes in the questionnaire, the experimenter personally went over the 
questions with the participant to verify instructions were understood and if they 
were not correct they would go through another set of practice rounds until the 
task was understood fully. 
 
6.2.5 Instructions 
All participants got their picture taken a week before they participated in the 
experiment, and were told their picture would be shown the other players they 
interacted with in the experiment that would follow. The participants were 
instructed that they were going to play an interactive game with two other 
players with whom they were connected via the internet. Furthermore, they 
were told that at the end of the experiment the computer would determine the 
pay-off for all players. It was emphasized that therefore their decisions had 
consequences for the pay-off of themselves and others. The total duration of the 
experiment was approximately 35 minutes. Last, when all participants had 




First we tested whether the different age groups differed in their perceptions of 
frequency of sharing and trustworthiness. Next we investigated how participants 
of different ages learned who to trust and distrust, and the relation between age, 
anger and punishment.  
 
6.3.1 Manipulation check  
To check whether there were age differences in the perception of the 
frequency of sharing decisions of the three types of players we performed 
ANOVA with frequency of reciprocal choices as dependent variable, type of 
player as within-subjects variable and age group as between-subjects factor.  
These analyses revealed a main effect of Type (F(2,58) = 163.20, p < .001), but 
no effect of Age (F(2,58) < 1, p = .67). Participants of all age groups recognized 
that the three players differed significantly in their frequency of sharing 
decisions (see Table 6.1), and frequency estimations did not differ between age 
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groups. These results are important because they show that age differences in 
punishing behavior or emotions are not due to different perceptions of the 
strategies of the other players.  
To investigate whether the different strategies of the other players were 
correctly recognized as differences in trustworthiness we performed a similar 
ANOVA with trustworthiness as dependent variable. As expected, these 
analyses revealed a main effect of Type (F(2,58) = 138.22, p < .001), but no 
effect of Age (F(2,58) < 1, p = .51). That is, participants of all age groups 
perceived the three players differing significantly in their trustworthiness (see 
Table 6.1), but importantly these estimations did not differ between age groups.  
  
Table 6.1: Average levels of Frequency estimation and Trustworthiness collapsed over 
all age groups.  
  Trustworthy Neutral Untrustworthy 
Frequency 4.46 2.93 1.63 
Trust 4.03 2.72 1.70 
 
6.3.2 Generalized Trust – the first move 
As expected, our data show that 11 year olds that made fewer trust decisions (M 
= 27%) in the first round relative to the 16 year olds (M= 47%) and the 22-year-
olds (M = 70%) who trusted the most (see Figure 6.2). Indeed, a logistic 
regression with first choice as dependent variable and age group as covariate 
revealed that with increasing age participants showed significantly more trust in 
























Figure 6.2: The percentage of participants in each group that decided to either trust and 
not to trust in the very first round of the experiment. Error bars represent standard error. 
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6.3.3 The relation-specific changes in trust 
Next, we were interested in how trust relations changed over time based on the 
behavior of the other player, and whether there were age differences in these 
developing patterns of trust. To investigate the relation-specific changes in trust 
over time we divided the experiment in three equal blocks (begin, middle, end). 
We performed a repeated measures ANOVA with Type of player (trustworthy, 
neutral, untrustworthy) and Time (begin, middle, end) as within-participants 
factors and Age as between-participants factor for the percentage of trust 
choices.  
As expected, this analysis yielded a main effect of Type of player on trust, 
F(2,58)= 128.03, p < .001, which was qualified by a significant Type x Time 
interaction (F(4,58)= 8.98, p < .001); over time participants showed increasing 
trust for the trustworthy player and decreasing trust for the untrustworthy player 
(see Figure 6.3). Moreover, our analyses also revealed an Type x Time x Age 
interaction (F(4,58)= 13.14, p < .005). This indicates that there are age 
differences in relation-specific changes in trust, as can be seen in Figure 6.3.  
To further interpret these age differences we performed separate Type x 
Time ANOVAs for each age group. These analyses revealed that in all age 
groups there was a significant difference in the amount of trust in each of three 
players (i.e., a main effect of type, all p’s < .001). Furthermore, for adults and 
adolescents (F(4,18)= 16.11, p < .001 and F(4,19)= 5.74, p < .005 respectively) 
but not for the children (F(4,18)= 2.67, p = .08) we observed a significant Type 
x Time interaction. The pattern of the children differs from the other age groups 
by showing no significant change in strategy over time, whereas adults and 
adolescents started to trust the trustworthy player more, and the untrustworthy 
player less, over time (see Figure 6.3).  
 
6.3.4 Tit for tat? 
To investigate differences in strategy use during the game we analyzed 
sequential effects. We analyzed whether the choice of the other player to 
reciprocate or defect in the previous round, regardless of whether the outcome 
was real or counterfactual (i.e., following trust or no trust), influenced the 
participants’ decision to trust in the next round with the same player. If the 
participants followed a  reciprocal tit-for-tat like strategy they would decide to 
trust if the other player had decided to share in the previous round (positive 
reciprocity), and decide not to trust when the other player had decided to keep 
all the money in the previous round (negative reciprocity). For these analyses 
we therefore calculated the percentage of tit-for-tat choices the participants 
made and compared these percentages for each age group with a univariate 
ANOVA.  
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Figure 6.3: The mean percentage of trust decisions per block of 10 trials for both 
computer players, error bars represent standard error. 
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This analyses revealed that all age groups applied a tit-for-tat strategy to a 
certain extent (all groups are well above 50% see Figure 6.4), and that there was 
a main effect of Age (F(1,58)= 6.41, p < .001). Tukey’s b tests for post hoc 
comparisons with an alpha of .05 showed that children (89 %) applied the tit-
for-tat strategy more often than adults and adolescents (74% and 71% 
respectively), who did not significantly differ in their strategies. 
 
 
Figure 6.4: The mean percentage of negative and positive tit-for-tat decisions for all 
age groups. 
 
6.3.5 Positive vs. Negative Reciprocity 
A tit-for-tat strategy is characterized by both positive and negative reciprocity. 
However, because psychologically positive and negative reciprocity may 
represent distinct processes we also analyzed them separately.  To investigate 
possible differences in tit-for-tat choices after either a share or keep choice of 
the other we preformed an ANOVA with Type of tit-for-tat (positive vs. 
negative) as within-participants factors and Age as between-participants factor. 
This analysis revealed further group differences in strategy use (Type of tit-for-
tat x Age interaction, F(2,58)= 4.67, p < .01). Post hoc paired t-tests per age 
group shows that children showed higher levels of negative than positive 
reciprocity (t(1,17) = -2.46, p < .025), whereas the other groups did not show 
such a difference (both p’s > .3, see Figure 6.4).  
Finally, based on the changing patterns of trust behavior over time we also 
investigated whether the number of tit-for-tat choices changed over time. For 















Defect -> No trust
*
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this purpose we calculated the percentage of tit-for-tat choices in each block 
(begin, middle, end) with age group as between subjects factor (see Figure 6.5). 
This analysis resulted in an Age x Time interaction, F(2,58)= 3.67, p < .04. 
Subsequent ANOVAs per age group revealed a significant effect of Time on tit-
for-tat strategy (F(2,18)= 5.21, p < .02 ) for adults, but not for the children and 
adolescents (both p’s >.1). As can be seen in Figure 6.5, adults showed an 
increase in tit-for-tat choices between the beginning and middle period and 
which then stayed on the same level, whereas the children remained at a stable 
level of tit-for-tat choices from the beginning until the end. 
 
 
Figure 6.5: The mean percentage of tit-for-tat decisions per block of 10 trials for all age 
groups. In both graphs error bars represent standard error. 
 
6.3.6 Anger and punishment 
Next, we investigated how the different strategies used by the computer players 
elicited feelings of anger and subsequent punishment. We performed an 
ANOVA with anger as dependent variable, Type of player as within-subjects 
variable and age group as between-subjects factor. These analyses revealed a 
main effect of Type (F(2,58) = 12.70, p < .001), and a main effect of Age 
(F(2,58) = 12.69, p < .001). That is, participants of all age groups showed more 
anger to the least trustworthy person; but the younger participants also showed 
more anger than the older participants (see Figure 6.6).  
 
 































Figure 6.6: Post-Game Questionnaire results for anger and punishment. 
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The analysis of punishment behavior revealed a similar pattern to that of anger; 
participants of all age groups punished the least trustworthy person the most 
(main effect Type, F(2,58) = 16.12, p < .001), and with age there was a general 
decrease in the amount of punishment given (main effect Age, F(2,58) = 5.08, p 
< .03) 
Finally, we were interested in the relation between reported levels of anger 
and subsequent size of punishment. As expected, there was a significant 
correlation between anger and punishment for all age groups (r = .54, p < .01, r 
= .53, p < .01 and r = .42, p < .03 for children, adolescents and adults). The 
correlation between anger and punishment suggests that the increase in 
punishment with age is a result of increased anger with age. To further 
investigate the relation between age and increased anger and punishment we 
have performed mediation analyses. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), 
mediation can be established by demonstrating that (a) there is a direct effect of 
the independent variable (i.e., age) on the dependent variable (i.e., punishment), 
(b) there is a significant effect of the independent variable on the proposed 
mediator (i.e., anger), (c) the proposed mediator is correlated with the 
dependent variable after controlling for the independent variable, and (d) the 
effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable drops significantly 
when the mediator is included in a simultaneous regression (Baron & Kenny, 
1986). As can be seen in Figure 6.7, all of the Baron and Kenny requirements 
are met. First, there is a significant effect of age on punishment (β = -.43), t(60) 
= 2.17, p < .02, and on the proposed mediator, anger (β = -.31), t(60) = 2.9, p < 
.005. Second, anger was correlated with punishment when controlling for age (β 
= .41), t(60) = 2.86, p < .003. Finally, the direct effect of sharing frequency was 
no longer significant (β =-.21), t(60) = 1.13, p =.26, when controlling for anger. 
In summary, the influence of age on punishment was completely mediated by 
feelings of anger towards the other player (Sobel z = 3.91, p < .01).  
 
 
Figure 6.7: Mediation analyses of age, anger and punishment. ** p < .01, * p < .05 
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Mediation also can be demonstrated by showing that the indirect effect (i.e., 
the path through the mediator) is significantly different from zero. The indirect 
effect is the product of two regression coefficients; specifically, the product of 
the regression weight linking the independent variable to the mediator (denoted 
a) and weight linking the mediator to the dependent variable (denoted b). Shrout 
and Bolger (2002) suggest that a formal test of mediation be conducted using a 
bootstrapping technique that involves computing confidence intervals around 
the product term (a*b). If zero falls outside of this 95% confidence internal, the 
indirect effect is significant and mediation can be said to have occurred. To 
implement this approach, we used SPSS syntax provided by Preacher and Hayes 
(2004) using 10,000 iterations. This approach provided results consistent with 
the mediation analyses described earlier. Specifically, zero fell outside our 95% 
confidence interval around the indirect effect, which ranged from .17 to .54. 
These results provide converging evidence that anger mediates the effects of 
frequency of sharing on punishment.  
 
6.4 Discussion 
Despite strong evidence for the benefits of trust for social development and 
society (e.g. Fukuyama, 1995; Bernath & Feshbach, 1995), it is less well known 
how people learn to trust or distrust persons and anonymous institutions. In this 
article, we combined insights from social psychology and developmental 
psychology, and used the STG to study the relation-specific changes in trust or 
distrust in three age groups. To our knowledge, no study to date has investigated 
age differences in learning who to trust and costly punishment of trust 
violations. This study had two main goals: (1) To examine the development of 
trust relationships between late childhood and young adulthood, and (2) To 
examine the developmental trajectory of emotions evoked by non-cooperative 
behavior of others, and to what extent these emotions may lead to altruistic 
punishment. To this end, the discussion is organized according to these main 
goals.  
 
Changes of trust 
As noted, previous research with the Trust Game has paid some attention to 
trust in children, but almost without exception these studies involved adults 
only. The decisions of adults in the current study resemble the pattern typically 
seen in these behavioral experiments. That is, adult participants often chose to 
trust in the first round, indicating that they expected others to reciprocate (e.g. 
Berg et al., 1995; Dufwenberg & Gneezy, 2000; McCabe et al., 2001). 
However, there were important age related changes in first move. As expected, 
children showed a low level of general, trust; most of them started with not 
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trusting the other. In addition, consistent with previous studies (Sutter & Kocher 
2008; van den Bos et al., 2009) our analyses revealed that this general trust 
increases with age.  
Next, we investigated the ‘relation-specific’ trust, by analyzing how levels of 
trust changed over time based on the interactions with the three different 
players. As expected, the strategy of the other player influenced the percentage 
of trust choices; over time adults learned who to trust and who to distrust. 
Furthermore, our analyses revealed that they applied a tit-for-tat like strategy, 
and importantly their strategy also changed over time. In the initial phase of the 
experiment, adults quickly learned the level of trustworthiness of the other 
players and adapted their behavior accordingly. At the moment they learned 
who to (dis)trust, their strategy changed to a stable tit-for-tat like pattern. 
Together, these results suggest that for adults trust decisions are initially based 
on a fairly high level of general trust and then are quickly adapted to the level 
trustworthiness of the player they interacted with. Our current study extends 
these findings by investigating how children and adolescents learned who to 
trust.  
Although the low level of general trust displayed by children in the first trial 
is consistent with previous studies, the following question remained: how would 
children and adolescents learn to trust or distrust another player? Our analyses 
of the relation-specific changes in trust revealed that participants of all ages 
were able to learn to trust a certain player, and importantly also learn not to trust 
another player. Indeed, both children and adolescents ended with high levels of 
trust for the trustworthy player and low levels of trust for the untrustworthy 
player. Interestingly, there were also age differences in strategies. As expected, 
the children used the strictest form of tit-for-tat strategy compared to the other 
age groups, and they did not show any changes in their strategy during the 
experiment. As a result of this strategy, the children displayed the same level of 
trust from beginning (excluding the first move) until the end, whereas we 
observed significant changes in levels of trust for both adolescents and adults. 
Finally, further analyses revealed that children differed from adults and 
adolescents especially in showing higher levels negative reciprocity.  
Why would children use a more direct tit-for-tat like strategy, in particular 
after trust violations, compared to adults and adolescents? The tit-for-tat 
strategy could be partly due to the higher levels of reactive aggression displayed 
by younger children (Conner et al., 2004); they keep reacting strongly to 
violations of trust in the previous round regardless of their indication of trust 
behavior in the past. This would also explain that the children particularly 
showed higher levels of negative reciprocity compared to the other age groups. 
Another possible, but tentative, explanation for the high level of tit-for-tat 
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choices for the youngest participants is that tit-for-tat is a strategy that requires 
very little from working memory (Milinski & Wedekind, 1998). Given that 
children still have an underdeveloped working memory capacity (e.g. Crone et 
al., 2006), they are more likely to use a strategy that is less memory demanding. 
This explanation is consistent with studies that have shown that adults will start 
playing more direct tit-for-tat when their memory load is occupied by another 
task (Milinski & Wedekind, 1998). However, because age did not significantly 
affect the participants’ estimations of the total frequency of sharing decisions, 
we consider this explanation less likely.  Nonetheless, it would be interesting for 
future research to investigate the possible relation between age related 
differences in working memory capacity and strategy differences in social 
interactions.  
 
Anger and Punishment 
Next, we investigated participants’ emotional reactions to trust violations and 
levels of costly punishment. As expected, the three players evoked different 
levels of both anger and punishment. Participants of all age groups were most 
angry at the player that violated trust the most, and punished accordingly. This 
pattern of behavior is consistent with several previous studies that investigated 
the relation between anger and costly punishment (see Seip et al., 2009). 
However, there were also large differences in levels of anger between age 
groups. Although all participants displayed more anger towards those players 
that violated trust the most, children showed more anger than adolescents, and 
adolescents more than adults. Additionally, we found that the younger 
participants punished more than the older participants.  
In contrast to children, adults showed virtually no anger towards, and did not 
punish the least untrustworthy player, even though that player kept the money 
20% of the time. So, although that player displayed some trust violations, these 
occasional violations did not seem to anger the adult participants, and it did not 
induce them to punish. This finding is in line with previous work that showed 
that positive peer relations become more stable and resistant to violations of 
trust (Kahn & Turiel, 1998). Future studies could further test the hypotheses of 
increasing stability with age by studying how participants adjust their behavior 
when their trustworthy player unexpectedly changes into an untrustworthy one. 
Based on our hypothesis above we would expect that children will almost 
immediately adjust, applying their strict tit-for-tat strategy, whereas adults 
would take longer to adjust because they also take the longer history of 
interactions into account.  
This leaves the question why children and adolescents reacted angrier than 
adults? One possible explanation is that they are less able to regulate the anger 
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evoked by violations of trust. This interpretation is in line with studies that show 
that age related increases in emotion regulation are strongly related to lower 
levels of reactive aggression (Conner et al., 2004; Winstok, 2009). 
Another explanation for the higher levels of anger in children is that their 
affective reaction to social interaction is based on a different perception of the 
intentions of the other players. Previous developmental studies have suggested 
that the increased skill of perspective taking, the ability to reason about the 
others’ intentions, significantly changes social behavior in one-shot Trust (van 
den Bos et al., 2009) and Ultimatum Games (Sutter, 2007; Guroglu et al., 2009). 
These studies suggest that an age related increase in perspective taking may lead 
to increased trust and a decrease in rejection rates. Furthermore, Mohr and 
colleagues (1999) showed that increased anger after provocation (i.e. violation 
of trust) is significantly related to a decreased capability of perspective taking 
(see also Eisenberg et al., 2006). Taken together, this suggests that a possibly 
more negative perception of the others’ intentions by the younger participants 
could have led to more anger and subsequently more punishment after the 
violation of trust. Given that all age groups had similar perceptions of the 
trustworthiness of the three players, the current results favor the explanation of 
differences in emotion regulation over perspective taking. Future studies may 
focus on disentangling the effects of perspective taking and emotion regulation 
on the increased negative affect in developmental populations, which will 
further our understanding of these processes in social decision-making.  
 
Conclusion 
The current finings revealed the importance of several psychological processes 
involved in learning who to trust. A comparison of age differences of behavior 
in the STG indicates that, besides a general increase of generalized trust, 
relation-specific trust changes with age. In particular, children appeared to apply 
a stricter tit-for-tat like strategy than adults and adolescents, and seem especially 
more sensitive to violations of trust. Additionally, the results show that with 
increasing age the amount of both anger and punishment decrease, and that age 
differences in trust were fully mediated by feelings of anger. Together these 
results indicate that the stability of adult trust relationships might be the results 
of an age related reduction of negative affect and negative reciprocity towards 
the violations of trust. Moreover, the current findings demonstrate how the 
combination and integration of social psychological and developmental insights 
may contribute to understanding of how we learn to trust (and distrust) others. 
 
7. Better than expected or as bad as you thought?  
    The neurocognitive development of probabilistic     




Learning from feedback lies at the foundation of adaptive behavior. Two 
prior neuroimaging studies have suggested that there are qualitative 
differences in how children and adults use feedback by demonstrating that 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and parietal cortex were more active 
after negative feedback for adults, but after positive feedback for children. In 
the current study we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to 
test whether this difference is related to valence or informative value of the 
feedback by examining neural responses to negative and positive feedback 
while applying probabilistic rules. In total, 67 healthy volunteers between 
ages 8 and 22 participated in the study (8–11 years, n = 18; 13–16 years, n = 
27; 18–22 years, n = 22). Behavioral comparisons showed that all participants 
were able to learn probabilistic rules equally well. DLPFC and dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex were more active in younger children following positive 
feedback and in adults following negative feedback, but only when exploring 
alternative rules, not when applying the most advantageous rules. These 
findings suggest that developmental differences in neural responses to 
feedback are not related to valence per se, but that there is an age related 





Learning to correctly adapt your behavior in a changing environment is an 
essential feature of human cognition and has been studied extensively over the 
past decades (for reviews, see Ridderinkhof and van den Wildenberg, 2005; 
Rushworth and Behrens, 2008). When adapting behavior, individuals often 
make use of feedback signals, which can be positive, encouraging the 
continuation of behavior, or negative, discouraging the continuation of behavior 
and signaling the need for adjustment. Prior studies have indicated that adaptive 
learning based on feedback signals undergoes pronounced developmental 
improvements between late childhood and early adulthood, as is evident from 
tasks in which participants need to switch between multiple rules (Crone and 
van der Molen, 2004; Somsen, 2007) or in which they need to infer sorting rules 
based on positive and negative signals (van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2008). 
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Early developmental improvements in adaptive behavior are observed when 
feedback has a direct mapping to deterministic rules (Somsen, 2007), however, 
when the feedback is probabilistic, changes in adaptive learning are observed 
until late adolescence (Hooper et al., 2004). In these situations, individuals must 
learn the statistical regularities between actions and outcomes, and use that 
information to interpret current feedback signals (see also Rangel et al., 2008). 
Feedback which is not directly mapped to behavior is often more complex 
because it requires individuals to attend to long term consequences and override 
the tendency to respond directly to local environmental change. 
Neuroimaging studies have shown that regions previously associated with 
cognitive control and response selection (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Toni et al., 
2002) are also active when adults receive negative performance feedback, 
including the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (Klein et al., 2007; Taylor et al., 2007). The dACC is 
thought to monitor action outcome regularities and is important for signaling 
adjustment (Botvinick et al., 2001; Yeung et al., 2004). In addition, the dACC 
may exercise behavioral control via the engagement of the DLPFC (Kerns et al., 
2004; Zanolie et al., 2008), which in turn is important for trial-to-trial 
adjustments of behavior (Dosenbach et al., 2008). Similar to the DLPFC, the 
parietal cortex is also involved in feedback processing, in particular negative 
feedback (Crone et al., 2008; van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2008). Finally, these 
regions are thought to work in close concert with the basal ganglia, specifically 
the caudate nucleus, which is thought to be engaged when learning action- 
outcome regularities (for a review see Cools, 2008). 
In two prior developmental studies we have identified the developmental 
time course of these regions during adaptive feedback processing. In the first 
study (Crone et al., 2008), participants were instructed to infer rules based on 
positive and negative feedback which could change without warning. Following 
Somsen (2007), we were interested in the way children, adolescents, and adults 
processed negative feedback indicating a rule shift. As anticipated, adults 
engaged DLPFC, dACC, and the parietal cortex when processing negative 
feedback indicating a rule shift. A similar pattern was observed in 14- to 15-
year-old adolescents, but 8- to 11-year-old children engaged these regions less 
following negative feedback in comparison to positive feedback or a low-level 
fixation baseline. In the second study (van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2008), 
participants were instructed to guess a correct rule. Because there were two 
possible rules, there was a 50% chances of receiving positive feedback, and 
therefore both feedback signals (negative and positive) were similarly salient 
and probable. Again, adults engaged DLPFC, dACC, and the parietal cortex 
following negative feedback, but in this study 8-year-old children engaged 
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DLPFC and the parietal cortex more following positive feedback relative to 
negative feedback. The developmental trajectory of the dACC followed a 
different pattern, as it slowly emerged in response to negative feedback at the 
age of 12, but it was not more active following negative compared to positive 
feedback at a younger age (see also Velanova et al., 2008). Although the 
caudate nucleus was involved in these tasks, these studies revealed that there 
were no developmental differences in activation patterns. 
Together, these findings indicate that the possible meaning of positive and 
negative feedback signals, and the role of the associated neural circuits, changes 
during development. However, prior studies could not dissociate between neural 
activation as a result of valence versus informative value, given that negative 
feedback always signaled response adjustment and therefore had different 
informative value than positive feedback. Thus, it remains to be determined 
how the involvement of DLPFC and the parietal cortex is dependent on valence 
versus informative value of the feedback. 
Prior research suggests that differences in positive and negative feedback 
adjustment are the result of differences in attention regulation (Somsen, 2007). 
Following this hypothesis, it is argued that children are less able to update the 
relevant feedback information and therefore they are less flexible in selecting 
alternative actions. We therefore reasoned that the brain regions implicated in 
prior feedback studies may be sensitive to the informative value of feedback, 
and that activation in these brain regions is indicative of feedback attendance. 
Furthermore, we predicted that attention to feedback may also underlie the 
developmental differences in brain activation. We hypothesized that DLPFC 
and parietal cortex would be more active following positive feedback in 
children and following negative feedback in adults, but only when the feedback 
has informative value for learning and response adjustment. Thus, we sought to 
test how neural responses are sensitive to informative value for learning versus 
valence of feedback, and the developmental trajectory of feedback processing. 
We reasoned that feedback valence versus informative value could be 
disentangled after participants learned probabilistic feedback rules. In the 
probabilistic learning paradigm, participants need to learn from positive and 
negative feedback under different levels of probability, and therefore not all 
positive feedback signals response continuation and not all negative feedback 
signals response adjustment. The probabilistic learning (i.e., trial-and-error) task 
employed in this study was based on a prior study by Frank et al. (2004), but 
was simplified for use with children. In our version of the probabilistic learning 
task, two different stimulus pairs (AB or CD) were presented in random order, 
and participants had to learn over trials that one stimulus was more likely to 
result in positive feedback (70–80%) (see Figure 7.1). Over the course of the 
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experiment participants had to learn the statistical regularities and thus had to 
learn to choose the stimuli with a high probability of positive feedback (A and 
C) more often than those with a low probability of positive feedback (B and D). 
 
 
Figure 7.1 (A) At the beginning of each trial a centrally located cue was presented with 
a jittered interval between 500 and 6000 ms, followed by a combined presentation of a 
stimulus pair and a response window of max. 2500 ms, after which feedback was 
presented for 1000 ms. After the feedback a short filler was presented, in the form of a 
blank screen, in order to compensate for different reaction times between trials and 
between participants (filler duration = 2500 ms – reaction time). (B) Average accuracy 
on AB and CD trials per age group. 
 
When participants have gained knowledge of the statistical regularities, they 
were expected to more often apply the correct rule. Notably, in probabilistic 
learning tasks individuals generally do not consistently apply the correct rule 
but show matching behavior; i.e., they choose the correct stimulus with a 
frequency that is proportional to the probability of positive feedback associated 
with that stimulus (Estes, 1961; Herrnstein, 1961; Shanks et al., 2002; Frank 
and Kong, 2008). Thus, we anticipated that participants would apply the correct 
rule (in this study, choosing the high probability stimuli A and C) more often, 
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but we also anticipated that they would remain exploring the alternative rule 
(choosing the low probability stimuli B and D). Therefore, this paradigm 
allowed us to investigate the processing of positive and negative feedback that 
carries different informative value. In particular, receiving negative feedback 
when choosing the correct rule should not be interpreted as a signal to switch to 
the alternative rule because the probability of positive feedback remains higher 
than for the alternative rule. In contrast, receiving negative feedback when 
choosing the alternative rule should lead to a switch to the correct rule. To be 
able to address the question how neural responses are sensitive to feedback 
signals in the context of learned rules, we only analyzed neural responses after 
participants had reached a learning plateau. 
Based on prior studies, we expected that DLPFC and the parietal cortex 
would be sensitive to whether feedback signals required greater attention, and 
would contain greater informative value for performance adjustment on 
subsequent trials. Therefore, we expected that these regions would be engaged 
mostly after choosing the alternative rule (B or D), because this feedback 
contained learning signals for performance adjustment, independent of valence. 
We also examined the role of the dACC and the caudate as these regions have 
previously been implicated in feedback processing (Schultz, 2007; Cools, 2008; 
Rushworth and Behrens, 2008). We expected that the dACC would be most 
sensitive to negative feedback signals, particularly when indicating the need for 
behavioral adjustment (Kerns et al., 2004), whereas we expected that the 
caudate would be most sensitive to positive feedback which signals response 
continuation (Cools, 2008). 
The second question concerned developmental differences in performance 
and neural activation. In prior research, developmental differences were 
observed between childhood and mid-adolescence, but differences between 
adolescence and adulthood remain unclear (Crone et al., 2008; van 
Duijvenvoorde et al., 2008). For this purpose, we compared behavioral and 
neural responses of three age groups; children (8–11 years), adolescents (13–16 
years), and adults (18–22 years). Behaviorally, we predicted that differences in 
adaptive learning would be largest between childhood and adolescence, with 
refinement of learning between adolescence and adulthood (Luna and Sweeney, 
2001; Crone and van der Molen, 2004; Somsen, 2007). In addition, we expected 
to find that these behavioral changes would be paralleled by changes in the 
areas involved in adaptive control (dACC, DLPFC, parietal cortex and caudate 
nucleus). For the fMRI analyses, we had three specific age related hypotheses 
based on prior studies. First, we expected an increase in differentiation in the 
dACC for positive and negative feedback processing with increasing age (van 
Duijvenvoorde et al., 2008; Velanova et al., 2008). Second, we expected an 
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attention-based shift in recruitment of DLPFC and the parietal cortex from 
positive to negative performance feedback with age. Third, we expected age 
differences in how learned probabilities would be associated with neural 
changes in feedback processing; in particular we predicted that feedback after 
exploring the alternative rule would be associated with developmental 
differences. Because of the children’s putative focus on positive feedback, we 
expected that with increasing age there would be a decrease in activity related to 
processing positive feedback and an increase in activity related to processing 
negative feedback following selection of the alternative rule. 
Finally, our paradigm allowed us to investigate age differences in adaptive 
behavior, that is, whether participants stay or shift on subsequent trials based on 
the received feedback. Besides behavioral analyses of sequential effects, we 
also employed exploratory sequential condition analyses to further understand 
the relation between neural activation and subsequent adjustment of behavior 
(see also Kerns et al., 2004). 
 
7.2 Materials and Methods 
 
7.2.1 Participants 
Sixty-seven healthy right-handed paid volunteers (35 female, 32 male; ages 8–
22 participated in the fMRI experiment. Age groups were based on adolescent 
development stage, resulting in three age groups: children (8- to 11-year-olds, n 
= 18; 9 female), mid-adolescents (13- to 16-year-olds, n = 27; 13 female) and 
young adults (18- to 22-year-olds, n = 22; 13 female). A chi square analysis 
indicated that the gender distribution was similar across age groups, χ2(2) = 
0.79, p = 0.67. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
and participants or their caregivers indicated an absence of neurological or 
psychiatric impairments. Participants and their caregivers (for minors) gave 
informed consent for the study and all procedures were approved by the medical 
ethical committee of the Leiden University Medical Center. In accordance with 
Leiden University Medical Center policy, all anatomical scans were reviewed 
and cleared by the radiology department following each scan. No anomalous 
findings were reported. 
 
7.2.2 Behavioral Assessment 
Parents filled out the Child Behavior Check List (CBCL, Achenbach, 1991) for 
participants younger than 18 years, in order to screen for psychiatric conditions. 
All participants scored below clinical levels on all subscales of the CBCL, and 
had scores within 1 SD of the mean of a normative standardized sample. 
Participants completed two subscales (similarities and block design) of 
either the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) or the Wechsler 
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Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC) in order to obtain an estimate of their 
intelligence quotient (Wechsler, 1991, 1997). There were no significant 
differences in estimated IQ scores between the different age groups, F(2, 66) = 
1.63, p = 0.20 (see Table 7.1). 
 








Adults 107 (2.4) 811(44) 118(3) .08(.01) 1.56 
Adolescents 108 (2.0) 773(39) 114(3) .08(.01) 2.96 
Children 111 (2.6) 804(42) 107(6) .09(.01) 2.85 
Displays means per age groups, standard errors between brackets. Final column 
represents the maximum head motion between two time points in each group 
 
7.2.3 Task Procedure 
The procedure for the probabilistic learning task (Frank et al., 2004) was as 
follows: The task consisted of two stimulus pairs (called AB and CD). The 
stimulus pairs consisted of pictures of everyday objects (e.g., a chair and a 
clock). Each trial started with the display of one of the two stimulus pairs and 
subsequently the participant had to choose one of the two stimuli (e.g., A or B), 
which were presented on the left or the right side of the screen. The stimulus 
pairs were presented in random order. Participants were instructed to choose 
either the left or the right stimulus by pressing a button with the index or middle 
finger of the right hand within a 2500 ms window, which was followed by a 
1000 ms feedback display. The feedback display consisted of a green V-signal 
for positive feedback and a red cross for negative feedback. If no response was 
given within 2500 ms, the text “too slow” was presented on the screen. This 
occurred on less than 2% of the trials. 
The feedback displayed was probabilistic. Choosing stimulus A led to 
positive feedback on 80% of AB trials, whereas choosing stimulus B led to 
positive feedback on 20% of these trials. The CD pair procedure was similar, 
but probability for positive feedback was lower; choosing stimulus C led to 
positive feedback on 70% of CD trials, whereas choosing stimulus D led to 
positive feedback on 30% in these trials. Thus, the correct choice in order to 
obtain most positive feedback was A or C, whereas the incorrect choice was B 
or D. 
Participants were instructed to earn as many points as possible (as indicated 
by receiving a positive feedback signal), but were also informed that it would 
not be possible to receive positive feedback on every trial. Further, participants 
were informed that although stimuli sometimes appeared on the right side and 
sometimes on the left side, that laterality was an irrelevant dimension. After the 
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instructions and right before the scanning session, the participants played 40 
practice rounds on a computer in a quiet laboratory to ensure proficiency on the 
task. 
In total, the task in the scanner consisted of two blocks of 100 trials each: 
50 AB trials and 50 CD trials per block. To ensure that participants had to learn 
a new mapping in both task blocks, the first and the second block consisted of 
different sets of pictures. The duration of each block was approximately 8.5 
min. The stimuli were presented in pseudo-random order with a jittered 
interstimulus interval (min = 1000 ms, max = 6000 ms) optimized with OptSeq2 
(Dale, 1999). During inter trial intervals, a central fixation cross was shown. 
 
7.2.4 Data Acquisition 
Participants were familiarized with the scanner environment on the day of the 
fMRI session through the use of a mock scanner, which simulated the sounds 
and environment of a real MRI scanner. Data were acquired using a 3.0T 
Philips Achieva scanner at the Leiden University Medical Center. Stimuli were 
projected onto a screen located at the head of the scanner bore and viewed by 
participants by means of a mirror mounted to the head coil assembly. First, a 
localizer scan was obtained for each participant. Subsequently, T2*-weighted 
Echo-Planar Images (EPI) (TR = 2.2 s, TE = 30 ms, 80 × 80 matrix, FOV = 
220, 35 2.75 mm transverse slices with 0.28 mm gap) were obtained during two 
functional runs of 232 volumes each. The first two scans were discarded to 
allow for equilibration of T1 saturation effects. A high-resolution T1-weighted 
anatomical scan and a high-resolution T2-weighted matched-bandwidth high-
resolution anatomical scan, with the same slice prescription as the EPIs, were 
obtained from each participant after the functional runs. Stimulus presentation 
and the timing of all stimuli and response events were acquired using E-Prime 
software. Head motion was restricted by using pillow and foam inserts that 
surrounded the head. 
 
7.2.5 fMRI Data Analysis 
Data were preprocessed using SPM5 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive 
Neurology, London). The functional time series were realigned to compensate 
for small head movements. Translational movement parameters never exceeded 
1 voxel (<3 mm) in any direction for any subject or scan. There were no 
significant differences in movement parameters between age groups F(2, 65) = 
0.152, p = 0.85, (see Table 7.1). Functional volumes were spatially smoothed 
using a 6 mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian kernel. Functional volumes 
were spatially normalized to EPI templates. The normalization algorithm used a 
12 parameter affine transformation together with a nonlinear transformation 
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involving cosine basis functions and resampled the volumes to 3 mm cubic 
voxels. The MNI305 template was used for visualization and all results are 
reported in the MNI305 stereotaxic space (Cosoco et al., 1997), an 
approximation of Talairach space (Talairach and Tourneaux, 1988). 
Statistical analyses were performed on individual participants’ data using 
the general linear model in SPM5. The fMRI time series data were modeled by 
a series of events convolved with a canonical haemodynamic response function 
(HRF). The presentation of the feedback screen was modeled as 0-duration 
events. The stimuli and responses were not modeled separately as these 
occurred in one prior or overlapping EPI images as feedback presentation. 
In the model, feedback was further subdivided into correct vs. alternative 
rule and positive vs. negative feedback. These trial functions were used as 
covariates in a general linear model, along with a basic set of cosine functions 
that high-pass filtered the data, and a covariate for run effects. The least-squares 
parameter estimates of height of the best-fitting canonical HRF for each 
condition were used in pair-wise contrasts. The resulting contrast images, 
computed on a participant-by-participant basis, were submitted to group 
analyses. At the group level, contrasts between conditions were computed by 
performing one-tailed t-tests on these images, treating participants as a random 
effect. We further performed voxelwise ANOVAs to identify regions that 
showed age related differences in relation to feedback processing. We tested for 
linear increases (−1 0 1) and decreases (1 0 −1) in the contrasts specified below. 
We applied AlphaSim (Ward, 2000) to calculate the appropriate threshold 
significance level and cluster size for the whole-brain analyses. A significance 
threshold of p < 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons was calculated by 
performing 10.000 Monte Carlo simulations in AlphaSim resulting in an 
uncorrected threshold of p < 0.001, requiring a minimum of 24 voxels in a 
cluster. This threshold was used for all whole-brain analyses. 
We used the Marsbar toolbox for use with SPM5 (Brett et al., 2002) to 
perform Region of Interest (ROI) analyses to further characterize patterns of 
activation. We created ROIs of the regions that were identified in the functional 
mask of whole-brain analyses. The masks used to generate functional ROIs was 
based on the general (positive vs. negative feedback) contrasts (p < 0.001, > 24 
voxels) across all participants, which was unbiased for effects of probability 
rule or age. Because this statistical image spanned several distinct functional 
brain regions in the striatum, we used Marsbar anatomical masks for the caudate 
nucleus to further specify our ROIs. 
For all ROI analyses, effects were considered significant at an α of 0.0125, 
based on Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons, p = 0.05/4 ROIs 
(caudate, DLPFC, parietal cortex and dACC), unless reported otherwise. 




To investigate the age differences in learning performance for the different 
stimulus pairs we calculated the percentage of correct choices (choosing the 
high probability stimulus) per block of 20 trials for each participant, resulting in 
five blocks in total. Because the two runs in the scanner consisted of new 
stimulus pairs, the two runs were collapsed. 
As expected, the age (8–11 years, 13–16 years, 18–22 years) × probability 
(AB, CD) × task block (5) ANOVA showed that participants learned to make 
more correct choices over time, as indicated by a main effect of task block, F(4, 
260) = 40.44, p < 0.001, (See Figure 7.1B). There was a significant difference 
in accuracy between the two probabilities; participants were more accurate on 
the AB (80%–20%) trials than the CD (70%–30%) trials, F(1, 65) = 11.58, p < 
0.001, .Contrary to predictions, there were no age differences in learning (age × 
task block interaction, F(8, 260) = 1.38, p = 0.11), no age differences in 
accuracy on the two pairs (age × probability interaction, F(2, 65) = 0.941, p = 
0.393), and no age × probability × task block interaction (p > 0.10). A similar 
ANOVA for reaction times revealed no differences for age, probability, or task 
block (all p’s > 0.10) (see Table 7.1). 
The task block factor allowed us to obtain the point in learning where 
participants reached a plateau. By selecting the task phase in which there were 
no longer differences in learning, we could examine how feedback was 
processed in the context of applying the correct (choosing the stimuli with a 
high probability of positive feedback) or alternative rule (choosing the stimuli 
with a low probability of positive feedback). Follow up comparisons showed 
that the last 60 trials were appropriate for this purpose, as performance 
stabilized and participants showed probability matching behavior (Shanks et al., 
2002). That is, both the AB and the CD pairs showed no effects of block 
(learning) on accuracy in the last three blocks, F(2, 130) = 3.47, p = 0.08 and 
F(2, 130) = 1.81, p = 0.52, respectively. When we reanalyzed these last 60 
trials, we still found a significant effect of stimulus pair, F(1, 65) = 16.51, p < 
0.001, , and again no significant interactions with age (all p’s > 0.3). 
To summarize, the behavioral results showed that all participants learned to 
perform more accurately over time and they learned faster on the easier AB 
trials than the more difficult CD trials. Performance stabilized in the last 60 
trials, at which point participants showed probability matching behavior 
(Shanks et al., 2002). 
The fMRI analyses focused on the last 60 trials. In order to have enough 
trial numbers in each condition, we collapsed across probabilities in the 
Better than expected or as bad as you thought 131 
analyses below. Thus, we differentiated between over-learned high probabilities 
(A and C collapsed) and alternative low probabilities (B and D trials collapsed). 
These will be referred to as the correct and alternative rules. Each of these rules 
could result in positive and negative feedback. 
 
 
Table 7.2. : Brain Regions revealed by whole brain contrasts. 
Anatomical region L/R voxel 
volume 
Z MNI coordinates 
    x y z 
Positive > Negative       
       
Striatum (ventral and dorsal) L/R 774 7.49 -6 12 -3 
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex L 71 4.61 -27 24 51 
Superior parietal cortex L 170 4.23 -30 -75 48 
Precuneus L/R 137 4.07 -3 -36 33 
Ventral Medial PFC L/R 26 4.03 3 54 -12 
Visual Cortex L/R 332 4.50 27 -93 -9 
       
Negative > Positive       
       
Dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex L/R 63 4.43 9 21 36 
       




7.4.2 fMRI Results Positive Versus Negative Feedback 
 
Whole-brain comparisons across age groups 
First, we identified the neural correlates of feedback processing by comparing 
the (positive feedback vs. negative feedback) contrast across all participants. 
This analysis revealed increased BOLD responses for positive feedback > 
negative feedback in several regions including the left and right caudate, left 
DLPFC and left parietal cortex (see Figure 7.2A). The opposite contrast 
(negative > positive feedback) resulted in increased activation in the dACC. The 
coordinates for these comparisons (positive feedback vs. negative feedback) are 
reported in Table 7.2. 
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Figure 7.2 (A) Regions from the (positive vs. negative feedback) contrasts across all 
participants (B) Parameter estimates and standard errors for positive and negative 
feedback that followed either the correct or the alternative rule displayed for each age 
group in left DLPFC, left parietal cortex, dACC and left caudate. Significant differences 




7.4.3 fMRI Region of Interest Results for Feedback × Rule × Age Group 
Interactions 
Next, we tested for age differences and rule sensitivity in these regions by 
performing region of interest (ROI) analyses. The ROI analyses were restricted 
to the four a priori defined regions which emerged in the (positive vs. negative) 
contrast across participants: bilateral caudate, left DLPFC, left parietal cortex 
and dACC. In order to investigate whether there were age differences in how 
the statistical regularities learned by the participants had an effect on how 
feedback was processed we performed 3 × 2 × 2 ANOVAs testing for the 
interaction between valence (positive vs. negative) and rule (correct vs. 
alternative) as within-subjects factors and age (children, adolescents, adults) as 
the between-subjects factor for each ROI (see Figure 7.2B). 
 
Left DLPFC. The (age group × valence × rule) ANOVA for left DLPFC 
resulted in an interaction between valence and rule, F(2, 64) = 6.32, p < 0.01, 
showing that left DLPFC was more active for both negative and positive 
feedback after choosing the alternative rule compared to the correct rule, but 
this difference was larger for positive than negative feedback. In addition, there 
was an interaction between rule (AC vs BD) and age group, F(2, 64) = 3.87, p = 
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0.02, and a three-way interaction between rule, valence, and age group, F(2, 64) 
= 6.77, p < 0.01. 
As can be seen in Figure 7.2B, children and adolescents showed more 
activity for positive feedback after choosing the alternative rule compared to the 
correct rule (t(17) = 2.64, p < 0.01 and t(26) = 3.18, p < 0.004, respectively), 
whereas this difference was not present in adults. In addition, adults and 
adolescents showed more activity for negative feedback after choosing the 
alternative rule compared to the correct rule, (t(21) = −2.49, p = 0.02 and t(23) = 
−2.81, p < 0.01 respectively), but this difference was not present in children. 
 
Left parietal cortex. The (age group × valence × rule) ANOVA for the left 
parietal cortex revealed a similar three-way interaction which approached 
significance, F(2, 64) = 3.16, p = 0.05 (see Figure 7.2B). Although the pattern 
of activation for the different conditions in the left parietal cortex appears 
similar to the pattern for left DLFPC, it did not survive Bonferroni correction 
and none of the post hoc comparisons resulted in significant effects. 
 
dACC. The (age group × valence × rule) ANOVA for the dACC resulted in a 
rule × valence interaction, F(2, 64) = 14.14, p < 0.001, an age × valence 
interaction, F(2, 64) = 4.11, p < 0.01, and an age × rule interaction, F(2, 64) = 
4.81, p = 0.03, but the three-way interaction failed to reach significance F(2, 64) 
= 0.28, p = 0.75. 
As can be seen in Figure 7.2B, adults showed more activation in dACC 
after negative feedback than after positive feedback, F(1, 21) = 8.25, p < 0.01, 
but this was not found for the younger age groups. Children and adolescence, in 
contrast, showed more dACC activation after positive feedback for the 
alternative rule relative to the correct rule (t(17) = 2.51, p < 0.01 and t(26) = 
3.44, p < 0.01 respectively). In addition, adults and adolescents showed more 
activity for negative feedback after choosing the alternative rule compared to 
the correct rule, (t(21) = −2.89, p < 0.01 and t(26) = −3.32, p < 0.003 
respectively), but this difference was not present in children. 
 
Left and right caudate. Finally, we performed an (age group × valence × rule) 
ANOVA for the left caudate nucleus. This analyses did not reveal any age 
effects, but a main effect for feedback, F(1, 64) = 33.17, p < 0.001, and a 
feedback × rule interaction F(2, 64) = 17.21, p < 0.01. All age groups showed 
more activity for the alternative (low probability) compared to the correct rule 
(high probability) positive feedback (all p’s < 0.001), but there were no 
additional main or interaction effects (Figure 7.2B). Similar analyses for right 
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caudate yielded the same results; a main effect of feedback, F(1, 64) = 28.16, p 
< 0.005, and a feedback × rule interaction F(2, 64) = 19.33, p < 0.01. 
 
7.4.4 Win Stay – Lose Shift Strategies: Behavior and Brain Analyses 
Finally, to further investigate differences in feedback processing we explored 
developmental changes in decision-making strategies on the behavioral and 
neural level. In order to investigate the strategy used on the task we examined 
how often participants chose either the same stimulus after positive feedback 
(win-stay) or the other stimulus after negative feedback (lose-shift). For this set 
of analyses we further broke down the trials based on the subsequent choice 
when presented with the same stimulus pair; win-stay, win-shift, lose-stay and 
lose-shift. The factor ‘win-stay’ was computed by calculating the proportion of 
choice repetitions following positive feedback as a function of the total number 
of positive feedback events. Likewise, the factor ‘lose-shift’ was computed by 
calculating the proportion of choice shifts following negative feedback as a 
function of the total number of negative feedback events. Because previous 
analyses revealed that positive and negative feedback were processed 
differently dependent on rule type we analyzed the sequential effects for the 
correct and alternative rule separately. 
 
Task Strategy. For correct rules, the univariate ANOVAs with age group as the 
between-subjects factor revealed a significant age difference in lose-shift 
strategies, F(2, 64) = 4.04, p < 0.02 as well as in win-stay strategies, F(2, 64) = 
4.51, p < 0.02 (see Figure 7.3A). These results illustrate that adults showed 
more optimizing behavior than adolescents and children; they stayed more often 
with the correct rule after positive feedback and shifted less often after negative 
feedback.  
For the alternative rules, the univariate ANOVAs revealed no age 
differences for win-stay strategies, F(2, 64) = 0.85, p = 0.43, but there was a 
significant age difference in lose-shift strategies, F(2, 64) = 3.91, p < 0.03. In 
the latter case, children showed less optimal behavior compared to the 
adolescents and adults; surprisingly, they stayed more often with the alternative 
(incorrect) rule after negative feedback. 
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Figure 7.3:(A) Percentages of win-stay and lose-shift choices per age group and rule 
type, error bars represent standard error. (B) Parameter estimates and standard errors for 
positive and negative feedback that followed by either staying or shifting, displayed for 
each age group and rule type separately. Significant differences between brain activity 
in two conditions are indicated with an asterisk (*Bonferroni corrected). 
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ROI analyses. In order to explore the relation between brain activity and 
behavior on the subsequent trial, we compared brain activity after positive and 
negative feedback that resulted in staying or shifting for the two rule types 
separately. We explored the same ROIs as reported above. These analyses 
revealed significant shift and age effects only in the dACC and left DLPFC, but 
not in the caudate or the parietal cortex. In general, the ANOVAs showed that in 
adults, dACC and DLPFC were more active when participants shifted on the 
next trial. There were some differences in significance levels, but overall this 
effect seemed generally independent of feedback valence or rule. The analyses 
are described in more detail below. 
The dACC showed the strongest relation between brain activity and 
subsequent behavioral change. When applying the correct rule, the shift × age 
group ANOVA for positive feedback revealed a main effect of shifting, F(1, 65) 
= 6.27, p < 0.01 but no interaction with age, F(2, 64) = 2.29, p = 0.11 (see 
Figure 7.3B). There was more dACC activity when shifting after positive 
feedback. The same ANOVA for negative feedback revealed an age × shift 
interaction, F(2, 64) = 3.62, p = 0.03. Post hoc comparisons revealed that there 
was more dACC activity when shifting compared to staying after negative 
feedback for adults (t(21) = −2.76, p < 0.01) but not for the adolescents and 
children (both p’s > 0.1). 
When applying the alternative rule, the shift × age group ANOVA for 
positive feedback revealed no significant effects of age or shifting. However, 
the same ANOVA for negative feedback revealed an age × shift interaction 
(F(2, 63) = 5.31, p < 0.01). Post hoc comparisons revealed that there was more 
dACC activity when shifting after negative feedback for adults (t(21) = −3.01, p 
< 0.01) but not for adolescents and children (both p’s > 0.2). 
Finally, the pattern of activation in the left DLPFC appeared similar to that 
of the dACC (Figure S7.2 in Supplementary Material). The shift × age 
ANOVAs for the correct rule resulted in significant shift × age interactions for 
both positive and negative feedback (F(2, 63) = 4.46, p = 0.03 and F(2, 64) = 
4.91, p = 0.02, respectively). Post hoc test revealed that there was more left 
DLPFC activity when shifting on the next trial after positive and negative 
feedback, but this was only significant for the adults (t(21) = −2.54, p < 0.01 
and t(21) = −2.32, p = 0.03, respectively). There were no significant effects for 
the alternative rule (all p’s > 0.2). 
 
7.4 Discussion 
The goal of this study was to examine the neural developmental changes 
when processing positive and negative feedback signals in a probabilistic 
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decision-making task. As predicted, all participants learned to choose the 
correct rules (high probability stimuli A and C) more often than the alternative 
rules (low probability stimuli B and D) (Frank et al., 2004; Klein et al., 2007). 
After approximately 40 trials, participants adapted a performance pattern 
consistent with ‘probability matching behavior’, and this behavioral phase was 
the focus of our further analyses. 
Behavioral analyses showed two important patterns: (1) probability 
matching behavior occurred in all age groups, but there were no age differences 
in overall learning rate, and (2) task adaptive win-stay, lose-shift strategies were 
observed, but age differences in adaptive behavior indicated more task-adaptive 
optimizing behavior in adults. These task and age differences in decision-
making strategy were paralleled by changes in functional brain activity; (1) 
neural responses in DLPFC, dACC, and caudate were sensitive to rule × 
feedback interactions and an age related difference was observed in DLPFC and 
dACC, and (2) activity in DLPFC and dACC predicted behavioral change on 
subsequent trials more strongly in adults than in adolescents and children. These 
behavioral data and their neural correlates provide important new insights in 
feedback processing in general and across development. The discussion will be 
organized according to these themes. 
 
7.4.1 Feedback processing in adults 
Our analysis of positive and negative feedback processing in a probabilistic 
environment demonstrated that feedback-related activity in the DLPFC, dACC 
and caudate was dependent on valence and information value. We started out 
with a general whole-brain comparison for positive versus negative feedback 
and used ROI analyses to explore the areas identified in this contrast. This 
analysis revealed that especially left DLPFC, dACC and bilateral caudate were 
sensitive to feedback × rule context interactions. Before interpreting age 
differences in these activation patterns, we start out with the interpretation of 
feedback sensitivity observed in adults, which will set the stage for interpreting 
the developmental effects. 
When exploring the data for adults separately, the results showed increased 
recruitment of DLPFC after receiving negative feedback following the 
alternative compared to the correct rule. Given that negative feedback after 
choosing the alternative, but not the correct, rule indicates the need for a switch 
in behavior, the adult findings are consistent with previous studies 
demonstrating negative feedback-related sensitivity in DLPFC for feedback that 
is important for subsequent behavioral adjustment (Kerns, 2006; van 
Duijvenvoorde et al., 2008; Zanolie et al., 2008) and not for negative feedback 
per se. 
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Besides DLPFC, the parietal cortex has previously been implicated in 
feedback processing (Crone et al., 2008, van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2008) and 
implementing cognitive control as part of the fronto-parietal network (Brass et 
al., 2005; Bunge et al., 2002; Dosenbach et al., 2008). In support of this 
hypothesis our whole-brain analyses revealed that the left superior parietal 
cortex was involved in feedback processing. However, in contrast with previous 
studies (van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2008), our subsequent post hoc analyses 
could not confirm a strong contribution of the superior parietal cortex. Possibly, 
the parietal cortex was more engaged in prior studies because these involved 
trial-to-trial learning, whereas in the current study we investigated feedback 
processing when rules were already learned. Future research is necessary to 
elucidate the role of the superior parietal cortex in feedback processing in 
relation to learning. 
The analyses of dACC revealed a very similar activation pattern as DLPFC, 
however the dACC activation pattern in adults was more supportive of a general 
increase in activity after negative feedback regardless of rule type. Possibly, this 
finding indicates that, at least in adults, the dACC has a more general role in 
processing negative feedback; both in terms of detecting general conflict 
(Brown and Braver, 2005) and signaling the need for behavior change (Holroyd 
and Coles, 2008; Rushworth, 2008). 
Finally, the caudate nucleus also showed sensitivity to feedback and rule 
type, but this region was more active after positive compared to negative 
feedback when participants chose the alternative rule. Given that this effect was 
specific for positive feedback, and that the probability for positive feedback for 
the alternative rule was low, the signal in the caudate could reflect a positive 
prediction error; i.e., signaling that the outcome is better than predicted (for 
review see Schultz, 2007). 
Together, analysis of the adult activation pattern confirms prior findings 
showing that DLPFC and dACC are sensitive to negative feedback and the 
caudate is sensitive to positive feedback, but the findings further elucidate that 
these neural responses are dependent on the extent to which these feedback 
signals provide a learning signal of future performance. That is, DLPFC and 
caudate responses were more pronounced after selecting the incorrect rule 
which had a low probability of resulting in positive feedback, but which may 
have been important to explore. In contrast, when applying over-learned high 
probability rules, DLPFC and caudate were less involved, possibly because the 
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7.4.2 Feedback Processing: Developmental Comparisons 
The neural activation patterns described above were differentially sensitive to 
age modulations. The first notable finding is that of differential activation 
patterns in the DLPFC. All participants, regardless of age, showed increased 
recruitment of DLPFC when choosing the alternative rule compared to the 
correct rule. However, children, but not adults, showed more activation in 
DLPFC after positive feedback when choosing the alternative rule. In contrast, 
adults, but not children, showed more activation in DLPFC after negative 
feedback when choosing the alternative rule. Adolescents seemed to be in a 
transition phase, because their neural response to positive feedback was similar 
to that observed in children, but their neural response to negative feedback was 
similar to that observed in adults. Thus, consistent with prior studies, these 
developmental differences indicate a shift from focus on positive to a focus on 
negative feedback with age (Somsen, 2007; Crone et al., 2008; van 
Duijvenvoorde et al., 2008), which appears to continue across adolescence. In 
addition, the current results extend previous findings by showing that 
developmental differences in neural responses to feedback are not related to 
valence per se, but suggest an age related change in processing learning signals 
with different informative value. 
In contrast, for all age groups the caudate nucleus was more active for 
positive compared to negative feedback, in particular when participants chose 
the alternative rule. This finding indicates that part of the feedback processing 
network, which is implicated in processing statistical regularities of reward 
(Schultz, 2007) matures already at an early age, whereas the part of the network 
that is involved in processing negative feedback and the subsequent control of 
behavior has a more protracted developmental time course. These findings are 
consistent with prior reports using cognitive tasks, as these studies have also 
reported early maturation of subcortical regions and protracted development of 
cortical brain areas (Casey et al., 2004; van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2008; 
Velanova et al., 2008). It should be noted that other developmental studies have 
reported increased sensitivity of the striatum in early adolescence, however, 
these studies have employed paradigms with a more affective content, such as 
gambling tasks with real monetary rewards or emotion recognition (Ernst et al., 
2005; Galvan et al., 2006; McClure-Tone et al., 2008; van Leijenhorst et al., 
2009). In future studies, it will be of interest to examine whether the caudate 
activation can be modulated by the use of affective task modulations when 
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7.4.3 Adaptive Behavior and Brain Activation across Development 
One of the challenging questions for future studies is how the neural activation 
is associated with trial-to-trial learning. For example, we did not observe age 
differences in general learning performance, despite differences in neural 
activation. This was unexpected, and again demonstrates that differences in 
neural activation can be present without differences in observable behavior 
(Ladouceur et al., 2004). However, consistent with prior studies, the sequential 
analyses revealed that with age, participants became better at using the negative 
feedback signals to adjust their behavior on subsequent trials (Crone and van 
der Molen, 2004). As expected, when receiving positive feedback after having 
applied the correct rule, participants were more likely to stay and select the 
same stimulus on the subsequent trial. Likewise, when receiving negative 
feedback after having applied the incorrect alternative rule, participants were 
more likely to shift and select the correct stimulus on the subsequent trial. 
Overall, adults appeared better at optimizing than adolescents, and adolescents 
performed better than children. Based on these findings, in combination with 
the developmental differences in neural activation, the data are supportive of a 
linear increase across adolescence. Although these findings differ from earlier 
reports which have showed larger differences in early adolescence than in later 
adolescence (e.g. Ladouceur et al. 2004) the findings are consistent with prior 
fMRI results showing late changes in brain activation and behavior (e.g. Scherf 
et al., 2006; van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2008). 
Intriguingly, even though children were more likely than adults to shift after 
receiving negative feedback when applying the correct rule, they were also 
more likely to stay after receiving negative feedback when applying the 
incorrect alternative rule. The reason for this behavioral pattern is still unclear, 
but it is possible that children waited with shifting when applying the incorrect 
alternative rule until they received positive feedback (20%). Future research 
should use task manipulations that allow for further investigation of this 
hypothesis. 
We performed exploratory analyses to investigate the relation between brain 
activity and win-stay, lose-shift behavior, although it should be noted that these 
analyses are preliminary as our study design was not optimized to test for these 
differences. The analyses on the ROIs identified in the main analyses revealed 
that, consistent with prior research, dACC and left DLPFC activity predicted 
behavioral adjustment on the subsequent trial in adults (Kerns et al., 2004; 
Jocham et al., 2009). However, this pattern was observed for both rule types and 
appeared independent of feedback valence. Possibly, the dACC and left DLPFC 
were important for trial-by-trial adjustment (Kerns et al., 2004). We found a 
similar pattern in adolescents, but only when applying the correct rule. We 
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failed to find similar relations in children, which may indicate that the neural 
mechanisms that facilitate future behavioral adjustment are still immature or 
that they employed different strategies to perform the task. These interpretations 
are consistent with an ERP study showing increased error related negativity 
across adolescence (Ladouceur et al., 2007). Furthermore, the same study 
showed that only in adults the ERN amplitude was related to task performance. 
The current study is limited by the relatively small number of trials for 
some of the contrasts examining the neural correlates of shifting behavior. 
Future studies should make use of tasks that are optimized for studying these 
developmental differences in more detail. 
In addition, a challenging direction for future research will be to investigate 
the developmental differences in the learning phase. The combined use of 
computational reinforcement learning models (Klein et al., 2007) with imaging 
techniques could be a promising endeavor to parse out the developmental 
changes in different phases of learning (e.g. learning rate) and their neural 
correlates. These methods could be combined with trial-to-trial data 
categorization to understand how the observed developmental change in 
sensitivity from positive to negative feedback hinders or facilitates learning 
locally versus oriented towards future goals. 
 
Conclusion 
Taken together, the current findings confirm that DLPFC, dACC and caudate 
are important for probabilistic feedback processing, and show that they have 
dissociable roles as reflected in differential sensitivity to feedback valence and 
rule types. The DLPFC and dACC were sensitive to information value in 
response to negative feedback, but the caudate was sensitive to information 
value in response to positive feedback. These findings are consistent with 
previously suggested computational models of feedback learning (Cohen, 2008; 
Frank and Kong, 2008). 
The results of this study replicate the previously reported developmental 
shift in sensitivity from positive to negative feedback as reflected in neural 
activation in the DLPFC, with a transition phase in adolescence. Using 
probabilistic feedback stimuli, we could dissociate between two competing 
hypotheses with respect to this developmental change. The results confirm the 
hypothesis that this shift is associated with different attention focus on learning 
signals and disconfirm the hypothesis that this shift reflects a simple valence 
effect. Further understanding of the age related changes in strategy differences, 
and how to influence decision-making strategies by guiding attention regulation, 
promise to be useful sources to improve learning behavior of children and 
adolescents. 
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7.5 Supplementary Material 
 
7.5.1 Additional tests for Feedback x Rule and Rule x Age groups interactions 
The ROI analyses presented in the manuscript suggest that neural responses to 
feedback valence are modulated by rule selection and age. Additionally, we 
performed whole-brain ANOVAs testing for interactions between valence 
(positive and negative), rule (correct high probability vs. alternative low 
probability) and age in order to explore whether additional regions were 
sensitive to these interactions. The whole brain ANOVA  and subsequent ROI 
analyses of age related changes on effects of rule choice further supported the 
hypothesis of a shift in focus from positive feedback to negative feedback from 
childhood to adulthood in the DLPFC when choosing the alternative rule (see 
Figure S7.1).  
 
Rule & Valence 
The first ANOVA was performed to test for regions that were sensitive to the 
rule x valance interaction across participants. This analysis revealed a single 
region in the right DLPFC (BA 9, MNI: [45, 39, 30], see Figure S7.1A). This 
region was further explored by extracting the ROI and was found to be more 
active for positive feedback following the alternative rule compared to positive 
feedback following the correct rule, t(58) = 4.30, p < .001, and was also more 
active for negative feedback following the alternative rule compared to negative 
feedback following the correct rule, t(63) = -3.93, p < .001. In addition, a 
comparison of positive and negative feedback for the alternative rule indicated 
that the neural response was enlarged for positive feedback signals, t(58) = 2.08, 
p < .05.  
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Figure S7.1: A) A whole-brain comparison revealed that the right DLPFC was sensitive 
to the rule x feedback interaction across all participants. Parameter estimates and 
standard errors for positive and negative feedback that followed either the correct or the 
alternative rule are displayed. (B) Regions in the right DLPFC that showed a rule x age 
interaction for positive and negative feedback separately. Parameter estimates and 
standard errors for positive and negative feedback that followed either the correct or the 
alternative rule are displayed for each age group. Significant differences between brain 
activity in two conditions are indicated with an asterisk (*).  
 
Age x Rule for positive and negative feedback  
Next, we tested for age differences by performing whole-brain ANOVAs with 
age group as between participants factor, testing for both linear increases [-1 0 
1] as well as decreases [1 0 -1] with age. Given that differences in feedback 
processing were expected to differentiate based on the rule that was applied 
(correct vs. alternative), we tested for age differences in processing positive and 
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negative feedback separately. In the rule x age ANOVA for positive feedback, 
the decrease contrast [1 0 -1] revealed an age related change in right DLPFC 
(BA 9, MNI: [39, 27, 17] Figure S7.1B). The ROI of this region was extracted 
to test for pattern differences. Post hoc comparisons showed more activation for 
positive feedback after the alternative rule compared to the correct rule for 
children only, t(17)= 2.93, p< .01. In contrast, adults and adolescents did not 
show differences in processing positive feedback following the two rules (both 
p’s >.2). No regions were detected for the increasing age contrast [-1 0 1].  
The same whole-brain rule x age ANOVA was performed for negative 
feedback. Here, the increasing age contrast [-1 0 1] revealed a slightly lower 
area in the right DLPFC (BA 46, MNI: [39, 27, 17], Figure 7.3B). Subsequent 
post hoc comparisons for the ROI which was extracted of this region revealed 
increased activity for negative feedback after the alternative compared to the 
correct rule for adults only, t(19)=-2.45, p< .01. The adolescents and children 
did not show any effect of rule choice on negative feedback (both p’s >.1). No 
regions were detected for the decreasing age contrast [1 0 -1].  
In sum, the whole brain ANOVA analyses of age related changes in effects of 
rule choice further supported the hypothesis of a shift in focus on positive 
feedback to negative feedback from childhood to adulthood in the DLPFC when 
choosing the alternative rule. Notably, the regions which were identified in this 
set of ANOVAs were right lateralized. Even though the post hoc comparisons 
of left and right DLPFC resulted in similar activation patterns, we interpreted 
this difference as right DLPFC being relatively more sensitive to rule context, 
and left DLPFC to feedback valence.  
 
Figure S7.2: Parameter estimates and standard errors for positive and negative feedback 
that followed by either staying or shifting, displayed for each age group and rule type 
separately. Significant differences between brain activity in two conditions are indicated 
with an asterisk (*, Bonferroni corrected). 
 
8. Striatum-medial prefrontal cortex connectivity 







During development, children improve in learning from feedback to adapt 
their behavior. However, it is still unclear which neural mechanisms might 
underlie these developmental changes. In the current study we used a 
reinforcement learning model to investigate neurodevelopmental changes in 
the representation and processing of learning signals. Healthy volunteers 
between ages 8 and 22 (children: 8–11 years, adolescents: 13–16 years, and 
adults: 18–22 years) performed a probabilistic learning task while in a MRI 
scanner. The behavioral data demonstrated age differences in learning 
parameters with a stronger impact of negative feedback on expected value in 
children. Model-based analysis of imaging data revealed that the neural 
representation of prediction errors was similar across age groups, but 
prediction error-related functional connectivity between the ventral striatum 
and the medial prefrontal cortex shifted as a function of age, from stronger 
after negative feedback to stronger after positive feedback. Furthermore, the 
connectivity strength predicted the tendency to alter expectations after 
receiving negative feedback. These findings indicate that the underlying 
mechanisms of developmental changes in learning may not be related to 
differences in the computation of learning signals per se, but rather to 






The ability to learn contingencies between actions and positive or negative 
outcomes in a dynamic environment forms the foundation of adaptive behavior 
(Rushworth & Behrens, 2008). Learning from feedback in probabilistic 
environments is sensitive to developmental changes, showing developmental 
improvements in learning from positive and negative feedback are observed 
until early adulthood (Crone & van der Molen, 2004; Hooper et al., 2004; 
Huizinga et al., 2006; van den Bos et al., 2009). Intriguingly, prior 
neuroimaging studies have demonstrated developmental differences in neural 
circuits associated with learning from feedback in a fixed, or static learning 
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environment (van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2008, Crone et al., 2008). These studies 
show that dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and parietal cortex are increasingly 
engaged when receiving negative feedback. However, in a probabilistic learning 
environment, learning is adaptive over trials and both positive and negative 
feedback informs future behavior. Therefore, an important question concerns 
the neural mechanisms that underlie developmental differences in adaptive 
probability learning.  
A crucial aspect of adaptive learning is using feedback to estimate the 
expected value of the available options. The first step in estimating the expected 
value is the computation of prediction errors, that is, calculating the difference 
between expected and experienced outcomes. Prediction errors can be positive, 
indicating that outcomes are better than expected, or negative, indicating that 
outcomes are worse than expected (Sutton & Barto, 1998). Next, these 
prediction errors are used to update the expected value associated with the 
chosen option: the expected value increases when the prediction error is positive 
and decreases when the prediction error is negative.  
Prior neuroimaging studies have shown that activity in the ventral striatum, 
a target area of dopaminergic midbrain neurons, correlates with positive and 
negative prediction errors (Knutson et al., 2000; Pagnoni et al., 2002; e.g. 
McClure et al., 2003; O'Doherty et al., 2003; McClure et al., 2004). The relation 
between prediction errors and subsequent learning is confirmed by studies 
demonstrating an association between the representation of prediction errors in 
the striatum and individual differences in performance on probabilistic learning 
tasks (Pessiglione et al., 2006; Schönberg et al., 2007). Recently, a 
developmental study revealed heightened sensitivity in the striatum to positive 
prediction errors in adolescents relative to children and adults (Cohen et al., 
2010). Children (ages 8-12) did not show evidence for a prediction error signal 
in the striatum, whereas adolescents (ages 14-19) and adults (25-30) did. 
Therefore, it is possible that the representation of prediction errors is one 
mechanism contributing to the observed developmental changes in adaptive 
behavior. 
Several neuroimaging studies have shown that activity in the medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) correlates with the expected value of stimuli or 
actions (for review see Rangel et al., 2008). Representations of expected values 
in the mPFC are thought to be updated by means of fronto-striatal connections, 
relating striatal prediction errors to medial prefrontal representations (Houk & 
Wise, 1995; Pasupathy & Miller, 2005; Frank & Claus, 2006; Camara et al., 
2009). In support of this hypothesis, recent studies have shown increased 
functional connectivity between the ventral striatum and mPFC during feedback 
processing (Camara et al., 2008; Munte et al., 2008). Furthermore, group 
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differences in learning may be related to the connectivity strength between the 
striatum and the PFC during feedback processing. For example, substance-
dependent individuals have an intact striatal representation of prediction errors, 
but are impaired in subsequently using these signals for learning (Park et al., 
2010). This study showed that there is a positive relation between learning 
speed and the strength of functional connectivity between the striatum and PFC 
(see also Klein et al., 2007). Therefore, a second possible mechanism that may 
contribute to developmental changes in adaptive behavior is an increase in 
striatal-mPFC connectivity. Indeed, there are also still substantial changes in 
anatomical connectivity between subcortical structures and the prefrontal cortex 
during adolescence (Supekar et al., 2009; Schmithorst & Yuan, 2010).  
To test these two hypotheses, a computational model of reinforcement 
learning model was applied to investigate developmental differences in (a) the 
neural representation of prediction errors, and (b) changes in fronto-striatal 
connectivity. Participants of three age groups (children ages 8-11, adolescents 
ages 13-16 and young adults ages 18-22) performed a probabilistic learning task 
(Frank et al., 2004) in an MRI scanner. We expect that with age, there is an 
improvement in learning from probabilistic feedback (Crone & van der Molen, 
2004; van den Bos et al., 2009). In order to capture age related changes in 
learning from positive and negative feedback separately, we use a reinforcement 
learning model with separate learning rates for positive and negative feedback 
(Kahnt et al., 2009). The individually estimated trial-by-trial prediction errors 
generated by this reinforcement model were subsequently used to test whether 
developmental differences in learning reflect functional differences in the 
representation of prediction errors or developmental changes in the propagation 
of prediction errors as measured by functional fronto-striatal connectivity (Park 
et al., 2010).  
 
8.2 Material and Methods 
 
8.2.1 Participants.  
Sixty-seven healthy right-handed paid volunteers ages 8-22 participated in the 
fMRI experiment. Age groups were based on adolescent development stage, 
resulting in three age groups: children (8- to 11-year-olds, n=18; 9 female), mid-
adolescents (13- to 16-year-olds, n=27; 13 female) and young adults (18- to 22-
year-olds, n=22; 13 female). A chi square analysis indicated that gender 
distribution did not differ between age groups, X2 (2) = .79, p = .67. All 
participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and participants or 
their caregivers indicated an absence of neurological or psychiatric 
impairments. Participants gave informed consent for the study and all 
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procedures were approved by the medical ethical committee of the Leiden 
University Medical Center.  
Participants completed two subscales (similarities and block design) of 
either the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) or the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC) in order to obtain an estimate of their 
intelligence quotient (Wechsler, 1991, 1997). There were no significant 
differences in estimated IQ scores between the different age groups, F (2, 66) = 
1.63, p = .20 (see Table 7.1, p. 132). 
 
8.2.2 Task Procedure 
The procedure for the probabilistic learning task (PLT, Frank et al., 2004; van 
den Bos et al., 2009) was as follows: The task consisted of two stimulus pairs 
(called AB and CD). The stimulus pairs consisted of pictures of everyday 
objects (e.g., a chair and a clock). Each trial started with the presentation of one 
of the two stimulus pairs and subsequently the participant had to choose one 
(e.g., A or B). Stimuli were presented randomly on the left or the right side of 
the screen. Participants were instructed to choose either the left or the right 
stimulus by pressing a button with the index or middle finger of the right hand. 
Responses had to be given within a 2500 ms window, which was followed by a 
1000ms feedback display (see Figure 8.1 A). If no response was given within 
2500 ms, the text “too slow” was presented on the screen.  
Feedback was probabilistic; choosing stimulus A led to positive feedback 
on 80% of AB trials, whereas choosing stimulus B led to positive feedback on 
20% of these trials. The CD pair procedure was similar, but probability for 
reward was different; choosing stimulus C led to positive feedback on 70% of 
CD trials, whereas choosing stimulus D led to positive feedback on 30% in 
these trials. 
Participants were instructed to earn as many points as possible (as indicated 
by receiving a positive feedback signal), but were also informed that it was not 
possible to receive positive feedback on every trial. After the instructions and 
before the scanning session, the participants played 40 practice rounds on a 
computer in a quiet laboratory to ensure they understood the task. 
In total, the task in the scanner consisted of two blocks of 100 trials each: 50 
AB trials and 50 CD trials per block. The first and the second block consisted of 
different sets of pictures and therefore, participants had to learn a new mapping 
in both task blocks. The data from the last 60 trials of each block were also 
reported in another study using a rule-based analysis (van den Bos et al., 2009). 
The duration of each block was approximately 8.5 minutes. The stimuli were 
presented in pseudo-random order with a jittered interstimulus interval 
(min=1000 ms, max=6000 ms) optimized with OptSeq2 (Dale, 1999). 
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Figure 8.1: A) Participants chose one stimulus by pressing the left or right button and 
received positive and negative feedback according to probabilistic rules. Two pairs of 
stimuli were presented to the participants: (1) the AB pair with 80% positive feedback 
for A and 20% for B, (2) the CD pair with 70% positive feedback for A and 30% for B 
where A 80%-20%. B) Estimated learning rates for positive and negative feedback per 
age group. C) Estimated model fits per age group. Error bars represent standard error in 
all graphs.  
 
 
8.2.3 Reinforcement Learning Model 
A standard reinforcement learning model (Sutton & Barto, 1998) was used to 
analyze behavioral and neural data (McClure et al., 2003; Cohen & Ranganath, 
2005; Haruno & Kawato, 2006; Frank & Kong, 2008; Kahnt et al., 2008). The 
standard reinforcement learning model uses the prediction error (δ) to update 
the decisions weights (w) associated with each stimulus (in this case A, B, C or 
D) (Schultz et al., 1997; Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Thus, whenever feedback is 
better than expected, the model will generate a positive prediction error which is 
used to increase the decision weight of the chosen stimulus (e.g. stimulus A). 
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However, when feedback is worse than expected, the model will generate a 
negative prediction error, which is used to decrease the decision weight of the 
chosen stimulus (e.g. stimulus B). The impact of the prediction error is usually 
scaled by the learning rate (α). We extended the standard reinforcement learning 
model by using separate learning rates for positive feedback (αpos) and negative 
feedback (αneg) (e.g. Kahnt et al., 2008). Thus, positive and negative feedback 
might have a different impact of the decisions weights. To model trial-by-trial 
choices, we used the soft-max mechanism to compute the probability (p) of 
choosing a high probability target (A or C) on trial t as the logit transform of the 
difference in the decision weights in each trial (wt) associated with each 
stimulus, passed through a biasing sigmoid function (Montague et al., 2004; 
Kahnt et al., 2008). For example, when stimulus pair AB is presented the 















After each decision the prediction error (δ) is calculated as the difference 
between the outcome received (r = 1 for positive feedback and 0 for negative 
feedback) and the decision weight (wt) for the chosen stimulus: 
 
(2) δt = rt −w chosen_ stimulus( )t  
 
Subsequently, the decision weights are updated according to: 
 
(3) ( ) tttt outcomeww δαπ ××+=+1  
 
Where π is 1 for the chosen and 0 for the unchosen stimulus, α(outcome) is a set 
of learning rates for positive (αpos) and negative feedback (αneg), which scale the 
effect of the prediction error on the future decision weights, and thus subsequent 
decisions. For example, a high learning rate for positive feedback but a low 
learning rate for negative feedback indicates that positive feedback has a high 
impact on future behavior, whereas negative feedback will hardly change future 
behavior. These two learning rates were individually estimated by fitting the 
model predictions (p(high probability stimulus)) to participants' actual 
decisions. We used the multivariate constrained minimization function 
(fmincon) of the optimization toolbox implemented in MATLAB 6.5 for this 
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fitting procedure. Initial values for learning rates were αpos = αneg = 0.5 and for 
action values, w(left) = w(right) = 0. 
 
8.2.4 Behavioral Analyses  
To examine the correspondence between model predictions and participants' 
behavior, model predictions were compared with the actual behavior on a trial-
by-trial basis. Model predictions based on estimated learning rates were 
regressed against the vector of participants' actual choices and individual 
regression coefficients were used to compare group differences in model fits. 
Differences in model fit between groups would indicate that other processes, for 
example a larger tendency to switch regardless of feedback, may play a 
relatively larger role in choice behavior in one group compared to the other. 
Only when there are no differences in model fit between groups one can 
confidently compare model parameters. 
 
8.2.5 Data Acquisition 
Participants were familiarized with the scanner environment on the day of the 
fMRI session through the use of a mock scanner, which simulated the sounds 
and environment of a real MRI scanner. Data were acquired using a 3.0T Philips 
Achieva scanner at the Leiden University Medical Center. Stimuli were 
projected onto a screen located at the head of the scanner bore and viewed by 
participants by means of a mirror mounted to the head coil assembly. First, a 
localizer scan was obtained for each participant. Subsequently, T2*-weighted 
Echo-Planar Images (EPI) (TR= 2.2 sec, TE= 30ms, 80 x 80 matrix, FOV = 
220, 35 2.75mm transverse slices with 0.28mm gap) were obtained during 2 
functional runs of 232 volumes each. A high-resolution T1-weighted anatomical 
scan and a high-resolution T2-weighted matched-bandwidth anatomical scan, 
with the same slice prescription as the EPIs, were obtained from each 
participant after the functional runs. Stimulus presentation and the timing of all 
stimuli and response events were acquired using E-Prime software. Head 
motion was restricted by using a pillow and foam inserts that surrounded the 
head. 
 
8.2.6 fMRI Data Analysis 
Data were preprocessed using SPM5 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive 
Neurology, London). The functional time series were realigned to compensate 
for small head movements. Translational movement parameters never exceeded 
1 voxel (< 3 mm) in any direction for any subject or scan. There were no 
significant differences in movement parameters between age groups F (2, 65) = 
.15, p = .85. Functional volumes were spatially normalized to EPI templates. 
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The normalization algorithm used a 12 parameter affine transformation together 
with a nonlinear transformation involving cosine basis functions and resampled 
the volumes to 3 mm cubic voxels. Functional volumes were spatially smoothed 
using a 8 mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian kernel. The MNI305 template 
was used for visualization and all results are reported in the MNI305 stereotaxic 
space (Cosoco, Kollokian, Kwan, & Evans, 1997)  
Statistical analyses were performed on individual participants’ data using 
the general linear model in SPM5. The fMRI time series data were modeled by 
a series of events convolved with a canonical haemodynamic response function 
(HRF). The presentation of the feedback screen was modeled as 0-duration 
events. The stimuli and responses were not modeled separately as these 
occurred in one prior or overlapping EPI images as feedback presentation. To 
investigate the neural responses to feedback valence, independent of learning 
conditions, we set up a general linear model (GLM) with the onsets of each 
feedback type (positive and negative) as regressors.  
To examine the neural correlates of reward prediction errors, we set up a 
second GLM with a parametric design. In this model, the stimulus functions for 
feedback were parametrically modulated by the trial-wise prediction errors 
derived from the reinforcement learning model. The modulated stick functions 
were again convolved with the canonical HRF. These regressors were then 
orthogonalized with respect to the onset regressors of positive and negative 
feedback trials and regressed against the BOLD signal.  
Finally, to investigate age linear and quadratic age trends we applied 
polynomial expansion analysis (Büchel et al., 1996) with age as continuous 
variable, using the forward model selection as described by Büchel and 
colleagues (1998). Thresholds were set to p < .001 uncorrected for the whole 
group analyses, with an extend threshold of 15 continuous voxels (cf. Kahnt et 
al., 2008). We used the Marsbar toolbox for use with SPM5 
(http://marsbar.sourceforge.net, Brett et al. 2002) to perform Region of Interest 
(ROI) analyses to further characterize patterns of activation and estimate 
individual differences in connectivity measures. 
 
8.2.7 Functional Connectivity Analyses 
To explore the interplay between the ventral striatum and other brain regions 
during reinforcement-guided decision-making, functional connectivity was 
assessed using psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis (Friston, 1994; 
Cohen et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008). The functional whole brain mask, in 
which activity correlated significantly with prediction errors for the whole 
group, was masked with an anatomical striatum ROI of the Marsbar toolbox 
that included the bilateral caudate, putamen and nucleus accumbens, to create 
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the seed region of interest (ROI). The method used here relies on correlations in 
the observed BOLD time-series data and makes no assumptions about the 
nature of the neural event that contributed to the BOLD signal (Cohen et al., 
2008). For each model, the entire time series over the experiment was extracted 
from each subject in the clusters of the (left and right) ventral striatum. 
Regressors were then created by multiplying the normalized time series of each 
ROI with condition vectors that contained ones for four TRs after positive or 
negative prediction errors and zeros otherwise (see also Cohen & Ranganath, 
2005; Kahnt et al., 2008; Park et al., 2010). Thus, the two condition vectors of 
positive and negative prediction errors (containing ones and zeros) were each 
multiplied with the time course of each ROI. These regressors were then used as 
covariates in subsequent analyses.  
The time series between the left and right hemispheres for the ventral 
striatum were highly correlated (averages across runs and participants were r = 
.84). Therefore, parameter estimates of left- and right structures were collapsed, 
and thus, represent the extent to which feedback-related activity in each voxel 
correlates with feedback-related activity in the bilateral ventral striatum. 
Individual contrast images for positive vs. negative prediction errors were 
computed and entered into second-level one-sample t-tests. In order to find age 
related differences in the whole-brain analyses of functional connectivity with 
the ventral striatum, we performed a regression analyses with an additional 
regressor for age. Thresholds for the connectivity analyses were also set to p < 




8.3.1 Behavioral data 
 
Reinforcement learning. First, we assessed how the model parameters differed 
between age groups. First of all, there was a good fit of the model to 
participants' behavior; the average regression coefficient was significantly 
above zero for all age groups (all p’s < .001. Figure 8.1 B). Importantly, the 
model fit did not differ significantly between groups (F(2,64) =  .96, p = .38), 
reassuring that parameters estimations could be compared between groups.  
Next, a two (learning parameters) x three (age groups) ANOVA tested for 
age differences in learning from positive and negative feedback. This analysis 
showed a significant group by parameter interaction (F(2,64) = 12.34, p < .001, 
see Figure 8.1 C), post-hoc tests revealed that there was an age related decrease 
in αneg, F(2,67) = 9.87, p < .001, and a marginal age related increase in αpos, F(2,67) 
= 2.96, p = .06. This result indicates that the relative influence of positive 
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feedback on expected values decreased with age and the relative influence of 
negative feedback on expected values increased with age.  
 
8.3.2 fMRI results  
 
Model-based fMRI. Across all participants, individually generated trial-wise 
prediction errors (positive and negative combined) correlated with BOLD signal 
in bilateral ventral striatum, MPFC, posterior anterior cingulate cortex (pCC) 
and the bilateral amygdala extending into the parahippocampal gyrus (Figure 
8.2 A, and Table 8.1). Activity in the ventral striatum was localized at an area 
comprising the ventral intersection between the putamen and the head of the 
caudate. Tests for positive and negative prediction errors separately revealed 
comparable results.  
Whole brain regression analyses for age differences revealed no linear or 
non-linear age group differences (Figure 8.2 B). This analysis was repeated for 
positive and negative prediction errors separately and these analyses also 
revealed no linear or non-linear age effects. This finding shows that the 
prediction error (positive or negative) is not represented differently between the 
three age groups. 
 
Figure 8.2: A) Regions in the medial prefrontal cortext (mPFC), ventral striatum and 
amygdala in which BOLD signal was significantly correlated with reward prediction 
errors. B) Parameter estimates of the prediction errors per age group in the functionally 
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Table 8.1 : Brain Regions revealed by whole brain contrasts. 
Anatomical region L/R BA Z MNI coordinates 
    x y z 
Positive > Negative Feedback       
       
Ventral Striatum L/R  7.49 -6 12 -3 
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex L 8 4.61 -27 24 51 
Superior parietal cortex L 7 4.23 -30 -75 48 
Precuneus L/R 31 4.07 -3 -36 33 
Medial PFC L/R 10/11 4.03 3 54 -12 
Visual Cortex L/R 17 4.50 27 -93 -9 
       
Negative > Positive Feedback       
       
Dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex L/R 32 4.43 9 21 36 
       
Prediction Error       
       
Ventral Striatum (caudate & putamen) L/R  6.29 -6 9 3 
Left Amygdala  L/R  5.50 -12 3 -18 
Right Amygdala R  5.05 18 6 -18 
Medial PFC L/R 10/11 5.84 0 54 3 
Posterior Cingulate Cortex L/R 32 4.83 0 -33 41 
Visual Cortex L/R 17 6.63 -18 -93 -18 
       
PPI (positive > negative)       
       
Medial Prefrontal Cortex L/R 10 5.47 -4 40 6 
Pre-SMA R 6 4.98 9 30 57 
Right Anterior Insula / IFG R  4.46 41 23 -9 
Left Anterior Insula / IFG L  4.67 -44 21 -3 
Ventral Striatum (caudate & putamen) L/R  7.50 9 9 3 
       
PPI (positive > negative) x Age       
       
Medial PFC L 10 4.02 -8 45 10 
       
MNI coordinators for main effects, peak voxels reported at p < .001, at least 20 
contiguous voxels.  
 
 
Functional Connectivity. Functional connectivity between the striatum and 
other brain regions was assessed during processing of negative and positive 
feedback using PPI. The contrast used for testing functional connectivity was 
positive > negative feedback. Note that the vectors for positive feedback events 
contain all positive prediction error events, and the vectors for negative 
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feedback events contain all negative prediction error events. Enhanced 
functional connectivity was found during positive > negative feedback between 
the bilateral ventral striatum seed and the mPFC (Figure 8.3 A), dACC, pre-
SMA, and bilateral anterior Insula extending into the inferior frontal gyrus. The 
opposite contrast (negative > positive feedback) did not reveal any significant 
changes in functional connectivity. 
Next, we examined age differences in ventral striatum connectivity by 
adding age as a regressor to the whole-brain PPI analysis. These analyses 
revealed age related increases in functional connectivity of the ventral striatum 
seed with the mPFC (BA10) for positive > negative feedback (Figure 8.3 B). No 
other areas were found when testing for non-linear age effects in functional 
connectivity.  
To further illustrate the age related changes in fronto-striatal connectivity we 
extracted the strength of functional connectivity between ventral striatum and 
mPFC for each participant and plotted it against age as a continuous variable 
(Figure 8.3 C). This plot reveals that the connectivity pattern shifts from a 
stronger connection after negative feedback for the youngest participants 
towards a stronger connection after positive prediction errors for the oldest 
participants.  
Finally, we performed ROI analyses to investigate whether striatum-mPFC 
connectivity was related to the individual learning parameters. The differential 
connectivity strength (positive > negative) between the ventral striatum and 
mPFC ROI was used to predict the individual differences in learning rates for 
positive and negative feedback. The relative connectivity measure correlated 
negatively with the learning rate for negative feedback (r = -.39, p < .001, 
Figure 8.3 D), and moderately positively with the learning rate for positive 
feedback (r = .23, p = .07). Thus, there was stronger striatum-mPFC coupling 
during negative > positive feedback in participants for whom negative feedback 
had a relatively large impact on future expected value, whereas the reverse was 
true (i.e., stronger coupling during positive > negative feedback) in participants 
for whom positive feedback had a relatively large impact on future expected 
value.  
To summarize, increased functional connectivity between the ventral 
striatum and mPFC was observed during processing of positive feedback 
compared to negative feedback. Furthermore, this analysis revealed that the 
relative strength in striatum-mPFC connectivity correlated positively with age, 
but negatively with the learning rate for negative feedback. 
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Figure 8.3: A) Regions which showed increased functional connectivity with the 
striatal seed region after positive compared to negative feedback. (B) Region in the 
mPFC that revealed age related changes in functional connectivity with the striatal seed 
region. Both statistical maps are all thresholded at p < .001, uncorrected, k = 15. (C) 
Scatterplot depicting the relationship between the functional connectivity measure of the 
striatum-mPFC (positive > negative feedback) and age. (D) Scatterplot depicting the 
relationship between the functional connectivity measure of the striatum-mPFC 




The goal of this study was to examine developmental changes in the neural 
mechanisms of probabilistic learning. The reinforcement model showed that 
with increasing age, negative feedback had decreasing effects on future 
expected values. Imaging analyses revealed that ventral striatum activation 
following prediction errors did not differ between age groups; however, age 
differences in the learning parameters were associated with an age related 
increase in functional connectivity between ventral striatum and the mPFC. 
These behavioral data and their neural correlates allow a deeper understanding 
of how children, adolescents and adults learn in a changing environment. The 
discussion will be organized according to these themes. 
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Developmental changes in learning parameters 
Using a reinforcement learning model we were able to disentangle differences 
in sensitivity to positive and negative feedback by estimating learning rates for 
positive and negative feedback separately. These estimated learning rates reflect 
the degree to which the future expected value of a stimulus will be changed 
after positive or negative prediction errors. As expected, the model-based 
analyses of learning behavior showed that with age there is a decrease in the 
learning rate fore negative prediction errors (αneg). This finding indicates that 
with increasing age, the impact of negative prediction errors on the future 
expected value decreases. These results are consistent with developmental 
studies that have shown that adults are less influenced by irrelevant negative 
feedback (Crone et al., 2004). Furthermore, compared to younger adults, older 
adults have been shown to report less negative arousal to anticipated losses 
(Samanez-Larkin et al., 2007). Taken together, these results show that the 
current reinforcement model can capture the subtle age related changes in 
adaptive learning, and thus provides a solid basis for exploring the underlying 
neurodevelopment changes in representing and the processing of learning 
signals. 
 
Neural Representation of prediction errors 
Consistent with previous studies, trial-by-trial prediction errors generated by the 
reinforcement learning model correlated with activity of a network of areas 
including the ventral striatum, mPFC and the amygdala (Pagnoni et al., 2002; 
McClure et al., 2003; O'Doherty et al., 2003; Cohen & Ranganath, 2005). This 
result indicates that these areas are sensitive to differences in expected vs. 
received feedback; showing increased activation when feedback is better than 
expected and decreased activation when the feedback is worse than expected. 
Our analyses did not reveal any (linear or non-linear) age related differences in 
prediction errors (positive or negative). These findings are consistent with prior 
studies using cognitive learning tasks, which have also reported early 
maturation of subcortical regions and protracted development of cortical brain 
areas (Casey et al., 2004; van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2008; Velanova et al., 
2008). However, a recent developmental study of reward-based learning using a 
comparable reinforcement model, with a single learning rate (for both negative 
and positive feedback), has shown heightened sensitivity to positive prediction 
errors in adolescents compared to children and adults (Cohen et al., 2010). It 
should be noted however, that Cohen and colleagues compared different age 
groups, as adolescence in this study was defined as the age range 14-19 years, 
and adulthood as 25-30 years. In this respect, the findings of the current study 
and the findings of Cohen et al. are not directly comparable. In future studies, it 
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will be important to test for changes in predictions errors across a wider age 
range and differentiating between different phases of adolescence.  
The results of the current study provide different findings in comparison to 
affective paradigms. These studies have reported increased sensitivity of the 
striatum in adolescence after receiving monetary rewards or highly emotional 
stimuli (Galvan et al., 2006; McClure-Tone et al., 2008; Van Leijenhorst et al., 
2009), which may trigger the peak in adolescent reward processing. 
Interestingly, Cohen et al. (2010) observed adolescent-specific increases in 
reaction times for 25 cents relative to 5 cents rewards. In future studies, it will 
be important to examine whether the prediction error representation can be 
modulated by the use of affective tasks or reward manipulations, and whether 
these effects are dependent on the development of the dopaminergic system 
during adolescence (for a review see Galvan, 2010).  
 
Developmental changes in striatum-mPFC connectivity 
Connectivity analyses revealed that during feedback processing the seed region 
in the ventral striatum sensitive to prediction errors showed increased functional 
connectivity with the mPFC, pre-SMA, and bilateral anterior insula/IFG during 
positive compared to negative feedback. This pattern of connectivity is 
consistent with several studies that have shown feedback-related changes in 
functional connectivity of the striatum (for a review see Camara et al., 2009).  
Subsequent analyses revealed age related changes in striatum–mPFC 
functional connectivity. The pattern shifted from stronger connectivity after 
negative feedback for the youngest participants towards stronger connectivity 
after positive feedback for the oldest participants. This suggests that shifts in 
feedback-dependent striatum-mPFC connectivity may underlie developmental 
changes in learning behavior. This interpretation is in line with an adult study 
which has shown that the strength of ventral striatum-mPFC connectivity 
following feedback is related to the adjustment of behavior on subsequent trials 
(Camara et al., 2008). This hypothesis is further supported by the correlation 
between striatum-mPFC connectivity and estimated learning rate parameter for 
negative prediction errors in the current study.  
Given that during adolescent development there are still substantial changes 
in structural connectivity within the prefrontal cortex (Schmithorst & Yuan, 
2010) it could be hypothesized that the developmental differences in striatum-
mPFC functional connectivity are related to changes in structural connectivity 
between these two structures (Cohen et al., 2008). In future developmental 
studies, it will be of interest to combine measures of structural and functional 
connectivity in order to further explore this hypothesis.  
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Additionally, it should be noted that the functional connectivity measure is 
uninformative about the directionality of the influence between different brain 
regions (Friston, 1994). Applying methods such as structural equation modeling 
and dynamic causal modeling (Friston et al., 1997), which take directionality 
into account, could further increase our knowledge of the underlying 
mechanisms of developmental changes in adaptive learning. 
 
A final question concerns how these results relate to previous 
developmental studies of feedback processing in static environments (van 
Duijvenvoorde et al., 2008; Crone et al., 2008). Learning theories have 
suggested two separate systems that operate in parallel during feedback learning 
(Dickinson & Balleine, 2002); one system that operates on task explicit 
representations, such as rules, and another system that operates on statistical 
contingencies of the environment, such as feedback probabilities. Recently, a 
study showed that updating task representations relies on the DLPFC-parietal 
network, whereas updating feedback probabilities was associated with the 
striatum (Gläscher et al., 2010). Thus, it is likely that developmental changes in 
the DLPFC-parietal network represent differences in the learning system that 
operates on rule-based task representations, whereas the current study shows 
developmental differences in the system tracking statistical contingencies (see 
also Galvan et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2010). The challenge for future 
developmental studies will be to disentangle the relative contributions of these 
networks, and to understand how these two systems contribute to developmental 
changes in feedback learning.  
 
Conclusion 
Previous studies have shown that either changes in the representation of the 
prediction errors in the striatum (Schönberg et al., 2007) or the connectivity of 
the ventral striatum with the prefrontal cortex (Klein et al., 2007; Park et al., 
2010) are related to individual differences in feedback learning. In the current 
study we provide evidence that developmental differences in feedback learning 
may not be due to differences in the representation of the prediction errors per 
se, but rather to developmental changes in the functional connectivity between 
the striatum and the mPFC. This finding suggests that children do not differ in 
their ability to track the statistical contingencies in the task, but rather process 
the learning signals differently. These findings advance our understanding of 
the neurodevelopmental underpinnings of probabilistic learning and highlight 
the importance of studying neural circuits in addition to specific brain regions 
(Camara et al., 2009).  
 









The research described in this thesis concerned the development of functionally 
defined brain networks underlying important aspects thought to drive 
developmental changes in adolescent social decision-making. Developmental 
theories suggest that the changes in adolescent social decision-making are 
related to increasing capacities for: (1) perspective-taking (Eisenberg et al., 
1995; Elkind, 1985), and (2) the regulation of social behavior (Steinberg, 2009). 
More recently it has been shown that these developmental changes in social 
decision-making are paralleled by substantial changes in brain structure (Giedd 
et al., 1999). Neurodevelopmental models hypothesize that changes in brain 
structure and social behavior are mediated via changes in brain function 
(Blakemore, 2008; Johnson, 2011).  
Current neuroscientific models of interactive social decision-making 
suggest that there are multiple systems that contribute to social behavior; a 
specific ‘social brain’ network involved in understanding others’ beliefs and 
intentions, and brain networks with a more general role in the monitoring and 
adaptation of behavior (Sanfey, 2007). Additionally, there is evidence that there 
are developmental changes in the activation patterns within these networks 
across adolescence (Blakemore, 2008; Sommerville & Casey, 2010) 
The experiments in this thesis set out to test the hypothesis that the age-
related changes in perspective-taking and self-regulation are associated with 
developmental changes in respectively the ‘social brain’ network, and the 
networks involved in the monitoring and regulation of behavior. 
 
The first empirical study described in Chapter 2 had two main goals: (1) to 
develop a new version of the Trust Game that enabled us to examine the 
developmental trajectory of trust and reciprocity during adolescent 
development, and (2) to examine the extent to which these processes are 
sensitive to social perspective-taking skills as measured by the risk and benefit 
manipulations. Participants of four age groups between 9 and 25 years 
participated in this study. For this study, a child friendly Trust Game paradigm 
was designed to capture individual and developmental differences in 
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perspective-taking. To examine the role of perspective-taking, experimental 
manipulations were added to the original Trust Game that revealed whether 
participants were taking the intentions of others, and consequences for others, 
into account (cf. Pillutla et al., 2003; Malhotra, 2004). All participants played 
multiple rounds of the Developmental Trust Game, in the roles of player 1 and 
2, with a different anonymous other player each round. As anticipated, the 
results demonstrated that during development there was a general increase of 
both trust and reciprocity. The results of this study also demonstrated that 
developmental differences in trust and reciprocity depended on the extent to 
which the other person’s perspective was taken into account. Although all age 
groups were more willing to trust when the risk was low rather than high, there 
were age related changes in sensitivity to the benefit of the other player in trust 
decisions; only the oldest participants were more willing to trust when the 
benefit for player 2 was high. Similarly, all age groups, except the youngest, 
were more willing to reciprocate when the benefit was high. However, only 
from mid adolescence onwards were participants also more willing to 
reciprocate when the risk for player 1 was high. The age differences in 
sensitivity to risk and benefit for trust and reciprocity support the hypothesis 
that besides a general increase of prosocial behavior, considering the outcomes 
for the other becomes important in social decision-making during adolescent 
development.  
 
Chapter 3 describes the second empirical study with the Developmental 
Trust Game. The goal of this study was to investigate the neural correlates of 
reciprocity motives in brain regions that have previously been associated with 
mentalizing (aMPFC, TPJ), affective processes (ventral striatum and insula) and 
regulation of selfish impulses (ACC, DLPFC) in social behavior. This study 
was inspired by the previous findings that decisions to reciprocate trust are not 
only motivated by personal outcome considerations but also involve 
considerations of the intentions of others, and the general tendency of 
individuals to value the outcome of others (McClintock and Allison, 1989; de 
Dreu and van Lange, 1995; van Lange et al., 1997). In this study, young adults 
between 18 and 22 years of age were the second player in the Developmental 
Trust Game while fMRI data were collected.  
As expected, the behavioral results showed that participants reciprocated 
more when the first player took a high risk to trust, indicating that participants 
took the consequences for the other into account. The imaging analyses revealed 
that two important areas of the social brain network, the aMPFC and right TPJ 
(Frith and Frith, 2003) have separable functions in reciprocal behavior. 
Consistent with previous studies, the aMPFC was more active when participants 
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defected compared to when they reciprocated (Gallagher et al., 2002; Decety et 
al., 2004). This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the aMPFC is 
important for self-referential processing (Northoff et al., 2006; Ochsner, 2008). 
In contrast to the aMPFC, the right TPJ was not sensitive to the type of choice 
but was sensitive to the risk manipulation when reciprocating. This result 
indicates that the right TPJ is involved in the shifting attention from the self to 
the other (Lamm et al., 2007), i.e. perspective-taking.  
Further analyses showed that the ACC and the right DLPFC were most 
active when social impulse control was required; both these areas were 
activated when participants reciprocated even though the benefit of being 
trusted was low. In other words, when the external incentive to reciprocate was 
low, the ACC and the right DLPFC were more engaged in reciprocal decisions.  
Finally, further analyses demonstrated that activity in the insula was 
sensitive to individual differences in social value orientation. The insula was 
more active when prosocial participants defected and more active when proself 
participants reciprocated. Additionally, the insula showed sensitivity to the risk 
manipulation; it was more active on those trials where participants chose to 
reciprocate when the risk that the first player took was low. Taken together, 
these results indicate that the insula was most active when a norm was violated 
(which can be a reciprocate norm for prosocial individuals or a defect norm for 
proself individuals, Singer et al., 2006; Montague and Lohrenz, 2007). 
 
Chapter 4 aimed at understanding the neurodevelopmental differences in 
the brain areas involved in reciprocal exchange and perspective-taking. To test 
the neural correlates of reciprocating behavior during adolescence, a 
neuroimaging study was performed with the Developmental Trust Game that 
included adolescents and adults between ages 12 and 22 years. Using the same 
Developmental Trust Game the developmental changes in neural correlates of 
perspective-taking in reciprocal behavior were investigated.  
The results of this study revealed that with age, adolescents were 
increasingly sensitive to the perspective of the other player as indicated by their 
reciprocal behavior in the different risk conditions. Furthermore, these advanced 
forms of perspective-taking were associated with an increased involvement of 
the left TPJ when being trusted. In contrast, the aMPFC was more active for the 
youngest participants. These results are consistent with recent developmental 
studies that indicated that there is an age related shift in relative contribution of 
the aMPFC and the TPJ during theory-of-mind tasks (e.g. reading stories, 
thinking about others; Wang et al., 2006; Pfeifer et al., 2007; Blakemore, 2008). 
Additionally, these results support the hypothesis that this shift in balance from 
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aMPFC to TPJ is related to a decrease in self-referential thought and an 
increased focus of attention on the other in social decision-making. 
This study also revealed that young adults, when receiving trust, showed 
increased activity in the right DLPFC, an area previously found to be involved 
in tasks requiring cognitive control (Miller & Cohen, 2001) and the control of 
selfish or self-oriented impulses in the context of social dilemmas (Rilling et al., 
2007). More importantly, there was an age related increase in DLPFC activity 
that was also related to advanced forms of perspective-taking, suggesting 
improved regulation of social behavior with increasing age.  
Finally, this study again showed that the insula was sensitive to personal 
norm violations. However, in contrast to the changes in the social brain 
network, activity in this area did not show developmental differences, indicating 
this network matures at an earlier age.  
 
In the subsequent chapter (Chapter 5) the neuro-developmental changes in 
another type of social decisions were investigated; fairness considerations. This 
research was inspired by prior behavioral studies that demonstrated that there 
are important developmental changes in perspective-taking related to fairness 
considerations until late adolescence (Sutter, 2007). For example, in a study 
using the mini-Ultimatum Game the youngest participants (9 years) were more 
likely to reject than to accept unfair offers, even when the proposer could not 
have chosen otherwise. In contrast, older participants (18 years) were more 
likely to accept unfair offers in that situation (Güroğlu et al., 2009).  
The developmental neuroimaging study using the mini-Ultimatum Game 
investigated the neural correlates of age differences in fairness considerations in 
participants between ages 10 and 20. Consistent with prior behavioral studies, 
participants rejected unfair proposals when the alternative for the proposer was 
a fair division (Güth et al., 2008). This behavior has previously been reported in 
children and adults, and shows that inequity aversion motivates fairness 
judgment already in late childhood and early adolescence (Fehr et al., 2008; 
Güroğlu et al., 2009). However, children demonstrated high rejection rates for 
unfair offers even when the proposer did not have a fair alternative, and this 
rejection rate gradually dropped over the course of adolescence. These results 
indicate that there was an increasingly important role for taking the perspective 
of the other person in fairness judgments. Furthermore, the imaging analyses 
revealed that TPJ activity was associated with intention considerations, and that 
there was an age related increase in TPJ activation. Additionally, besides the 
TPJ, the DLPFC was also more active in adults than in children, when 
considering unintentional unfair offers. Finally, participants of all ages showed 
activation in the bilateral insula related to norm violations. 
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In sum, consistent with the results of the study with the Developmental 
Trust Game, these findings provide evidence for an early developing affective 
network involved in detecting norm-violations and a gradually increasing 
involvement of temporal and prefrontal brain regions related to intentionality 
considerations and the regulation of social behavior. 
 
The study described in Chapter 6 had two main goals: (1) to examine the 
development of trust relationships between late childhood and young adulthood, 
and (2) to examine the developmental trajectory of emotions evoked by non-
cooperative behavior of others, and to what extent these emotions may lead to 
altruistic punishment. To investigate developmental changes in adaptive social 
behavior we used a repeated Trust Game paradigm in which participants, 
between 11 and 25 years old, interacted with three different players for several 
rounds (King-Casas et al., 2005). Unbeknownst to the participant the other 
players were computer players, preprogrammed to display different levels of 
trustworthiness (low, medium and high). During the repeated interactions the 
participants were in the role of the first player, thus, each round they had to 
decide whether or not to trust the other.  
The data showed that adult participants often chose to trust in the first 
round, indicating that they expected others to reciprocate (e.g. Berg et al., 
1995). In contrast, children showed a lower level of initial trust; most of them 
started with not trusting the other. However, for all age groups the strategy of 
the other player influenced the percentage of trust choices; over time all 
participants learned who to trust and who to distrust. Interestingly, our analyses 
also revealed developmental changes in strategies and adaptive behavior; all 
participants played a tit-for-tat type of strategy, but the children used the 
strictest form of tit-for-tat strategy compared to the other age groups. Further 
analyses revealed that children differed from adults and adolescents especially 
in showing higher levels negative reciprocity, thus being more sensitive to 
violations of trust. 
Next, we investigated the relation between trust violations and participants’ 
emotional reactions and their level of punishment. As expected, the different 
levels of trustworthiness displayed by the other players evoked different levels 
of both anger and punishment. Participants of all age groups were most angry at 
the player that violated trust the most and punished accordingly. Additionally, 
the results showed that with increasing age the amount of both anger and 
punishment decreased, and that age differences in trust were fully mediated by 
feelings of anger. Together these results indicate that the stability of adult trust 
relationships might be the result of an age related increase in regulation of 
negative affect towards violations of trust. 




The studies in chapters 7 and 8 were inspired by (1) recent neuroimaging 
studies of social interactions that have shown that brain areas that are involved 
in performance monitoring are also involved in tracking and predicting the 
social behavior of self and other players in multi-round Games (Delgado et al., 
2005; King-Casas et al., 2005; Behrens et al., 2009), and (2)  developmental 
studies showed that monitoring and regulating behavior based on feedback 
signals undergoes pronounced developmental improvements between late 
childhood and early adulthood (Crone & van der Molen, 2004; Hooper et al., 
2004). Therefore, further understanding of the age related changes in the neural 
mechanisms of adaptive behavior is useful for understanding developmental 
changes in the fundamental systems that are shown to support adaptive social 
behavior in multiple interactions. 
 
In Chapter 7 we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to 
examine the neural developmental changes when processing positive and 
negative feedback signals in a probabilistic decision-making task. This study 
was inspired by several previous studies that suggested that the neural 
mechanism underlying adaptive learning based on feedback signals undergo 
developmental changes until early adulthood (Crone et al., 2008; van 
Duivenvoorde et al., 2008). The study was specifically set up to test whether 
this developmental difference is related to valence or informative value of the 
feedback by examining neural responses to negative and positive feedback 
while applying probabilistic rules. Healthy volunteers between ages 8 and 22 
years old participated in the study. 
Behavioral analyses revealed that all participants learned to choose the 
correct rules (high probability stimuli A&C) more often than the alternative 
rules (low probability stimuli B&D) (Frank et al., 2004; Klein et al., 2007). 
After approximately 40 trials, participants adapted a performance pattern 
consistent with ‘probability matching behavior’, and this behavioral phase, 
consisting of the last 60 trials, was the focus of the first set of analyses. 
Although probability matching behavior occurred in all age groups and there 
were no age differences in overall accuracy, there were age differences in win-
stay, lose-shift strategies. Sequential analyses revealed that the children applied 
a less optimal shifting strategy after negative feedback.  
These age differences in decision-making strategy were paralleled by 
changes in functional brain activity. All participants, regardless of age, showed 
increased recruitment of DLPFC when choosing the alternative rule compared 
to the correct rule. However, children, but not adults, showed more activation in 
DLPFC after positive feedback when choosing the alternative rule. In contrast, 
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adults, but not children, showed more activation in DLPFC after negative 
feedback when choosing the alternative rule. Thus, consistent with prior studies, 
these developmental differences indicate a shift from focus on positive to a 
focus on negative feedback with age (Crone et al., 2008; van Duivenvoorde et 
al., 2008; Somsen, 2007). Taken together, these findings suggest that 
developmental differences in neural responses to feedback in the DLPFC are 
not related to valence per se, but that there is an age related change in 
processing learning signals with different informative value.   
Chapter 8 describes a follow up study that concerned the neural 
mechanisms that underlie developmental differences in adaptive probability 
learning. In this study, based on the same data and participants as Chapter 7, we 
used a reinforcement learning model to investigate neurodevelopmental changes 
in the representation and processing of learning signals during the complete 
task. In order to capture age related changes in learning from positive and 
negative feedback separately, we use a reinforcement learning model (Sutton & 
Barto, 1999) with separate learning rates for positive and negative feedback 
(Kahnt et al., 2009). The individually estimated trial-by-trial prediction errors 
generated by this reinforcement model were subsequently used to test whether 
developmental differences in learning reflect functional differences in the 
representation of prediction errors or developmental changes in the propagation 
of prediction errors as measured by functional fronto-striatal connectivity (Park 
et al., 2010). 
The model-based analyses of learning behavior showed that, with age, there 
is a decrease in the learning rate for negative feedback. This finding indicates 
that with increasing age, the impact of negative feedback on the future expected 
value decreases. Subsequent analyses of imaging data revealed that, consistent 
with previous studies, trial-by-trial prediction errors generated by the 
reinforcement learning model correlated with activity in a network of areas 
including the ventral striatum, mPFC and the amygdala (Pagnoni et al., 2002; 
McClure et al., 2003; O'Doherty et al., 2003; Cohen & Ranganath, 2005). The 
analyses did not reveal any age related differences in prediction errors. In 
contrast, age related differences in feedback adjustment were associated with 
increased ventral striatum connectivity with the VMPFC. The pattern shifted 
from stronger connectivity after negative feedback for the youngest participants 
towards stronger connectivity after positive feedback for the oldest participants. 
These findings suggest that developmental changes in adaptive behavior are not 
due to differences in the computation of the learning signal, but rather related to 
changes in how the learning signal is subsequently used in adaptive behavior. 
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9.2 Conclusions and Future Directions 
How can these results contribute to our understanding of the relation 
between the development of prosocial behavior and functional brain 
development? Since the specific implications of the studies have been discussed 
in detail in the respective chapters the general discussion will take a broader 
perspective, focusing on theoretical and methodological points that open 
avenues for future inquiries. 
 
Child’s play – Games as a proxy for social development 
The first important finding of the studies presented here is that the two 
economic games, the Trust and Ultimatum Game, capture the increased capacity 
of perspective-taking in relation to changes in social behavior during 
adolescence (Güroğlu et al., 2009; van den Bos et al., 2010). Additionally, the 
study employing the iterative Trust Game revealed that children use a stricter 
tit-for-tat strategy compared to the other age groups, especially showing 
increased levels of anger and retribution following trust violations. These results 
support the hypothesis that developmental differences in social decision-making 
are related to differences in capacity to regulate social feedback.  
Second, the studies also yielded novel insights in the development of social 
behavior. As Eisenberg has shown in an extensive meta-analysis (1987), there 
was only a mildly positive correlation between age and prosocial behavior. 
Hence, many studies did not find this relationship. This raises the question to 
what extent age related changes in display of prosocial behavior are context-
dependent. The results of the collection of studies presented in this thesis, show 
that economic games can be useful to further investigate this question. For 
instance, the study with the Developmental Trust Game suggests that from mid- 
adolescence onwards there is no general increase in prosocial behavior but 
rather a ‘sophistication’ of prosocial behavior. Although trust and reciprocal 
behavior were at a stable level at mid-adolescence, there were still changes in 
the effect of the outcome manipulations until late adolescence. Thus, with age, 
prosocial behavior becomes more context dependent, leading to more prosocial 
behavior in one situation but less in another. Similarly, the analyses of multiple 
interactions showed that children and adults showed similar responses when 
trust was reciprocated, but that children were more sensitive to violations of 
trust. These are examples of how economic games can reveal how the 
differences in social behavior across development are dependent on the context.  
Taken together, economic games are useful extensions of the researchers’ 
toolbox for experimental research on the development of social behavior. In 
future studies, economic games can further contribute to structured investigation 
of prosocial behavior of children, adolescents, and adults. 
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Neurocognitive development  
The imaging studies demonstrated asynchronous developmental patterns in the 
‘social brain’ network. In general, the pattern demonstrated a faster maturation 
of the aMPFC but late maturation of the TPJ. Additionally, the results showed 
increased involvement of the regulatory network (e.g. DLPFC), and an early 
maturation of the network involved in monitoring norm violations (e.g. insula). 
Importantly, these changes were related to developmental changes in behavior 
as assessed by the various social decision-making tasks. As such, the results 
support the hypothesis that social development is related to developmental 
changes in different brain networks, especially those underlying perspective-
taking and self-regulation. These findings provide further support for the 
theoretical perspective that poses that social development is driven by increased 
capacities for perspective-taking and self-regulation. The following sections 
will: (1) reflect on the possible nature of the changes in the respective networks 
in light of theoretical perspectives and frameworks of brain development, and 
(2) point out two general directions that can advance our understanding of 
developmental changes in brain function. 
 
Changing brains, changing perspectives 
The analyses of the ‘social brain’ network identified two different 
developmental patterns for the aMPFC and TPJ. The aMPFC shows a pattern of 
local specialization, that is, in early adolescence this area is engaged in both 
reciprocal and defect choices, whereas from mid adolescence onwards it is only 
engaged in defect choices. The pattern of activity of the TPJ in both the Trust 
and Ultimatum Game suggests that this area gradually becomes more involved 
in the decision process until young adulthood. Therefore the increase in 
prosocial behavior might be the result of two separate processes, an early 
decrease in self-focus and a gradual increase in other-focus.  
However, the framework of interactive specialization proposes that the 
developmental shift from aMPFC to TPJ may be the result of the strengthening 
of connections between these areas (Johnson et al., 2009). Because at younger 
ages the network is not fully developed young adolescents might rely more on 
self-reflective processes associated with the aMPFC. Findings by Blakemore 
and colleagues support this hypothesis; in a series of studies they showed that 
during adolescent development there was a developmental shift from aMPFC to 
TPJ activation, and at the same time an increase in connectivity strength 
between the aMPFC and the TPJ (Burnett et al., 2008; Burnett & Blakemore, 
2009). These studies involved a passive perspective-taking task: it therefore 
remains to be determined whether this change in connectivity is related to the 
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developmental changes in social behavior. Future studies using behavioral 
paradigms, or re-analyses of current data-sets, are needed to investigate the role 
of connectivity in order to further address the nature of functional brain changes 
underlying social decision-making. 
 
The regulation of social behavior 
The social interaction paradigms also indicated developmental changes in the 
regulatory network, the DLPFC in particular. The study with the Developmental 
Trust Game showed that with increasing age the DLPFC gradually becomes 
more engaged in the decision process, showing significant relations with 
behavioral measures from mid-adolescence onwards. Furthermore, the data 
from both social interactions studies indicate that the DLPFC is engaged in 
situations when participants violate personal norms or behavioral tendencies. 
Taken together, these results fit with the theoretical accounts that the increased 
capacity for self-regulation is particularly driven by the gradual increase in 
strength of the regulatory processes to adapt social behavior (Steinberg, 2009).  
The second part of this thesis had a more detailed focus on the development 
of the networks that underlie the monitoring and regulation of behavior in a 
probabilistic learning task. This section will reflect on how these results support 
earlier conclusions on the role of regulation in social development, but also 
expand on them in various ways. Finally, new hypothesis on the development of 
self-regulation in context of social behavior will be generated.  
The initial analyses showed that the DLPFC is already involved at a young 
age when processing feedback in context of applying probabilistic rules. 
However, there was a qualitative shift in the pattern of activation, which may 
reflect age related changes in strategy differences and attention regulation. On 
the other hand, analyses of the relation between activity in the regulatory 
network and shifting behavior showed a very similar pattern as in the social 
interaction studies: there was an age related increase in the correlation between 
activity and behavior until young adulthood. Thus, the pattern that emerges 
from these data is that the DLPFC is already engaged at a young age in 
processing feedback from the environment, while with increasing age the 
relation between DLPFC activity and behavioral adaptation becomes stronger.  
In subsequent analyses a reinforcement learning model was used to further 
explore the processes involved in adaptive behavior. These analyses revealed 
that age related changes in connectivity strength between the striatum and the 
medial PFC was related to the tendency to adjust behavior following positive or 
negative feedback. Taken together, these results show that age related changes 
in adaptive behavior are the related to developmental differences in several sub-
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processes involved in monitoring and regulation, which are associated with the 
DLPFC/parietal cortex and striatum/mPFC networks. 
Interestingly, the developmental pattern of behavior in the probabilistic 
learning paradigm was in one aspect very a similar to the behavior in the 
multiple round Trust Game, namely that children were more sensitive to 
negative feedback than adults. Based on this similarity in behavior, and given 
that the DLPFC/parietal cortex and striatum/medial PFC networks have been 
identified to be involved in numerous adult studies with (multiple) social 
interactions (Delgado et al., 2005; King-Casas et al., 2005; Behrens et al., 
2009), it can be hypothesized that the reported developmental changes in brain 
activation will also contribute to the ability to regulate social behavior.  
Consequently, it follows that the increased capacity for self-regulation of 
social behavior is not only due to an increased capacity to adapt future behavior, 
but the result of developmental changes in several sub-processes involved in 
self-regulation. One of the most interesting directions for future developmental 
studies would therefore be combining a multi round Trust Game with 
neuroimaging, to explore this hypothesis in more detail. The results of such 
studies may reveal in more detail which sub-processes of self-regulation 
contribute to developmental changes in social behavior. 
 
Detecting norm violations 
Finally, a very robust finding in all the social interactions studies is that all 
participants, almost independent of age, are sensitive to violations of social 
norms regarding fairness and reciprocity. This was reflected in the early 
maturation of the pattern of activation in the bilateral anterior insula, and by 
behavior in the tasks (e.g rejecting unfairness and reciprocating trust). These 
results suggest knowledge of these social norms is already present at the start of 
adolescence. Indeed, in case of fairness norms there is evidence that this already 
present by very young children (e.g. Fehr et al., 2008). However, the behavioral 
study showed that the youngest participants ages 9-10 did not always behave 
according to the basic norm of reciprocity, for example, when it was not in their 
own benefit.  
Overall, these results suggest that children are already aware of social 
norms at a young age but predominantly react to them when it is in their own 
benefit. This fits well with research on the development of moral reasoning 
(Kohlberg, 1981) and prosocial behavior (Eisenberg et al., 1995, 2005) that 
suggests that young children mainly refer to selfish or hedonistic reasons when 
thinking about social dilemmas. By showing the early maturation of norm-
violation related activity, the neuroimaging results further corroborate 
developmental theories that suggest that moral development during adolescence 
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is not a process of learning and internalizing social norms (Keller & Edelstein, 
1993), but rather a process of becoming more skilled in reasoning and applying 
these norms (Kohlberg, 1981; Eisenberg et al., 1995, 2005). In future studies it 
would be interesting to expand the age range to younger populations who have 
not yet internalized these norms, or to investigate populations that are learning 
novel norms (such as at a student fraternity). One possible outcome is that in the 
early learning phase, norms are represented in the DLPFC/parietal network that 
is known to be involved in rule representation (Bunge, et al., 2009). 
 
Multiple systems: connecting the dots 
The question that remains is: how do these different networks interact? How 
does the information that a norm is violated, and our estimation of the intentions 
of the other, connect to reach a decision? Here the framework of interactive 
specialization points us towards a way of understanding this question in terms 
of brain function (Johnson, 2011). Besides the connectivity strength between 
brain areas within a network, the interactive specialization framework also 
emphasizes the importance of connectivity strength between specialized 
networks. In case of social behavior this could be an improved coordination 
between the networks that represent social norms (e.g., recognizing behavior 
that transgresses a norm), and the networks that are involved in taking the 
perspective of the other (e.g. recognizing that norm-transgressing behavior is 
not intentional). In support of this hypothesis, a recent study with adults showed 
that the functional connectivity strength between areas of the ‘social brain’ 
network (TPJ) and the affective network (VMPFC) was associated with the 
amount of money participants were willing to donate to charity (Hare et al., 
2010). This suggests that besides an internal shift in connectivity within the 
‘social brain’ network, developmental changes in social behavior may also be 
the result of strengthening of the connectivity between functional networks. 
Although there is no direct evidence for such a developmental pattern in the 
studies described in this thesis, both social interaction studies report increasing 
co-activation of the DLPFC and the TPJ, which might indicate a stronger 
functional connectivity between different networks.  
To improve our understanding of the development of complex social 
behavior it would be beneficial to develop integrative models that describe the 
relation between the functional networks involved in social decision-making. 
The challenge for these models is not just to recognize the involvement of 
multiple functional networks but also to understand how these interact, for 
instance using network analyses (e.g. Fair et al., 2008). To conclude, measuring 
functional connectivity both within and between areas or networks can advance 
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our understanding of how these different functional networks contribute to the 
development of social behavior. 
 
Computational models of social decision-making 
Another promising methodological development that may contribute to our 
understanding of the relation between the development of cognitive processes 
and brain function is the use computational models (Frank et al., 2009; 
Poldrack, 2010). Current experimental designs allow only a limited view on the 
computational processes that underlie individual differences or developmental 
changes in behavior (Huizinga et al., 2006; Corrado & Doya, 2007). Over the 
past decade computational models of reward-based decision-making in 
combination with neuroimaging techniques have proven successful at 
identifying computational sub-processes and their neural implementations (for 
review see Rushworth & Behrens, 2008). The study in chapter 8 showed that 
these relatively simple models could also advance the understanding of the 
development of the neural mechanisms underlying monitoring and regulation of 
behavior based on feedback.  
Recently, several studies have successfully extended these models to 
include processes involved in social interactions, such as predicting the mental 
states of others (Chang et al., 2010; Behrens et al., 2008; Hampton et al., 2008). 
Using these models the experimenters were able to correlate activity in brain 
regions with different model parameters, demonstrating dissociations between 
social and non-social functional processing. Additionally, these models can 
contribute to the understanding of how social values might interact with more 
basic computational processes in decision-making. 
Taken together, this work shows that computational modeling in 
combination with neuroimaging can support stronger interpretations than what 
is possible using neuroimaging alone (Poldrack, 2010). Furthermore, in the past 
decade there has been a steady growth in the use of computational models to 
understand the development of cognitive functions (e.g., Mareschal, 2007; 
Munakata and McClelland, 2003). However, these models have not yet been 
integrated with neuroimaging studies of cognitive development. Future 
developmental studies could benefit from using computational models to gain 
more detailed insight in the processes that underlie changes in social behavior. 
 
Quo vadis? 
The previous part focused on (1) how the current results speak to the previous 
theoretical perspectives on the relation between social and brain development, 
and (2) how (methodologically) advancing these studies may contribute to a 
better understanding of the nature of social development. However, these 
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studies also laid groundwork for asking more challenging new questions. The 
next section will sketch several of those future directions in relation to the 
impact of internal and external influences on the development of social 
behavior, and how these studies can be better embedded in theoretical 
perspectives on social development. 
 
Genetic and environmental influences on social behavior 
Besides the developmental differences in the behavior regarding social norms, 
the results described in this thesis have also shown that there are large 
individual differences in social value orientation. These individual differences 
were reflected, for example, in insula activation and were similar for all age 
groups. Indeed, earlier studies have shown that besides developmental changes 
in prosocial behavior there are individual differences in prosocial attitudes that 
are already present at a young age and remain fairly consistent over the course 
of development (Eisenberg et al., 1995). One of the long standing questions for 
developmental and social psychology regards the exact nature of individual and 
developmental differences in prosocial behavior, and to what extend these are 
influenced by differences in genes and social environment (Lenroot et al., 
2009). Currently many studies have shown that individuals differences in both 
genetic variables (Rueda et al., 2005) and environment (Diamond et al., 2007) 
are strongly associated with cognitive functioning. However, the question that 
remains is how these genetic and environmental differences have an impact on 
brain structure and function, and subsequently individual differences in 
behavior. For instance, it would be very interesting to be able to point out the 
sources, in terms of genes or environment, of the differences in neural activation 
between age groups that are reported in this thesis. An exciting avenue for 
future developmental research would therefore be combining genetics, 
economic games and neuroimaging to investigate the neural components of 
these ‘hard-wired’ differences in prosocial behavior, and to what extent neural 
differences are related to environmental variables. Note that, ultimately 
understanding how internal (e.g. genetic differences) and external (e.g. social 
economic status) factors interact and contribute to different developmental 
trajectories, rather than outcomes, requires longitudinal neuroimaging studies 
(Paus, 2010).  
 
Hormonal changes  
An example of an internal factor influencing developmental changes in 
behavior, that is specific to adolescence, is the influence of pubertal hormones. 
Numerous human and animal studies have indicated that puberty is marked by 
fundamental modifications in both the hypothalamic-pituitary-gonadal (HPG) 
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and hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axes (Romeo, 2005). These pubertal 
shifts in HPG and HPA function result in very different levels of gonadal and 
adrenal steroid hormones during puberty relative to childhood and are thought 
to have a significant impact of brain structure and function (Ernst et al., 2008). 
Interestingly, these hormonal changes have also been suggested to be a driving 
force of developmental changes in (appetitive) social behavior (Forbes & Dahl, 
2010; Nelson et al., 2005; Spear, 2000). A comprehensive perspective on social 
development should therefore incorporate the effects of puberty related 
hormonal changes. The use of economic games can be a good starting point to 
systemically examine the effects of puberty on social behavior. Interesting 
directions for future research would be the relation between pubertal hormones 
and: (1) developmental changes in the interactions between different sex peers 
(Collins, 2003), and (2) the structural and functional development of sub-
cortical structures (Ernst et al., 2008; Blakemore et al., 2010). 
 
The structure-function relationship 
Linked to the previous points is the relation between brain structure and 
function. Although, the studies in this thesis were inspired by the changes in 
brain structure that take place during adolescence, they did not directly examine 
this topic itself. Further exploration of this relation in developmental 
populations can contribute to increased understanding of how internal and 
external factors influence brain function by re-shaping the brain. For instance, it 
can help determining to what extent observed age differences in brain activation 
reflect hard developmental constraints (e.g., anatomical constraints on signal 
transmission speed within certain connections). Recently, several studies have 
shown that that there are still significant developmental changes in structural 
connectivity until young adulthood (Schmithorst & Yuan, 2010), and that there 
are direct relations between structural connectivity and brain function (e.g 
Cohen, 2009, Camara et al., 2008). The multimodal analysis of structural and 
functional connectivity is therefore an interesting framework for understanding 
the relation between structural and functional development, and how network 
architecture shapes and constrains the development of social behavior (Honey et 
al., 2007; 2009). 
 
Ecological validity 
Finally, in every day life only a very small fraction of social interactions is with 
anonymous others. An interesting next step will therefore be to experimentally 
control for the relationship between the players, for instance by making use of 
sociometric questionnaires to identify peer relations (see Güroğlu et al., 2008). 
Second, behavior and neural activity associated with social interaction games 
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may be more strongly related to real world behavior (Rilling & Sanfey, 2010), 
for instance, by using experience sampling methods (Eisenberger et al., 2007). 
Third, future developmental studies could benefit from combining the use of 
games with more traditional measures (e.g. self-reports and structured 
interviews) of perspective taking and moral reasoning, in order to further embed 




To conclude, this thesis describes a set of studies that have integrated research 
in developmental, social, and cognitive psychology, experimental economics 
and neuroscience. The collection of studies presented here provides to a 
comprehensive and multidisciplinary perspective on the development of 
prosocial behavior. The application of economic games yielded novel 
behavioral results and provided evidence for the hypothesis that developmental 
changes in social behavior are related to specific changes the different neural 
networks underlying social decision-making.  
Additionally, several directions for future research were highlighted that 
aim at increasing our understanding of the processes and nature of 
developmental changes in the brain that underlie the development of social 
behavior. Two promising directions which can be directly applied are: (1) 
network/connectivity analyses, and (2) the application of computational models. 
The challenge for the future will be to develop an integrative model that can 
accommodate evidence from anatomical, functional and psychological analyses, 
















Het onderzoek beschreven in dit proefschrift is gericht op de ontwikkeling van 
functioneel gedefinieerde netwerken die betrokken zijn bij het maken van 
keuzes in een sociale context, gedurende de adolescentie. De adolescentie is een 
periode van grote sociale heroriëntatie; in de vroege adolescentie zijn 
individuen meer geneigd tot zelfgerichte gedachten en handelingen (Eisenberg 
et al., 1995; Elkind, 1985), terwijl zij later in de adolescentie meer geneigd zijn 
om aan anderen te denken, verantwoordelijkheid te nemen, en hun zelfzuchtige 
impulsen onder controle te houden (Steinberg, 2009). Deze veranderingen in 
prosociaal gedrag gaan gepaard met grote verandering in de structuur van de 
hersenen (Giedd et al., 1999). In het algemeen wordt door neurologische 
ontwikkelingsmodellen verondersteld dat de veranderingen in sociaal gedrag 
worden gemedieerd door veranderingen in hersenfunctie. Deze veronderstelling  
wordt gesteund door ontwikkelingsstudies die hebben aangetoond dat de 
functionele ontwikkeling en structurele ontwikkeling van de hersenen een zeer 
overeenkomstig patroon laten zien (Casey et al., 2005). Bovendien blijken deze 
functionele veranderingen geassocieerd te zijn met ontwikkelingsveranderingen 
in cognitieve functies (Crone, 2009). Echter, op dit moment is er niet veel 
bekend over hoe de veranderingen in de hersenen bijdragen aan specifieke 
veranderingen in sociaal gedrag. 
Neurowetenschappelijke modellen suggereren dat er verschillende 
breinnetwerken zijn die bijdragen aan sociaal gedrag; het ’sociale-brein’ 
netwerk dat betrokken is bij het begrijpen van overtuigingen en intenties van 
anderen, en neurale netwerken met een meer algemene rol in leren en reguleren 
van gedrag (Sanfey, 2007; Frank et al., 2009). Deze netwerken, die zijn 
geïdentificeerd in neuroimaging studies met volwassenen, functioneren als een 
referentiepunt voor het begrijpen van de neurologische veranderingen die ten 
grondslag liggen aan de ontwikkeling van sociaal gedrag. De in dit proefschrift 
beschreven experimenten waren gericht op het onderzoeken van 
ontwikkelingsveranderingen in deze specifieke functionele netwerken. Het 
eerste deel van dit proefschrift is gericht op de hypothese dat de ontwikkeling 




vaardigheid het perspectief van de ander in te nemen (Eisenberg et al., 1991, 
1995, 2006). Daardoor ligt de focus van de eerste hoofdstukken op de 
ontwikkeling van het sociale-brein netwerk. Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift 
is gericht op de verschillen in sociale ontwikkeling in de context van herhaalde 
sociale interacties, en de ontwikkelingsveranderingen in de bijbehorende 
affectieve en regulatie netwerken. In het eerste deel van het proefschrift staan 
twee experimentele paradigma’s van de economische speltheorie centraal; de 
Trust Game (het vertrouwensspel) en Ultimatum Game (het ultimatumspel). 
Beiden zijn zeer simpele spellen waarbij twee spelers een bepaald geld bedrag 
kunnen delen. In het vertrouwensspel gaat het om vertrouwen en 
wederkerigheid. De eerste speler in het spel krijgt een bepaald geld bedrag (10 
euro) en kan kiezen om dit eerlijk te delen (5 euro voor beide spelers) of om het 
gehele bedrag aan de andere speler te geven (zie Figuur 9.1). Als de eerste 
speler alles aan de andere speler geeft dan wordt dit verdrievoudigd (het totaal 
is 30 euro). De tweede speler heeft nu ook weer twee keuzes. Deze kan het 
totale bedrag voor zichzelf houden, of dit bedrag weer eerlijk delen (15 euro 
voor beide spelers). De eerste speler is op de hoogte van de mogelijkheid van de 
tweede spelers, en zal dus alleen het geld aan de tweede speler geven al hij er op 
vertrouwt dat deze speler eerlijk zal gaan delen. De tweede speler is wederkerig 
als hij het vertrouwen van de ander beloont met het eerlijk delen van het nieuwe 
bedrag, en wordt als zelfzuchtig bestempeld als hij al het geld voor zichzelf 
houdt. Dit spel wordt vaak maar een ronde gespeeld, met anonieme spelers, de 
tweede speler kan dus gemakkelijk het geld voor zichzelf houden. De 
voorspelling vanuit economische theorie is dan ook dat mensen het geld altijd 
voor zichzelf zullen houden en daarom ook dat mensen als eerste speler de 
ander nooit zullen vertrouwen. Toch zien we dat in de werkelijkheid mensen 
elkaar toch vaak vertrouwen en ook dat er vaak sprake is van wederkerigheid 
(Berg et al., 1995).  
In het ultimatumspel draait het om eerlijkheid. In dit spel zijn er ook weer 
twee spelers en begint de eerste speler met een bepaald geld bedrag (10 euro). 
De eerste speler moet de tweede een aanbod doen om dit bedrag te verdelen. De 
tweede speler kan dit aanbod weigeren en dan krijgen beide spelers niks, of hij 
kan het aanbod aannemen en dan krijgen beiden spelers uitbetaald wat de eerste 
speler voorstelde (zie Figuur 9.1). Economische theorie voorspelt dat mensen 
alle verdelingen aannemen waarbij zij meer krijgen dan 0 euro; iets is immers 
meer dan niets. Uit onderzoek blijkt dit niet het geval te zijn: een oneerlijke 
verdeling, bijvoorbeeld 8 voor mij en 2 voor jou, wordt over het algemeen 
geweigerd (dan liever helemaal niks!). Ook dit spel wordt over het algemeen 
maar een keer gespeeld dus kan er niet onderhandeld worden (de spelers kunnen 
elkaar ook niet zien of spreken). Hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 4 beschrijven 
Summary in Dutch 179
experimenten met de Developmental Trust Game (DTG), een kindvriendelijke 
versie van het vertrouwensspel (Berg et al., 1995) dat ontwikkeld is om 
individuele en ontwikkelingsverschillen te meten in de mate waarin 
proefpersonen  het  perspectief van de ander in acht nemen (Malhotra et al., 























Figuur 9.1 Voorbeelden van de het vertrouwensspel en het ultimatumspel.  
 
De studie beschreven in hoofdstuk 2 had twee doelen: (1) om een nieuwe 
versie van het vertrouwensspel te ontwikkelen dat ons in staat stelde het 
ontwikkelingstraject van vertrouwen en wederkerigheid te onderzoeken tijdens 
de adolescentie, en (2) te onderzoeken in welke mate vertrouwen en 
wederkerigheid gevoelig zijn voor de vaardigheid het perspectief van de ander 
in te nemen. Vier groepen jongeren tussen 9 en 25 jaar namen deel aan deze 
studie. Alle deelnemers speelden meerdere rondes van het 
ontwikkelingsvertrouwensspel, in de rol van speler 1 en 2, telkens met een 
andere anonieme speler.  
Zoals verwacht toonden de resultaten een algemene stijging van zowel 
vertrouwen als wederkerigheid tijdens de ontwikkeling. Dit resultaat geeft aan 
dat het ontwikkelingsvertrouwensspel in staat was om de algemene toename van 




prosociaal gedrag gedurende de adolescentie, zoals beschreven in de 
ontwikkelingsliteratuur, vast te leggen. Daarbij hebben de resultaten van deze 
studie ook aangetoond dat de ontwikkelingsverschillen in vertrouwen en 
wederkerigheid gerelateerd waren aan de mate waarin de proefpersonen 
rekening hielden met het perspectief van de ander. Hoewel alle leeftijdsgroepen 
vaker bereid waren om de ander te vertrouwen wanneer het risico relatief klein 
was, waren er leeftijdsgerelateerde veranderingen in de gevoeligheid voor het 
voordeel van de andere speler. Alleen de oudste deelnemers waren vaker bereid 
om te vertrouwen wanneer het voordeel voor de andere speler relatief groot 
was. Alle leeftijdsgroepen, met uitzondering van de jongste, waren vaker bereid 
om wederkerigheid te tonen wanneer voordeel van het krijgen van vertrouwen 
relatief groot was. Echter, pas vanaf medio adolescentie waren deelnemers ook 
vaker bereid wederkerigheid te tonen als het risico voor de eerste speler relatief 
groot was. Deze leeftijdsverschillen in gevoeligheid voor risico's en voordelen 
ondersteunen de hypothese dat, naast een algemene toename van prosociaal 
gedrag, het perspectief van de ander steeds belangrijker wordt tijdens 
adolescentie. 
 
Figuur 1.2 Schematic representation of the networks of brain areas involved in social 
decision-making: aMPFC = anterior Medial Prefrontal Cortex, TPJ = Temporal Parietal 
Junction, pSTS = posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus, TP = Temporal Poles, Vstr = 
Ventral Striatum, A = Amygdala, VMPFC = Ventro Medial Prefrontal Cortex OFC = 
Orbito frontal Cortex, dACC = dorsal Anterior Cingulate, DLPFC = Dorsolateral 
Prefrontal Cortrex, VLPFC = Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex, PPC = Posterior Parietal 
Cortex.  
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Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft de tweede empirische studie met het ontwikkelings-
vertrouwensspel. Het doel van deze studie was de neurale correlaten van 
individuele verschillen in wederkerigheid te onderzoeken. Deze studie was 
speciaal gericht op de netwerken die in verband zijn gebracht met beslissingen 
in sociale context; het sociale-brein netwerk (aMPFC, TPJ), het affectieve 
netwerk (ventrale striatum en insula) en het netwerk geassocieerd met de 
regulering van zelfzuchtige impulsen (ACC, DLPFC, zie figuur 9.2). Bovendien 
werd deze studie geïnspireerd door eerdere bevindingen dat wederkerigheid 
deels wordt ingegeven door individuele verschillen in de algemene tendens om 
de gevolgen voor anderen in acht te nemen (Sociale Waarde Oriëntatie: 
McClintock en Allison, 1989; De Dreu en Van Lange, 1995). 
In deze studie speelden volwassen deelnemers tussen de 18 en 22 jaar de 
tweede speler in het ontwikkelingsvertrouwensspel terwijl zij in een MRI-
scanner lagen. Zoals verwacht bleek uit onze gedragsresultaten dat de 
deelnemers vaker wederkerigheid vertoonden wanneer de andere speler een 
groot risico had genomen, wat aangeeft dat de deelnemers de gevolgen voor de 
andere spelers in acht namen. Uit de fMRI-analyses bleek dat de twee 
belangrijke gebieden van het sociale-breinnetwerk, de aMPFC en TPJ (Frith en 
Frith, 2003), verschillende functies hadden in wederkerig gedrag. In 
overeenstemming met eerdere studies was er meer activiteit in de aMPFC 
wanneer deelnemers voor zichzelf kozen vergeleken met wanneer zij deelden 
met de ander (Gallagher et al., 2002; Decety et al., 2004). Dit resultaat is in 
overeenstemming met de hypothese dat de aMPFC belangrijk is voor 
zelfgerichte processen (Northoff et al., 2006; Ochsner, 2008). In tegenstelling 
tot de aMPFC was de rechter TPJ niet gevoelig voor de aard van de keuze (alles 
houden of delen), maar wel voor de risicomanipulatie. Hieruit blijkt dat de 
rechter TPJ betrokken is bij het richten van aandacht op de uitkomsten voor de 
ander (Lamm et al., 2007).  
Verdere analyses toonden aan dat de activiteit in het affectieve netwerk 
gevoelig was voor individuele verschillen in sociale-waardeoriëntatie. De 
activiteit van het striatum was hoger voor wederkerige keuzes dan voor 
zelfzuchtige keuzes, maar dit gold alleen voor de prosociale deelnemers. Voor 
de deelnemers met een zelfzuchtige waardeoriëntatie bleek juist het 
tegenovergestelde patroon. Deze resultaten werden geïnterpreteerd in het kader 
van een recente neurowetenschappelijke theorie over sociale voorkeuren. Deze 
theorie stelt dat voor prosociale personen wederkerigheid als een beloning 
wordt gezien, en dat voor zelfzuchtige individuen het materiële gewin een 
hogere beloningswaarde heeft. Daarbij stelt deze theorie dat het nut van sociale 





Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft ontwikkelingsverschillen in de hersengebieden die 
betrokken zijn bij wederkerigheid en het innemen van het perspectief van de 
ander.  Om deze ontwikkelingsverschillen te toetsen, is er een studie gedaan met 
het onwikkelingsvertouwensspel met deelnemers tussen de 12 en 22 jaar. De 
deelnemers waren verdeeld in drie leeftijdsgroepen (12-14 jaar, 15-17 jaar en 
18-22 jaar), en speelden telkens de tweede speler in het 
onwikkelingsvertouwensspel terwijl zij in de MRI-scanner lagen.  
Uit de resultaten van deze studie bleek, net zoals in de eerdere 
gedragsstudie (hoofdstuk 2), dat naarmate de proefpersonen ouder werden zij 
gevoeliger waren voor het perspectief van de ander. Daarbij bleek ook dat deze 
aan leeftijd gerelateerde gevoeligheid voor het perspectief van de ander 
samenhing met een toename in activiteit in de linker TPJ. De activiteit in de 
aMPFC liet het tegenovergestelde patroon zien; deze was juist actiever voor de 
jongste deelnemers. Deze resultaten zijn consistent met eerdere bevindingen van 
ontwikkelingsstudies waaruit bleek dat kinderen en volwassenen wel hetzelfde 
netwerk van gebieden activeren, maar dat er een verschuiving is in activiteit 
binnen het netwerk van de aMPFC naar de TPJ (Wang et al., 2006; Pfeifer et 
al., 2007; Blakemore, 2008). Onze resultaten ondersteunen de hypothese dat 
deze verschuiving in de balans van aMPFC naar TPJ gerelateerd is aan een 
afname van zelf gericht denken en een toename in de aandacht voor de ander in 
sociale besluitvorming. 
Deze studie toonde ook aan dat de insula gevoelig was voor het schenden 
van persoonlijke normen. Echter, in tegenstelling tot de veranderingen in het 
sociale-breinnetwerk, toont de activiteit in deze gebieden geen 
ontwikkelingsverschillen. Dit lijkt aan te geven dat dit netwerk al op jongere 
leeftijd hetzelfde functioneert als bij volwassenen. Tot slot, vonden wij ook dat 
voor de oudste groep DLPFC-activiteit toenam als men vertrouwd werd door de 
ander, terwijl dit niet het geval was bij de jongere groepen. Deze toename was 
tevens gerelateerd aan toenemende gevoeligheid voor het perspectief van de 
ander. Gezien de eerder aangetoonde rol van de DLPFC in cognitieve controle 
(Miller & Cohen, 2001) en de regulatie van zelfzuchtige impulsen (Riling et al., 
2007), lijkt dit patroon van activiteit te wijzen op een betere regulatie van 
sociaal gedrag met toenemende leeftijd. 
 
In het volgende hoofdstuk (hoofdstuk 5) zijn de ontwikkelingsverschillen in de 
hersengebieden die betrokken zijn bij het beoordelen van eerlijkheid 
onderzocht. Dit onderzoek was geïnspireerd op eerdere gedragsstudies die lieten 
zien dat kinderen al op zeer jonge leeftijd gevoelig zijn voor eerlijkheid, maar 
ook dat er nog belangrijke ontwikkelingen zijn in de mate dat het perspectief 
van de ander in deze overwegingen een rol speelt (Sutter, 2007; Guroglu et al., 
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2009). Bijvoorbeeld, in een studie met het mini-ultimatumspel waren volwassen 
eerder geneigd om een oneerlijk aanbod te accepteren als de aanbieder hiervan 
geen andere keuze had, maar de jongste deelnemers (9 jaar) waren hier veel 
minder toe bereid. 
In de neuroimaging studie met het mini-ultimatumspel hebben wij de 
ontwikkelingsverschillen in de hersengebieden onderzocht van deelnemers 
tussen de 10 en 20 jaar oud. In overeenstemming met eerdere gedragsstudies, 
vonden wij dat deelnemers van alle leeftijden een oneerlijk aanbod vaker 
afwezen wanneer er ook een eerlijk alternatief was voor de aanbieder (Guth et 
al., 2008). Deze resultaten ondersteunen de hypothese dat een gevoel voor 
eerlijkheid zich al vroeg ontwikkelt (Fehr et al., 2008; Guroglu et al., 2009.). 
Echter, kinderen waren, vergeleken met volwassenen, vaker geneigd om een 
oneerlijk aanbod af te wijzen wanneer er geen alternatief was voor de aanbieder. 
Dit geeft aan dat pas op latere leeftijd het perspectief van de ander ook een 
belangrijke rol gaat spelen in deze eerlijkheidsoverwegingen. Uit de fMRI-
analyses bleek dat de activiteit in de TPJ in verband kon worden gebracht met 
de eerlijkheidsoverweging in het geval dat de aanbieder geen alternatieve keuze 
had. Daarbij bleek dat er voornamelijk verhoogde activiteit was in de TPJ 
wanneer dergelijke oneerlijke aanbiedingen werden afgewezen. Dit patroon van 
activiteit werd geïnterpreteerd als een mogelijke reflectie van schuldgevoel 
(Takahashi et al., 2004).  
De gedrags- en imaging-resultaten samen genomen geven aan dat er (1) een 
leeftijdsgerelateerde toename is in de gevoeligheid voor het perspectief van de 
ander en (2) dat deze toename samengaat me de toenemende rol van de TPJ in 
eerlijkheidsoverwegingen. Bovendien waren er nog twee resultaten die zeer 
overeenkomstig waren met de resultaten van Hoofdstuk 4: (1) dat de DLPFC 
een toenemende rol kreeg in de eerlijkheidsoverwegingen naarmate de 
deelnemers ouder werden en (2) dat de voor alle leeftijden de activiteit in insula 
gerelateerd was aan het overtreden van een sociale norm. In overeenstemming 
met de resultaten van het ontwikkelingsvertrouwensspel leveren deze 
bevindingen het bewijs voor; (1) een vroegtijdige ontwikkeling van het 
affectieve netwerk dat betrokken is bij de opsporing van normovertredingen, en 
(2) een geleidelijke toename in de betrokkenheid van gebieden die gerelateerd 
zijn aan het innemen van het perspectief van de ander (TPJ), en de regulering 
van sociaal gedrag (DLPFC).  
 
Het tweede deel van het proefschrift (Hoofdstukken 6 tot en met 8) is gericht op 
ontwikkelingsverschillen in het aanpassen van sociaal gedrag op basis van 
veranderingen in de omgeving. Het aanpassen van gedrag gebeurt vaak op basis 




en het vertoonde gedrag bevorderen, of negatief zijn en juist het vertoonde 
gedrag ontmoedigen en aangeven dat aanpassing van gedrag nodig is. In dit deel 
van het proefschrift is onderzocht hoe deze aanpassingsmechanismen werken en 
ontwikkelen in een sociale context en hoe de neurale mechanismen die 
betrokken zijn bij aanpassing van gedrag zich ontwikkelen. 
 
De studie beschreven in hoofdstuk 6 had twee doelstellingen: (1) het 
onderzoeken van de ontwikkeling van adaptief sociaal gedrag in een 
vertrouwensspel met meerdere rondes en (2) het onderzoeken van de 
ontwikkelingsverschillen in de emoties die werden opgeroepen door negatieve 
sociale terugkoppeling. Om de ontwikkelingen in aanpassing van sociaal gedrag 
te bestuderen hebben wij een vertrouwensspel ontwikkeld waarbij de spelers 
meerdere rondes met dezelfde persoon spelen. In totaal waren er drie 
verschillende medespelers met wie de deelnemers dit spel speelden. De 
deelnemers waren altijd de eerste speler en hadden de keuze om de ander een 
geldbedrag toe te vertrouwen. Terwijl de deelnemers dachten online met drie 
anderen het spel te spelen, waren de andere spelers voorgeprogrammeerd en 
vertoonden verschillende niveaus van betrouwbaarheid (laag, gemiddeld en 
hoog). De deelnemers kwamen uit drie leeftijdsgroepen tussen de 11 en 25 jaar. 
Uit de resultaten bleek dat volwassenen, vergeleken met kinderen, in het 
begin van het spel eerder geneigd waren om te beginnen de ander te vertrouwen. 
Met de tijd leerden alle deelnemers welke medespeler wel en welke niet te 
vertrouwen was. Toch waren er ook wel leeftijdsverschillen in 
aanpassingsgedrag; kinderen verschilden van de andere groepen doordat zij veel 
vaker negatieve wederkerigheid lieten zien. Dat wil zeggen dat zij gevoeliger 
waren voor het schaden van hun vertrouwen en daarna eerder geneigd waren de 
ander geen geld meer toe te vertouwen totdat deze goede wil had getoond (zelfs 
als uit de vele rondes daarvoor bleek dat de persoon zeer betrouwbaar was).  
Vervolgens hebben wij ook gekeken naar de emotionele reacties op het 
verbreken van vertrouwen en hoe deze emoties (in het bijzonder boosheid) 
motiveren om de ander te straffen voor zijn asociale gedrag. Zoals verwacht 
bleek uit onze analyse dat deelnemers van alle leeftijden het boost waren op de 
persoon die het vertrouwen het vaakst had beschadigd en dat die persoon ook 
het hardst werd gestraft. Ook lieten de resultaten zien dat de mate van boosheid 
afnam als de leeftijd toenam en dat de leeftijdsverschillen in mate van straffen 
gemedieerd werden door de mate van boosheid. Deze resultaten geven aan dat 
de leeftijdsgerelateerde toename in stabiliteit van vertrouwensrelaties mogelijk 
te danken is aan een afname in gevoeligheid voor negatieve wederkerigheid, 
mogelijk door een toenemend vermogen om negatieve emoties te reguleren. 
In hoofdstuk 7 zijn de ontwikkelingsverschillen onderzocht in de neurale 
Summary in Dutch 185
correlaten van positieve en negatieve feedbackverwerking. Deze studie was 
gebaseerd op een aantal eerdere studies die ontwikkelingsveranderingen 
aantoonden in de neurale mechanismen die ten grondslag liggen aan adaptief 
leren (Crone et al., 2008; Van Duivenvoorde et al., 2008.). Deze studie was er 
op gericht om te testen of deze ontwikkelingsveranderingen in 
feedbackverwerking gerelateerd zijn aan de valentie (positief of negatief) of de 
informatieve waarde (gedrag veranderen of niet) van feedback. Gezonde 
vrijwilligers tussen de leeftijd van 8 en 22 jaar oud namen deel aan deze studie. 
Voor dit onderzoek werd er een kindvriendelijke probabilistische leertaak 
ontwikkeld. Tijdens deze taak werden iedere keer twee paren van twee plaatjes 
getoond (het AB en het CD paar). De deelnemers moesten telkens een van de 
twee plaatjes uitkiezen. Vervolgens kregen de deelnemers positieve of negatieve 
feedback op hun keuze. In het begin wisten de deelnemers nog niets over de 
plaatjes maar gedurende het experiment leerden de deelnemers welke plaatjes 
de grootste kans hadden op positieve feedback (A en C, 80 en 70%) of 
negatieve feedback (B en D, 20 en 30%). 
Uit de gedragsanalyses bleek dat alle deelnemers leerden om de juiste regel 
(plaatjes A en C) vaker te kiezen dan de alternatieve regel (plaatjes B en D). Na 
ongeveer 40 rondes werd het gedragspatroon van de deelnemers consistent. 
Hoewel de kinderen even snel leerden welke plaatjes de goede waren, bleken er 
wel leeftijdsverschillen te zitten in de keuzestrategieën. Uit de sequentiële 
analyses bleek dat de kinderen een minder optimale strategie toepasten na het 
krijgen van negatieve feedback. Uit de fMRI-analyses bleek dat deze 
leeftijdsgerelateerde verschillen in strategie gepaard gingen met veranderingen 
in hersenactiviteit. 
Alle deelnemers, ongeacht leeftijd, vertoonden verhoogde activiteit in de 
DLPFC wanneer zij de alternatieve regel kozen. Echter, kinderen vertoonden 
meer activiteit in de DLPFC na positieve feedback bij het kiezen van de 
alternatieve regel en volwassenen vertoonden juist meer activiteit in de DLPFC 
na negatieve feedback. In overeenstemming met eerdere studies wijzen deze 
ontwikkelingsverschillen op een verschuiving van een focus op positieve naar 
een focus op negatieve feedback (Crone et al., 2008; Van Duivenvoorde et al., 
2008; Somsen, 2007). Tevens laten deze bevindingen zien dat de 
ontwikkelingsverschillen in de neurale reacties op feedback geen verband 
houden met valentie per se, maar ook afhankelijk zijn van de informatieve 
waarde van de feedbacksignalen.  
 
De studie in hoofdstuk 8 beschrijft additionele analyses op de data van het 
experiment beschreven in hoofdstuk 7. Deze analyses maakten gebruik van een 




mechanismen die betrokken zijn bij leren nader te onderzoeken. De gedragsdata 
werden geanalyseerd door middel van een reinforcement learning model (Sutton 
& Barto, 1999) met verschillende leerparameters voor positieve en negatieve 
feedback (Kahnt et al., 2009). Een reinforcement learning model is een 
computationeel model dat ervan uitgaat dat tijdens het leren de verwachte 
uitkomst van een keuze telkens wordt aangepast op basis van de feedback. Deze 
aanpassing van de verwachting gaat middels een leersignaal; de prediction error 
of voorspellingsfout. Dit signaal kan klein of groot, positief of negatief zijn, 
naarmate de inschatting van de proefpersoon te laag of te hoog was vergeleken 
met de werkelijke uitkomst. De leerparameters in het model bepalen vervolgens 
in welke mate de voorspellingsfout wordt gebruikt om de verwachte waarde van 
een keuze aan te passen. Als de leerparameter groot is betekent dat, dat een 
persoon zijn verwachtingen telkens in grote mate aanpast wanneer deze 
uitkomst anders was dan verwacht. Is deze zeer klein dan zal deze persoon zijn 
verwachtingen en dus ook zijn gedrag niet snel veranderen op basis van de 
signalen uit de omgeving.  
Uit de gedragsanalyses bleek dat met toenemende leeftijd een daling 
plaatsvindt in de leerparameter voor negatieve feedback. Deze bevinding geeft 
aan dat, met toenemende leeftijd, de impact van de negatieve feedback op de 
toekomstige verwachte waarde daalt. De individueel geschatte 
voorspellingsfouten en leerparameters, gegenereerd door het computationele 
model, zijn vervolgens gebruikt om ontwikkelingsverschillen in neurale 
processen nader te onderzoeken.  
Uit de fMRI-analyses bleek dat, in overeenstemming met eerdere studies, 
de voorspellingsfouten correleerden met de activiteit in het ventrale striatum 
(Pagnoni et al., 2002; McClure et al., 2003; O'Doherty et al., 2003; Cohen & 
Ranganath, 2005). De analyses toonden ook aan dat er geen 
leeftijdsgerelateerde verschillen zijn in neurale representatie van de 
voorspellingsfouten. Daarentegen waren er wel leeftijdsgerelateerde verschillen 
in de functionele connectiviteit, oftewel in de synchronisatie van activiteit, 
tussen het striatum en de VMPFC. Het patroon liet een verschuiving zien van 
sterkere connectiviteit na negatieve feedback voor de jongste deelnemers tot 
sterkere connectiviteit na positieve feedback voor de oudste deelnemers. Deze 
bevindingen suggereren dat veranderingen in de ontwikkeling van adaptief 
gedrag niet te wijten zijn aan verschillen in de berekening van het leersignaal, 
maar veroorzaakt worden door verschillen in de manier waarop het leersignaal 
vervolgens wordt gebruikt om toekomstig gedrag aan te passen. 
 
Conclusie  
Dit proefschrift beschrijft een reeks van studies die gebaseerd zijn op onderzoek 
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in de ontwikkelings-, sociale en cognitieve psychologie in combinatie met 
onderzoek uit de  experimentele economie en de neurowetenschappen. Deze 
collectie van de studies biedt een uitgebreid en multidisciplinair perspectief op 
de ontwikkeling van prosociaal gedrag. De toepassing van economische spellen 
leverde nieuwe gedragsresultaten, en ondersteuning voor de hypothese dat 
ontwikkelingsveranderingen in sociaal gedrag zijn gerelateerd aan 
veranderingen van de verschillende neurale netwerken. De belangrijkste 
bevinden worden hieronder nog een keer kort op een rijtje gezet. 
 
Kinderspel – Spelen als methode voor onderzoek naar sociale ontwikkeling 
De eerste belangrijke bevinding is dat de twee economische spellen, het 
vertrouwens- en het ultimatumspel, de gedragsveranderingen in sociaal gedrag 
tijdens de adolescentie,  zoals beschreven in de literatuur goed konden 
repliceren (Güroğlu et al., 2009; van den Bos et al., 2010). Daarbij hebben de 
resultaten van de studies met de economische spellen ook nieuwe inzichten 
opgeleverd. Bijvoorbeeld, dat na midden-adolescentie gedrag niet per se meer 
sociaal wordt maar eerder meer context afhankelijk. Dit kan leiden tot meer 
prosociaal gedrag in de ene situatie, maar minder in de andere. Uit de analyses 
van het spel met meerdere interacties is gebleken dat kinderen vooral gevoeliger 
zijn voor schendingen van vertrouwen, maar op eenzelfde manier reageren op 
wederkerigheid. Dit zijn beiden voorbeelden van hoe de economische spellen 
kunnen onthullen hoe de ontwikkelingsverschillen in sociaal gedrag in 
ontwikkeling afhankelijk zijn van de context waarin zij plaatsvinden. In 
toekomstige studies kunnen deze spellen verder bijdragen aan gestructureerd 
onderzoek naar prosociaal gedrag van kinderen, adolescenten en volwassenen. 
Deze studies hebben laten zien dat de economische spellen nuttige uitbreidingen 
zijn van onderzoekers’ instrumenten voor experimenteel onderzoek. 
  
Veranderende hersenen, veranderende perspectieven 
De analyses van het sociale-brein netwerk hebben twee verschillende 
ontwikkelingspatronen voor de aMPFC en TPJ geïdentificeerd. De aMPFC 
toont een patroon van lokale specialisatie, dat wil zeggen in de vroege 
adolescentie is dit gebied actief voor zowel wederkerige en zelfzuchtige keuzes, 
terwijl het vanaf midden-adolescentie allen activiteit vertoont bij zelfzuchtige 
keuzes. De TPJ wordt juist geleidelijk aan steeds meer betrokken bij het keuze 
proces, en deze ontwikkeling gaat door tot jong-volwassenheid. Deze resultaten 
suggereren dat de veranderingen in prosociaal gedrag het resultaat zijn van 
ontwikkelingen in twee afzonderlijke processen; (1) een vroege daling in zelf-






De regulering van sociaal gedrag 
De studies in dit proefschrift hebben ook aangegeven dat er belangrijke 
ontwikkelingsveranderingen plaatsvinden in het regulatie netwerk, de DLPFC 
in het bijzonder. De studie met het vertrouwensspel toonde aan dat met 
toenemende leeftijd de DLPFC geleidelijk meer betrokken wordt in het 
besluitvormingsproces, en dat vanaf midden adolescentie er een sterke relatie is 
tussen DLPFC activiteit en de mate van prosociaal gedrag. Bovendien, de 
gegevens van beide sociale interactie studies geven aan dat de DLPFC zich 
bezighoudt met situaties waarin de deelnemers extra controle moeten 
uitoefenen. Deze resultaten ondersteunen de theoretische modellen die 
vooronderstellen dat de toenemende capaciteit voor zelfregulering een zeer 
belangrijke rol speelt in de ontwikkeling van sociaal gedrag (Steinberg, 2009).  
 
Normovertredingen  
Ten slotte, uit de sociale interactie studies bleek dat alle deelnemers, 
onafhankelijk van de leeftijd, gevoelig zijn voor schendingen van sociale 
normen ten aanzien van eerlijkheid en wederkerigheid. Dit kwam tot uiting in 
de vroege rijping van het patroon van activiteit in de bilaterale anterior insula, 
en door het gedrag in de spellen (bijv. afwijzing van onrechtvaardigheid en de 
hoge mate van wederkerigheid). Deze resultaten suggereren dat kennis van deze 
sociale normen al aanwezig is bij het begin van de adolescentie. Deze resultaten 
sluiten aan bij recente studies die laten zien dat het gevoel van eerlijkheid al op 
zeer jonge leeftijd aanwezig is (bijvoorbeeld Fehr et al., 2008). Het is 
interessant om te zien dat er tijdens de ontwikkeling, naast de verschillen in het 




De imaging studies hebben asynchrone ontwikkelingspatronen aangetoond in 
het netwerk van de 'sociale brein'. De resultaten toonden een snellere rijping van 
de aMPFC, maar late rijping van de TPJ. Daarnaast toonde de resultaten een 
grotere betrokkenheid van het regulerende netwerk (DLPFC), en een vroege 
rijping van het affectieve netwerk dat betrokken is bij normovertredingen. Deze 
studies hebben bijgedragen aan een dieper inzicht in de processen die ten 
grondslag liggen aan de sociale ontwikkeling tijdens de adolescentie. De 
uitdaging voor toekomstige studies is om een model te ontwikkelen om de 
resultaten van studies naar structurele en functionele hersenontwikkeling te 
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